> On 25 Jun 2019, at 21:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/25/2019 9:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 19:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/24/2019 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> That sounds a bit observer dependent. >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of >>>>>> arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. >>>>>> An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of >>>>>> the self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p). >>>>>> >>>>> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same >>>>> physical world. >>>> >>>> It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we >>>> get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics. >>> >>> How exactly "the same". Can you show that the observed physics is the >>> only possible physics? >> >> >> Yes. Compare the physics in the head of the universal machine with the >> observation. What we see, if it is does not belong to that machine’s >> internal physics, but is consistent with it, > > OK. Is what's in the head of the universal machine consistent with there > being three families of fermions? Is it consistent with the Standard Model? > Is it consistent with conservation of energy-momentum? See, the problem is > that you have no way saying what is or isn't in the head of the universal > machine...so almost anything may be consistent.
Consistency is cheap, but we require the arithmetical soundness assumption, which is much stronger. The rest are interesting open problem, a bit premature as we don’t even have any particles yet. The point is that we have no choice, here. To invoke an ontology will not help. Keep in mind that physicalism does not work with mechanism. That has been proven, but the persistence of the mind-body problem since long is by itself an illustration of the failure of physicalism to solve the mind-body problem. Then we get the quantum logic, which is, Imo, hardly a coincidence. Physics explains the fermions, but physicalism prevents consciousness to have any access on them without using non-computationalist assumption. That is the problem (not for physicists, but for physicalist). > > >> can be defined as the local geography-history (indexically contingent, and >> usually treated with the diamond in the modes. >> >> If there is a contradiction between the machine’s physics and the >> observation, then mechanism is false, or we are in a malevolent simulation. >> >> >> >> >>> >>>> >>>> Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the >>>> physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the >>>> change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.). >>>> >>>> Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe, >>> >>> I don't see that explanation? >> >> I might ask what you miss in the UDA, which shows that physics is reduced to >> an indexical statistics > > It doesn't "show" that, It does. You have to refute the argument. Which step would be wrong? > it hypothesizes that it must be so. It's like hypothesizing God. But it does not hypothesize more than elementary arithmetic, and digital mechanism. > Is God consistent with human suffering? He must be, otherwise the hypothesis > is false. No problem with this, but I don’t see any relation with the fact that UDA enforce the existence of a reduction of physics to arithmetic, making mechanism testable. If some fermlons will be lacking, prove it, then the evidences for those fermions will be evidences against Digital Mechanism. Without doing this, you are the one speculating on future results to keep your own physicalist god alive (Matter). > >> on all relative computations ((aka sigma_1 sentences, by a normal form >> theorem of Kleene, and some subtleties about G* and Z*). >> >> Then what are you missing in AUDA (the arithmetical translation of UDA in >> arithmetic). The main things have been found by Goödel, Löb, Feferman, >> Friedman, Boolos, Goldblatt, up to Solvay’s1976 theorem: the discovery of G >> and G*. >> >> The probability (a credibility or plausibility, actually) one is given, for >> the observable, by the logic of []p & <>t. I justify this by thought >> experience, Kripke semantics, and the bastard calculus in Timeaeus and >> Plotinus (and got evidence that Moderatus got it already from its >> interpretation of the Parmenides). >> >> >> >>> Why is not each person is a different universe, as they are in different >>> dreams. >> >> I am not sure I understand the question. Each person is supported by an >> infinity of computations, and they diverge, a bit like the W vs M divergence >> in the self-duplication, except that it is a continuous transformation of >> some sort. The person $are* in different dream/computations, but some type >> of dream are sharable > > But some types are not. So why are we in a sharable one? Because they have to win the relative measure competition if mechanism is correct. I agree that if mechanism leads to solipsism, that is as good as any absurdity to refute Digital Mechanism. But you cannot speculate on this; the whole point is that we have to do the math and the experimental testing. > Are you hypothesizing the there are other people who are only in unsharable > dreams? It seems you are invoking the "might theory is consistent with > everything" rule. No, if the []p & <>t (& p) modes works, all universal machine have both sharable and unsharable “dreams”. That it works or not is a matter of investigation, not speculation. > >> and long histories develops, in the limit of all first person experience >> (due to the invariance of consciousness for the arithmetical delays in the >> stepping of the universal dovetailer). >> >> Finding the propositional modes of self-reference explains why we have >> bodies, soul and qualia, and why we are conscious, and why we are in front >> of the … unknown. > > Only in some idiosyncratic meaning of "explain”. If you feel that it does not explain, ask question. Try to make explicit what is missed in the explanation. I have already explained what physicalism missed, and miss necessarily when we assume Mechanism. I present reasoning and facts? I do NOT do “philosophy”; other that the one which, when assuming Mechanism, is also science. > >> But to progress, we need to progress also in the quantified modal logic of >> provability, and to better extracts Quantum Logic, etc. >> >> It might not work. The fact is that it works up to now, > > It does no work up to now. Physicalism is arguably not working. Why makes you saying that Mechanism does not work. Negative comments must be specific, or they looks like … not serious. > It is just sufficiently expansive that no contradiction is apparent. ? Bruno > > Brent > >> and is the only precise and testable theory addressing the Mind-Body >> problem, to my knowledge. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>>> and why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than >>>> physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non >>>> sharable qualia. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/40792d73-e1bf-b0d2-de47-434be6bd6fce%40verizon.net >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/40792d73-e1bf-b0d2-de47-434be6bd6fce%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/25AF6181-C364-43FB-84A8-838117CFA816%40ulb.ac.be >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/25AF6181-C364-43FB-84A8-838117CFA816%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c0a8c3d2-f8ce-d547-57ee-ee6905df7bb5%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c0a8c3d2-f8ce-d547-57ee-ee6905df7bb5%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/669AE6B4-A591-4153-BC87-1B6AE3BA2D73%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/669AE6B4-A591-4153-BC87-1B6AE3BA2D73%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2c2e0bf4-dfc8-9cd9-f459-7573a9f347f9%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2c2e0bf4-dfc8-9cd9-f459-7573a9f347f9%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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