> On 25 Jun 2019, at 20:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > The universal machine provides an account of its > body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to > some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). > > I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very notion > of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even reducible (by > the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable. > > With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as > long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. > > From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the > universal machine discourses and phenomenologies. > > We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively recently, > 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they are docile > slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that they aren’t. > > Bruno > > > > > The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just as > we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) we > think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties (qualia, > phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, selfness, …).
Of course we have already agree to disagree on this. I mean, I do not assume the physical reality, and with mechanism, things like mass, charge .. have to be explained from G*, qG* (number theology, as I call it). > > Modal provability mathematics relates to them - experiential semantics - as > being a (possible) denotational semantics counterpoint. That seems nice, but if that work, that would be a reason more to distinguish “pan” (in oanpsychism) from anything physical, given that the modal provability logic are consequence of arithmetic (without further assumption). Bruno > > @philipthrift > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/90774097-e5ba-4aea-9650-2cb05704c0ee%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/90774097-e5ba-4aea-9650-2cb05704c0ee%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A6ECC1AB-E2CD-425B-AD4D-E71DC36D13AA%40ulb.ac.be.
