On Tuesday, June 25, 2019 at 10:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > The universal machine provides an account of its > body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to > some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). > > I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very > notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even > reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable. > > With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as > long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. > > From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the > universal machine discourses and phenomenologies. > > We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively > recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they > are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that > they aren’t. > > Bruno > >
The "psychical body" is just the fundamental panpsychic assumption: Just as we think things have physical properties (mass, charge, polarity, ...) we think those same things have psychical (or experiential) properties (qualia, phenomenologicals like colors, taste, freedom, happiness, selfness, ...). Modal provability mathematics relates to them - *experiential semantics* - as being a (possible) *denotational semantics *counterpoint. @philipthrift > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/90774097-e5ba-4aea-9650-2cb05704c0ee%40googlegroups.com.
