On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 4:13:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>
> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
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>
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> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>  That sounds a bit observer dependent.
>
> Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of 
> arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. An 
> observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the 
> self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p).
>
> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same 
> physical world.
>
>
> It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we 
> get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics.
>
> Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the 
> physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the 
> change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.).
>
> Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe, and 
> why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than 
> physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non 
> sharable qualia.
>
> Bruno
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>
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>
 
That every "universal machine/number" has "the same physics" would be 
consistent with materialism: There is just matter (that's all the cosmos 
is), and it's the matter that ever was or will be.


"Materialism is a philosophical perspective according to which all that 
occurs or exists has its origin and cause in matter and its 
transformations."
- 
https://www.academia.edu/38046481/A_Survey_of_Materialism_in_Thought_and_Communication

@philipthrift

 

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