> On 11 Jul 2019, at 14:23, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 8:40 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > > <[email protected] > > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > > > > > > > On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = > >> xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave some > >> posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me. > > > > Which in it self is a reductio of your theory. > > Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given > (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then > SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology > applicable to it. > > Come now. That is just the cat=dog argument for which I have often criticised > you. You take a superficial resemblance between two things and claim identity.
Not identity, but equivalence. Conscience is a general term, like cat and dog are both quadrupeds mammals. You are criticising the axiomatic method. I certainly do not identify the many consciousness possible, as numerous as possible persons, human or not, and in fact, the works shows the existence of very variate forms of consciousness. It is not because both dog and cat are quadrupeds mammals that Dog = Cat. But if you are OK that consciousness is characterised by the quasi axiomatic I give, then all universal machine can be said to be conscious, and the Löbian machine can be said to be self-conscious. > Very poor logic, I must say. It is called the axiomatic method, and it is the jewel brought by modern logic. The idea is to characterise things by searching some principles on which we agree about those things, letting open that we might later add incompatible proposition to gives different examples of the thing, like we could add “barking” to "quadruplet mammals” if we want distinguish dog from cat. Since Gödel we have good reason for doing that, because we know that all concepts “rich enough” cannot be defined at all, but can be characterised by first order logical axiomatic system, or by definition *in* such system. We can’t do better a priori, unless we are gods or something non Turing emulable. All theories about computer programs are essentially undecidable, and most concept there are not univocally definable: you need to add non computable set of postulates to characterise them univocally, which of course cannot be done. > "True, knowable, non-provable, definable without invoking truth" is but a > poor definition of consciousness, That is an opinion, and I have no clue why you say this. Keep in mind that we have already precise mathematical definition of truth (for the simple Löbian machine), provable, knowable, non-definable, and that all what <I say makes sense thanks to the theorems of Gödel 1931, and Löb 1955, and Solovay 1976 (on G and G*). > even if it may be a property of your feeble combinators. Feeble? Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRwEn42sDr7DfakkQfQ5h-2DqbhxBZUQjpv_-v3SkesJw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRwEn42sDr7DfakkQfQ5h-2DqbhxBZUQjpv_-v3SkesJw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/85919B11-6677-4547-A9A1-EDB1ABE06B35%40ulb.ac.be.
