> On 12 Jul 2019, at 03:12, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 11:09 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > On 11 Jul 2019, at 14:23, Bruce Kellett <bhkellet...@gmail.com > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 8:40 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be >> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: >> >> > On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> > <everything-list@googlegroups.com >> > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote: >> > >> > >> > >> > On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = >> >> xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave some >> >> posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me. >> > >> > Which in it self is a reductio of your theory. >> >> Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given >> (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then >> SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology >> applicable to it. >> >> Come now. That is just the cat=dog argument for which I have often >> criticised you. You take a superficial resemblance between two things and >> claim identity. > > > Not identity, but equivalence. > > Is not identity an equivalence relationship? You are chopping logic.
Identity is an equivalence, but equivalence is not an identity. You are confusing p -> q and q -> p. > > Conscience is a general term, like cat and dog are both quadrupeds mammals. > You are criticising the axiomatic method. > > Science is not axiomatic. Of course. But it can use the axiomatic method. > > I certainly do not identify the many consciousness possible, as numerous as > possible persons, human or not, and in fact, the works shows the existence of > very variate forms of consciousness. > > It is not because both dog and cat are quadrupeds mammals that Dog = Cat. > > No, one can point to many more dissimilarities than there are similarities. > So your attempt at equivalence or identity between your pathetically > inadequate definition of consciousness and your combinator logic fails at > every level. Where? Specifically. (But your use of “pathetically” suggest me that you have not yet studied the subject, and that your agenda is just a destructive one, you don’t seem interested in the problem). > In other words, you have not 'explained' consciousness -- you are not even > talking about consciousness as usually understood. Can you explain what is missing? Or if you know a better theory (than Mechanism). I have only precise definition and theorem. You can always cricicze definitions, but then provide better one please. The definition given here justify why ([]p & <>t & p) describe qualia, and why we recover quanta from the wearability of some type of qualia among different universal machine. I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny mockery in violent hate and defamation). Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain it here. > > But if you are OK that consciousness is characterised by the quasi axiomatic > I give, then all universal machine can be said to be conscious, and the > Löbian machine can be said to be self-conscious. > > I reject your definition of consciousness as totally inadequate. As Brent > points out, it does not even begin to cover important aspects of > consciousness, such as awareness of an environment. Not only it explains awareness of an environment, but it explains why that the observable with respect of that environment obeys quantum logic (formally), and even more simply, why the universal machine executed in arithmetic discover soon or later the “many-worlds” appearances. Also, physics fails on this. It miss awareness, and use a brain-mind identity thesis which is incompatible with Mechanism to link the experimental evidence with the first person view. And that is obvious with mechanism, but well known by the expert, even without Mechanism. It is called the mind-body problem. > >> Very poor logic, I must say. > > It is called the axiomatic method, and it is the jewel brought by modern > logic. The idea is to characterise things by searching some principles on > which we agree about those things, letting open that we might later add > incompatible proposition to gives different examples of the thing, like we > could add “barking” to "quadruplet mammals” if we want distinguish dog from > cat. > > And we could add "interacting with an environment", or "capable of autonomous > action", or "can pass a Turing Test" to the list of characteristics of > consciousness. None of these additional features are satisfied by your > combinators, Do you have a proof of this? > so your equivalence relationship is far from being satisfied. > > > Since Gödel we have good reason for doing that, because we know that all > concepts “rich enough” cannot be defined at all, but can be characterised by > first order logical axiomatic system, or by definition *in* such system. We > can’t do better a priori, unless we are gods or something non Turing > emulable. All theories about computer programs are essentially undecidable, > and most concept there are not univocally definable: you need to add non > computable set of postulates to characterise them univocally, which of course > cannot be done. > >> "True, knowable, non-provable, definable without invoking truth" is but a >> poor definition of consciousness, > That is an opinion, and I have no clue why you say this. > > That would suggest that you don't know what consciousness is. Can you provide arguments or give specific counter-examples. It looks like you are speculating on negative possible failures. That can be done with any theory. > > Keep in mind that we have already precise mathematical definition of truth > (for the simple Löbian machine), provable, knowable, non-definable, and that > all what <I say makes sense thanks to the theorems of Gödel 1931, and Löb > 1955, and Solovay 1976 (on G and G*). > > What has 'truth' got to do with it? It has to do with the fact that for a conscious entity, that consciousnesss is lived as a truth. It means that consciousness is a semantical notion. You can relate it with another definition of consciousness that I have given; the knowledge (true belief) in a reality. This use Gödel’s completeness theorem: a theory is consistent if and only if the theory has a model. > Is an axiom conscious? An axiome alone, certainly not. But an axiom together with inference rule and a model: it can be. > >> even if it may be a property of your feeble combinators > Feeble? > > Yes, feeble. You put your combinators and a logic text into a room and shut > the door. They couldn't even report back the colour of the wallpaper, much > less initiate any autonomous action, or pass a Turing test. You are assuming here that Digital Mechanism is false, In that case, my theorem remains valid, even if the conclusion does no more apply. But I am not interested in discussing truth of falsity of theories, prefer to derive experimental means to test the theories. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRPshfFByAsJHw5WcVNJ0sB%2BW6h-ZorC-%3Dj-mA-w9j5rQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRPshfFByAsJHw5WcVNJ0sB%2BW6h-ZorC-%3Dj-mA-w9j5rQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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