On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 4:23 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> On 7/26/2019 2:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:44 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> For example, you could, over time, change neuron by neuron, until you
>> looked like and had the mind of Julius Caesar.
>>
>>
>> I think these thought experiments need to be more carefully considered.
>> I don't think it is nomologically possible to give you the mind of Julius
>> Caesar by transferring on neuron at a time.  That would entail intermediate
>> stages in which neurons were connected neither as yours were nor as
>> Caesar's were, and less obviously the same goes for the connections of the
>> body cells.  It is too cheap to just say "at the appropriate substitution
>> level".
>>
>
> It's a given that the intermediate stages are neither like you nor like
> Caesar. But if you can remain conscious/alive during the process, then
> "what happened to you", "did you die in the transformation?", etc.
>
> Jason
>
>
> *But if **you** can remain conscious/alive during the process, then "what
> happened to you", "did you die in the transformation?", etc. *
>
> But *you* obviously can't.
>

Either you is defined strictly or loosely. If strictly *you is* limited to
a observer moment. If loosely, such that two different observer moments can
be identified as belonging to the same *you*, then what possible system of
definitions can keep this definition of you from exploding out across the
continuum of like persons until it includes everyone?

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjyTLeDWZEY7mtoeZxt6THAhWQuV_U1jAhYUcMfg9ZmvA%40mail.gmail.com.

Reply via email to