> On 27 Jul 2019, at 01:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 7/26/2019 3:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 4:23 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> >> >> On 7/26/2019 2:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:44 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> For example, you could, over time, change neuron by neuron, until you >>>> looked like and had the mind of Julius Caesar. >>> >>> I think these thought experiments need to be more carefully considered. I >>> don't think it is nomologically possible to give you the mind of Julius >>> Caesar by transferring on neuron at a time. That would entail intermediate >>> stages in which neurons were connected neither as yours were nor as >>> Caesar's were, and less obviously the same goes for the connections of the >>> body cells. It is too cheap to just say "at the appropriate substitution >>> level". >>> >>> It's a given that the intermediate stages are neither like you nor like >>> Caesar. But if you can remain conscious/alive during the process, then >>> "what happened to you", "did you die in the transformation?", etc. >>> >>> Jason >> >> But if you can remain conscious/alive during the process, then "what >> happened to you", "did you die in the transformation?", etc. >> >> But you obviously can't. >> >> Either you is defined strictly or loosely. If strictly you is limited to a >> observer moment. If loosely, such that two different observer moments can be >> identified as belonging to the same you, then what possible system of >> definitions can keep this definition of you from exploding out across the >> continuum of like persons until it includes everyone? > > There's a third choice. Define "you" by continuity of your body.
That is the natural insight. That is exactly what the ([]p & p), and ([]p & <>t & p) do, and why the machine is a priori non mechanist, and can’t believe in Mechanism unless some leap of faith. Eventually, that “continuity” is part of the reconstruction of the notion of matter, and is part of the derivation of physics from the material modes. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06cfbd26-c5b5-8eaf-3e24-2372d37434c8%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/06cfbd26-c5b5-8eaf-3e24-2372d37434c8%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7FF96A4E-D027-4BD0-92E2-A9C1127B5101%40ulb.ac.be.
