On 7/26/2019 3:59 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 4:23 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



    On 7/26/2019 2:10 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


    On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 12:44 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
    List <[email protected]
    <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:



        On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:42 PM Jason Resch
        <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
        For example, you could, over time, change neuron by neuron,
until you looked like and had the mind of Julius Caesar.

        I think these thought experiments need to be more carefully
        considered.  I don't think it is nomologically possible to
        give you the mind of Julius Caesar by transferring on neuron
        at a time.  That would entail intermediate stages in which
        neurons were connected neither as yours were nor as Caesar's
        were, and less obviously the same goes for the connections of
        the body cells.  It is too cheap to just say "at the
        appropriate substitution level".


    It's a given that the intermediate stages are neither like you
    nor like Caesar. But if you can remain conscious/alive during the
    process, then "what happened to you", "did you die in the
    transformation?", etc.

    Jason

    /But if //*you*//can remain conscious/alive during the process,
    then "what happened to you", "did you die in the transformation?",
    etc. //
    /
    But /*you*/ obviously can't.


Either you is defined strictly or loosely. If strictly *you is* limited to a observer moment. If loosely, such that two different observer moments can be identified as belonging to the same *you*, then what possible system of definitions can keep this definition of you from exploding out across the continuum of like persons until it includes everyone?

There's a third choice.  Define "you" by continuity of your body.

Brent

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