On Thursday, July 25, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:44 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Monday, July 22, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 2:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 11:50, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 7/22/2019 1:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be >>>>>> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, >>>>>> questions >>>>>> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed >>>>>> out >>>>>> several times. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in >>>>> these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But what if, as seems likely to me, it is theoretically impossible to >>>>> copy a brain to a level that it undetectable, i.e. it will necessarily be >>>>> possible to distinguish physical differences. Now these differences may >>>>> not matter to consciousness, or they may imply only a brief glitch at the >>>>> conscious/classical level, but we know from Holevo's theorem that the >>>>> duplicate can't be known to be in the same state. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I feel that I am the same person today as yesterday because I am pretty >>>> close to the person I was yesterday, even though if you were to look at me >>>> in enough detail, even using simple tests and instruments, I am quite >>>> different today. It seems unreasonable to insist that a copy of a person >>>> must be closer to the original than the "copying" that occurs in everyday >>>> life. >>>> >>> >>> Dealing with this particular worry is one of the strengths of Nozick's >>> 'closest continuer' theory. >>> >> >> >> Closest continuer theory is the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of personal >> identity theory. A stop gap to preserve common sense notions in light of >> paradoxes that imply the old way if thinking is untenable. >> >> As with quantum mechanics, common sense personal identity theories are >> forced to either abandon any connection linking observer moments (like the >> zero universe interpretation) or to a universalism that links all observers >> to a single person (like many worlds). >> > > ????? > Could you clarify your question? > > >> Personal identity theories based on psychological or bodily continuity >> can always be shown to break down, either by holding the body the same and >> changing the psyche, or holding the psyche the same and changing the body. >> > > How would one do that when psychological states are clearly closely > correlated with physical (brain) states? > > > Bodily continuity is same physical body without discontinuities. A bit like closest continuer theory. But there's no limit to how radically you could alter that body over time. This is where things like ageing, amnesia, memory loss, differentiation of twins, etc. come into play. For example, you could, over time, change neuron by neuron, until you looked like and had the mind of Julius Caesar. But under this continuity of the body your psyche, as you know it, has completely disappeared. Continuity of the psyche preserves your mind, but is discontinuous in physical instantiation. This is where you have transporters, duplicators, mind simulation, substitution of brain regions, etc. > > Personal identity is multifactorial: it is not just psychological > continuity or just physical continuity, but a combination of those and > other factors. > > What are those factors? If personal identity requires bodily continuity you get closest continuer theory. If it's psychological continuity you get functionalism. If it's both you get identity only of single thought moments, if it's neither you get universalism. Personal identity theories, should enable one to answer for any situation: "what experiences belong to you?" Consider some edge cases: - split brains - amoeba-like splits (e.g identical twins) - fusion of previously split brain hemispheres - transportation - duplication - transportation with errors - memory erasure - memory swapping - morphing to another person (with nanotechnology) - two people morphing into each other If the theory of personal identity can't deal with those cases it's incomplete, if not inconsistent. Jason > Bruce > > >> >> "Oneself: the logic of experience" by Arnold Zuboff is a good >> introduction to the reasoning. Many thinkers, including Shrodinger, Dyson, >> and Hoyle reached the same conclusion. >> >> Jason >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/ > msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRPiS6UqTq%3DCE2KfdeSzYUPVjghXzXMcq7O6EAw > _b7DKg%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRPiS6UqTq%3DCE2KfdeSzYUPVjghXzXMcq7O6EAw_b7DKg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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