On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:44 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Monday, July 22, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 2:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 11:50, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 7/22/2019 1:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be >>>>> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, >>>>> questions >>>>> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been pointed >>>>> out >>>>> several times. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption in >>>> these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. >>>> >>>> >>>> But what if, as seems likely to me, it is theoretically impossible to >>>> copy a brain to a level that it undetectable, i.e. it will necessarily be >>>> possible to distinguish physical differences. Now these differences may >>>> not matter to consciousness, or they may imply only a brief glitch at the >>>> conscious/classical level, but we know from Holevo's theorem that the >>>> duplicate can't be known to be in the same state. >>>> >>> >>> I feel that I am the same person today as yesterday because I am pretty >>> close to the person I was yesterday, even though if you were to look at me >>> in enough detail, even using simple tests and instruments, I am quite >>> different today. It seems unreasonable to insist that a copy of a person >>> must be closer to the original than the "copying" that occurs in everyday >>> life. >>> >> >> Dealing with this particular worry is one of the strengths of Nozick's >> 'closest continuer' theory. >> > > > Closest continuer theory is the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of personal > identity theory. A stop gap to preserve common sense notions in light of > paradoxes that imply the old way if thinking is untenable. > > As with quantum mechanics, common sense personal identity theories are > forced to either abandon any connection linking observer moments (like the > zero universe interpretation) or to a universalism that links all observers > to a single person (like many worlds). > ????? > Personal identity theories based on psychological or bodily continuity can > always be shown to break down, either by holding the body the same and > changing the psyche, or holding the psyche the same and changing the body. > How would one do that when psychological states are clearly closely correlated with physical (brain) states? Personal identity is multifactorial: it is not just psychological continuity or just physical continuity, but a combination of those and other factors. Bruce > > "Oneself: the logic of experience" by Arnold Zuboff is a good introduction > to the reasoning. Many thinkers, including Shrodinger, Dyson, and Hoyle > reached the same conclusion. > > Jason > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRPiS6UqTq%3DCE2KfdeSzYUPVjghXzXMcq7O6EAw_b7DKg%40mail.gmail.com.
