On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 10:19 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 1:06 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Thursday, July 25, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:44 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Monday, July 22, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 2:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 11:50, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 7/22/2019 1:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can >>>>>>>>> be replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, >>>>>>>>> questions about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has >>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>> pointed out several times. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption >>>>>>>> in these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But what if, as seems likely to me, it is theoretically impossible >>>>>>>> to copy a brain to a level that it undetectable, i.e. it will >>>>>>>> necessarily >>>>>>>> be possible to distinguish physical differences. Now these >>>>>>>> differences may >>>>>>>> not matter to consciousness, or they may imply only a brief glitch at >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> conscious/classical level, but we know from Holevo's theorem that the >>>>>>>> duplicate can't be known to be in the same state. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I feel that I am the same person today as yesterday because I am >>>>>>> pretty close to the person I was yesterday, even though if you were to >>>>>>> look >>>>>>> at me in enough detail, even using simple tests and instruments, I am >>>>>>> quite >>>>>>> different today. It seems unreasonable to insist that a copy of a person >>>>>>> must be closer to the original than the "copying" that occurs in >>>>>>> everyday >>>>>>> life. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Dealing with this particular worry is one of the strengths of >>>>>> Nozick's 'closest continuer' theory. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Closest continuer theory is the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of >>>>> personal identity theory. A stop gap to preserve common sense notions in >>>>> light of paradoxes that imply the old way if thinking is untenable. >>>>> >>>>> As with quantum mechanics, common sense personal identity theories are >>>>> forced to either abandon any connection linking observer moments (like the >>>>> zero universe interpretation) or to a universalism that links all >>>>> observers >>>>> to a single person (like many worlds). >>>>> >>>> >>>> ????? >>>> >>> >>> >>> Could you clarify your question? >>> >> >> I have no idea what your statement means. >> > > It's an imprecise and ad-hoc revision to the theory to preserve a > "singular identity" when the situation tells us the notion of a singular > identity is inconsistent and untenable. And just as quantum mechanics > undermined the idea of a single universe/history, QI was an imprecise and > ad-hoc revision added to preserve that notion. > I see. That is a rather judgemental approach to take. CI may have been ad hoc at the time, but recent developments in the understanding of Everett show that CI was not totally silly, after all (See Zurek arxiv:1807.02092. I see the closest continuer theory as a reasonable attempt to make sense of the notion of personal identity in a series of unusual scenarios. It makes little sense to say that these scenarios require that we throw out previous understandings of the idea. Personal identity theories based on psychological or bodily continuity can >>>>> always be shown to break down, either by holding the body the same and >>>>> changing the psyche, or holding the psyche the same and changing the body. >>>>> >>>> >>>> How would one do that when psychological states are clearly closely >>>> correlated with physical (brain) states? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> Bodily continuity is same physical body without discontinuities. A bit >>> like closest continuer theory. But there's no limit to how radically you >>> could alter that body over time. This is where things like ageing, amnesia, >>> memory loss, differentiation of twins, etc. come into play. >>> >> >> Of course, and the theory deals adequately with them all. >> > > What is closer, a duplicate mind among: > > - two branches of the wave function containing the same mind which differ > by the location of a photon, or two branches of the wave function that > differ in the location of an electron? > Since different branches of the wave function form disjoint worlds in the MWI approach, it makes no sense to talk about a "distance" between the branches -- comparisons are no longer possible. - another branch of the wave function vs. 1 meter away in space? > - separated 1 second in time versus separated by 1 meter in space? > See above. Branches of the wave function are not separated in space in this way. > - a duplicate mind built as a physical computer that fully surrounds the > previous mind and extends 1 kilometer in all directions surrounding the > previous mind vs. a duplicate 1 meter away? > What does the size of the computer have to do with it? > - two duplicates separated by a distance less than a plank length, but > with one being closer (does it result in two new people? How can you tell?) > - two duplicates in different reference space-time locations such that > from different reference frames there are different conclusions regarding > which of the duplicates is closer? > I think you are confused about what I mean by a metric in the multidimensional space describing a person. This is not ordinary space, and the metric you use might well be up for discussion, or a matter of personal preference, and it will spend on the relative weights that you give to different dimensions, such as body, brain, recent memories, distant memories, personality traits, emotional responsiveness, etc, etc. I see no clear answers to these cases offered by closest continuer theory. > Nor any way to address them from within the theory. The onyl way would be > to add more ad-hoc rules, like space of any distance trumps different > branches of the wave function, ans distance in time must be less than > (speed of light*that time) to be a closer continuer, and that the reference > frame to use to break ties must be the reference frame of the original > mind. None of this is based on any rational basis, it's plugging in holes > as they appear in the theory with an ever increasing number of new theories. > It can be rationally based -- one just has to know what one is trying to achieve. Defining a metric or measure in the personality space may not be easy, but it is not irrational. > The same thing happened with CI, regarding different masses or scales > where superpositions necessarily would break down. > That is a misrepresentation of recent ideas for collapse models. These are quite rational, coherent, scientific and, testable. > For example, you could, over time, change neuron by neuron, until you >>> looked like and had the mind of Julius Caesar. But under this continuity >>> of the body your psyche, as you know it, has completely disappeared. >>> >>> Continuity of the psyche preserves your mind, but is discontinuous in >>> physical instantiation. This is where you have transporters, duplicators, >>> mind simulation, substitution of brain regions, etc. >>> >> >> Closest continuer theory also applies -- although it might not give the >> results that you appear to want. >> > > It's a non-mathematical, non-formalized theory. It doesn't address the > questions it purports to answer, it only creates many more questions. > It is a framework within which these questions can be given sensible answers. The memory-only model of personal identity does too much violence to normal ideas of identity, and does not cover cases such as anaesthesia, coma, and so on. Even though you are not aware in these circumstances, your identity continues -- as will be attested by your family. Personal identity is multifactorial: it is not just psychological >>>> continuity or just physical continuity, but a combination of those and >>>> other factors. >>>> >>>> >>> What are those factors? If personal identity requires bodily continuity >>> you get closest continuer theory. If it's psychological continuity you get >>> functionalism. If it's both you get identity only of single thought >>> moments, if it's neither you get universalism. >>> >> >> It is not a dichotomy of that sort. The theory involves both bodily and >> psychological continuity -- or at least the closest continuer in this >> multifactorial space. There may not be any continuers close enough, given >> some metric over the space, in which case there is no continuer. Or there >> may be ties, in which case multiple new persons are formed. >> > > What is the difference between two new people resulting from a tie, versus > when there is no tie? Is there any subjective or objective difference > anywhere in the picture? Could it ever be tested? > The test is whether it gives reasonable answers or not. There will always be borderline cases, so you might well have to make up your own mind. Science does not always give black and white answers to everything. > Personal identity theories, should enable one to answer for any situation: >>> "what experiences belong to you?" >>> >> >> Define "you" in all these cases below. >> > > As I said, there are only two consistent notions of "you" that remain. > 1. You are a single thought-moment > 2. All experiences are yours > > The third option, (the common sense idea), which says "Certain experiences > belong to you, and others don't" doesn't work, and can further be disproved > probabalistically. Zuboff demonstrates this in the work I cited. > He might argue it -- I don't know the work. But that does not mean he is right. > It is the result of the same class of illusions the ego plays on itself. > The illusion that makes you think there is something special about, or some > selection process was involved in selecting a: "here", "now", "branch", or > "being's perspective". In truth there is no selection process, all heres, > nows, branches, and beings are on equal footing. All heres exist, all > points in time exist, and all experiences belong to you. > That is just meaningless mysticism. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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