On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 10:19 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 1:06 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Thursday, July 25, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 2:44 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Monday, July 22, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jul 23, 2019 at 2:41 PM Stathis Papaioannou < >>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, 23 Jul 2019 at 11:50, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 7/22/2019 1:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Brain scans might have some bearing on whether not your brain can be >>>>>>>> replaced by some equivalent digital device. Once you can do this, >>>>>>>> questions >>>>>>>> about personal identity become an empirical matter, as has been >>>>>>>> pointed out >>>>>>>> several times. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The substantive problem is a philosophical one, since by assumption >>>>>>> in these debates the copied brain is identical by any empirical test. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But what if, as seems likely to me, it is theoretically impossible >>>>>>> to copy a brain to a level that it undetectable, i.e. it will >>>>>>> necessarily >>>>>>> be possible to distinguish physical differences. Now these differences >>>>>>> may >>>>>>> not matter to consciousness, or they may imply only a brief glitch at >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> conscious/classical level, but we know from Holevo's theorem that the >>>>>>> duplicate can't be known to be in the same state. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I feel that I am the same person today as yesterday because I am >>>>>> pretty close to the person I was yesterday, even though if you were to >>>>>> look >>>>>> at me in enough detail, even using simple tests and instruments, I am >>>>>> quite >>>>>> different today. It seems unreasonable to insist that a copy of a person >>>>>> must be closer to the original than the "copying" that occurs in everyday >>>>>> life. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dealing with this particular worry is one of the strengths of Nozick's >>>>> 'closest continuer' theory. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Closest continuer theory is the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of personal >>>> identity theory. A stop gap to preserve common sense notions in light of >>>> paradoxes that imply the old way if thinking is untenable. >>>> >>>> As with quantum mechanics, common sense personal identity theories are >>>> forced to either abandon any connection linking observer moments (like the >>>> zero universe interpretation) or to a universalism that links all observers >>>> to a single person (like many worlds). >>>> >>> >>> ????? >>> >> >> >> Could you clarify your question? >> > > I have no idea what your statement means. > It's an imprecise and ad-hoc revision to the theory to preserve a "singular identity" when the situation tells us the notion of a singular identity is inconsistent and untenable. And just as quantum mechanics undermined the idea of a single universe/history, QI was an imprecise and ad-hoc revision added to preserve that notion. > > > Personal identity theories based on psychological or bodily continuity can >>>> always be shown to break down, either by holding the body the same and >>>> changing the psyche, or holding the psyche the same and changing the body. >>>> >>> >>> How would one do that when psychological states are clearly closely >>> correlated with physical (brain) states? >>> >>> >>> >> Bodily continuity is same physical body without discontinuities. A bit >> like closest continuer theory. But there's no limit to how radically you >> could alter that body over time. This is where things like ageing, amnesia, >> memory loss, differentiation of twins, etc. come into play. >> > > Of course, and the theory deals adequately with them all. > What is closer, a duplicate mind among: - two branches of the wave function containing the same mind which differ by the location of a photon, or two branches of the wave function that differ in the location of an electron? - another branch of the wave function vs. 1 meter away in space? - separated 1 second in time versus separated by 1 meter in space? - a duplicate mind built as a physical computer that fully surrounds the previous mind and extends 1 kilometer in all directions surrounding the previous mind vs. a duplicate 1 meter away? - two duplicates separated by a distance less than a plank length, but with one being closer (does it result in two new people? How can you tell?) - two duplicates in different reference space-time locations such that from different reference frames there are different conclusions regarding which of the duplicates is closer? I see no clear answers to these cases offered by closest continuer theory. Nor any way to address them from within the theory. The onyl way would be to add more ad-hoc rules, like space of any distance trumps different branches of the wave function, ans distance in time must be less than (speed of light*that time) to be a closer continuer, and that the reference frame to use to break ties must be the reference frame of the original mind. None of this is based on any rational basis, it's plugging in holes as they appear in the theory with an ever increasing number of new theories. The same thing happened with CI, regarding different masses or scales where superpositions necessarily would break down. > > >> For example, you could, over time, change neuron by neuron, until you >> looked like and had the mind of Julius Caesar. But under this continuity >> of the body your psyche, as you know it, has completely disappeared. >> >> Continuity of the psyche preserves your mind, but is discontinuous in >> physical instantiation. This is where you have transporters, duplicators, >> mind simulation, substitution of brain regions, etc. >> > > Closest continuer theory also applies -- although it might not give the > results that you appear to want. > It's a non-mathematical, non-formalized theory. It doesn't address the questions it purports to answer, it only creates many more questions. > > >> Personal identity is multifactorial: it is not just psychological >>> continuity or just physical continuity, but a combination of those and >>> other factors. >>> >>> >> What are those factors? If personal identity requires bodily continuity >> you get closest continuer theory. If it's psychological continuity you get >> functionalism. If it's both you get identity only of single thought >> moments, if it's neither you get universalism. >> > > It is not a dichotomy of that sort. The theory involves both bodily and > psychological continuity -- or at least the closest continuer in this > multifactorial space. There may not be any continuers close enough, given > some metric over the space, in which case there is no continuer. Or there > may be ties, in which case multiple new persons are formed. > What is the difference between two new people resulting from a tie, versus when there is no tie? Is there any subjective or objective difference anywhere in the picture? Could it ever be tested? > > Personal identity theories, should enable one to answer for any situation: >> "what experiences belong to you?" >> > > Define "you" in all these cases below. > As I said, there are only two consistent notions of "you" that remain. 1. You are a single thought-moment 2. All experiences are yours The third option, (the common sense idea), which says "Certain experiences belong to you, and others don't" doesn't work, and can further be disproved probabalistically. Zuboff demonstrates this in the work I cited. It is the result of the same class of illusions the ego plays on itself. The illusion that makes you think there is something special about, or some selection process was involved in selecting a: "here", "now", "branch", or "being's perspective". In truth there is no selection process, all heres, nows, branches, and beings are on equal footing. All heres exist, all points in time exist, and all experiences belong to you. > > >> Consider some edge cases: >> - split brains >> - amoeba-like splits (e.g identical twins) >> - fusion of previously split brain hemispheres >> - transportation >> - duplication >> - transportation with errors >> - memory erasure >> - memory swapping >> - morphing to another person (with nanotechnology) >> - two people morphing into each other >> >> If the theory of personal identity can't deal with those cases it's >> incomplete, if not inconsistent. >> > > Closest continuer theory can provide sensible answers in all these cases, > provided one doesn't define it out of existence. With respect to 'memory > swapping' and the like, I refer you to the Thomas Mann novella: "The > Transposed Heads" (1941). > Thanks for the reference, but that's not exactly what I mean. Zuboff gives a scenario where two people are on operating tables side by side, and bits of brain are transported gradually between them. At the end of the process, would you say the two people swapped locations, or has each person morphed into a new person? Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiC98XvaG5uAQEiPaO5M-k_ntrD62nbL6cO8YGmbLtCig%40mail.gmail.com.
