On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 4:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 12:51 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 2:16 PM Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Saturday, August 24, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via >>>>> Everything List wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>>> > > >>>>> > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with >>>>> the >>>>> > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the >>>>> > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical >>>>> > > things. >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > >>>>> > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. Do >>>>> you mean >>>>> > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would deny >>>>> that >>>>> > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if >>>>> the brain >>>>> > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it isn't >>>>> > disembodied. >>>>> > >>>>> > Brent >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment could >>>>> be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) >>>>> scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) >>>>> exists in any fundamental sense. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, power, >>>> etc to the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. >>>> >>> >>> The mind is a pattern distinct from any of it's physical incarnations. >>> >> >> That does not imply that it can exist without some form of physical >> realization. >> > > While I agree any mind requires an instantiation/incarnation/realization, > before we can continue I think we need to clarify what is meant by > "physical". > > For example, do you think there is any important difference between a > mathematical structure that is isomorphic to a physical universe and that > physical universe? > Yes; the physical universe is self-sustaining, the mathematical structure is not. > Assuming both exist, is one capable of building conscious minds while the > other is not? If one cannot, what do you think it is that "physicalness" > adds which is not present in that mathematical structure which enables the > physical one to hold conscious minds? > As I said; the physical structure exists independently, whereas the mathematical structure is only an abstract construct, which does not exist independently of the mind that created it. Either way (with or without zombies in the mathematical structure) would > you agree that the isomorphically identical mathematical structure would > contain humans, human civilization, philosophers, books about > consciousness, arguments about qualia, and all the other phenomena we see > in the physical universe? > The mathematical structure might describe these things, but descriptions are not the things they describe. Brains have mass, minds do not. >>> Brains have definite locations, minds do not. >>> >> >> Can you prove that? >> > > > A mind can exist in multiple locations if its state is duplicate (just as > a Moby Dick exists in many locations while a single book can exist only in > one location). > There is a big "if" there -- "if its state is duplicated"....... > Minds can exist in multiple locations at once, brains cannot. >>> >> >> Can you prove that? That is, show me a mind that is in several locations >> at once. >> > > It is a consequence of: > - the standard cosmological model (infinite, homogenous, isotropic > universe) > - eternal inflation > - quantum mechanics without collapse > These are different ideas. The multiverse of eternal inflation is not the many worlds of Everettian QM (despite attempts to show that they are). So unless all of those theories are false, they are a natural consequence. > > The basic idea is any finite volume of finite energy contains only a > finite amount of information. By the pigeon hole principle, there are only > so many ways matter and energy can be organized in a finite volume. With > infinite space you inevitably will find repetitions of patterns (from the > size of skulls to the size of planets and Hubble volumes). These > repetitions, however, will be very far away, so I cannot point out one to > you. This paper estimates your nearest doppelganger might be 10^10^28 > meters away: https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/PDF/multiverse_sciam.pdf > That is the theory. But it relies on many unproven assumptions about distributions in the initial state. While eternal inflation might lead to duplicate universes, it does not imply that every universe is duplicated. It might well be the case that the only universes that are duplicated are entirely uninteresting sterile universes without much structure. Why do you think that the initial conditions of our Hubble volume should be duplicated somewhere? We might come from unique initial conditions -- of measure zero in the infinite extent of space in our extended universe. Of course if there is no collapse then QM also implies duplications of > brains. I obtained the following 48 bits from a quantum random number > generator <https://qrng.anu.edu.au/RainBin.php>: > 000111100110110110001101011110111010011101101010 > > Since you have looked at them, there are 2^48 new copies of your brain. > But here, your mind has also differentiated, as these bits entered your > conscious awareness. If instead I kept the numbers to myself, and did not > tell you about them, only that I saw a 48-bit number, then I would have > created many new physically distinct brain states without creating new mind > states (for you). > Everettian quantum mechanics might imply many worlds, split off as copies from the world in which I exist. But these worlds are orthogonal to this world. This means that the existence of such orthogonal worlds can be assumed, or ignored, as you choose -- these "other worlds" have no consequences for our present existence. > Minds can travel from one physical universe to another, or to locations >>> beyond the cosmological horizon receding at speeds greater than c, brains >>> cannot. >>> >> >> Is this supposed to mean anything other than that we can think about such >> things? Beside, what evidence do you have for the existence of other >> physical universes to which we can travel, even in thought? >> >> You seem to assume a lot of mythology here. >> > > No mythology involved here. > > Let's say we simulate another physical universe with completely different > physical laws. And we simulate it in sufficient detail that we can witness > life evolve in that universe, and eventually evolve brains and > consciousness. We can then "abduct" one of those beings into our universe > by copying its information into our own, we might even equip it with a > robotic body so that we can interact with that alien in our own universe. > This being was able to travel from one universe to another, though its > physical brain are forever stuck in the physical universe where it evolved. > I thought that your scenario involved a simulated "other world". That simulation is presumably performed on a computer in our world, so there is no transfer of a conscious mind from one physical universe to another. As a related question, if you simulate consciousness in a computer, is the simulated mind necessarily conscious? For example, is the "Eliza" program created at MIT conscious when running one of its scripts? This is an important question for the AI program. If you simulate a physical brain by simulating the detailed behaviour and interconnections of all the neutrons and other structure in the brain, will that be capable of consciousness? Or if consciousness is actually a computation independent of these neural processes, can you create consciousness only by actually running the same (or similar) program on a computer? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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