> On 25 Aug 2019, at 10:10, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 4:42 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 12:51 AM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 2:16 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Saturday, August 24, 2019, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > wrote: > > > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with the > > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the > > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical > > > things. > > > > > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. Do you mean > > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would deny that > > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if the brain > > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it isn't > > disembodied. > > > > Brent > > > > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment could > be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) > scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) > exists in any fundamental sense. > > Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, power, etc > to the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. > > The mind is a pattern distinct from any of it's physical incarnations. > > That does not imply that it can exist without some form of physical > realization. > > While I agree any mind requires an instantiation/incarnation/realization, > before we can continue I think we need to clarify what is meant by "physical". > > For example, do you think there is any important difference between a > mathematical structure that is isomorphic to a physical universe and that > physical universe? > > Yes; the physical universe is self-sustaining, the mathematical structure is > not.
That is your hypothesis, and you are coherent: you need to abandon Mechanism, as you said you do. > > Assuming both exist, is one capable of building conscious minds while the > other is not? If one cannot, what do you think it is that "physicalness" > adds which is not present in that mathematical structure which enables the > physical one to hold conscious minds? > > As I said; the physical structure exists independently, whereas the > mathematical structure is only an abstract construct, which does not exist > independently of the mind that created it. With mechanism, we explain the mind from 2+2=4 & Co. Not the reverse, which does not make much sense, as all physical theories does the assumption of 2+2=4 & Co. > > Either way (with or without zombies in the mathematical structure) would you > agree that the isomorphically identical mathematical structure would contain > humans, human civilization, philosophers, books about consciousness, > arguments about qualia, and all the other phenomena we see in the physical > universe? > > The mathematical structure might describe these things, but descriptions are > not the things they describe. I think you confuse the mathematical structure, and the theory describing that mathematical structure. Those are very different things. > > > Brains have mass, minds do not. > Brains have definite locations, minds do not. > > Can you prove that? > > > A mind can exist in multiple locations if its state is duplicate (just as a > Moby Dick exists in many locations while a single book can exist only in one > location). > > There is a big "if" there -- "if its state is duplicated"....... > > > Minds can exist in multiple locations at once, brains cannot. > > Can you prove that? That is, show me a mind that is in several locations at > once. > > It is a consequence of: > - the standard cosmological model (infinite, homogenous, isotropic universe) > - eternal inflation > - quantum mechanics without collapse > > These are different ideas. The multiverse of eternal inflation is not the > many worlds of Everettian QM (despite attempts to show that they are). > > So unless all of those theories are false, they are a natural consequence. > > The basic idea is any finite volume of finite energy contains only a finite > amount of information. By the pigeon hole principle, there are only so many > ways matter and energy can be organized in a finite volume. With infinite > space you inevitably will find repetitions of patterns (from the size of > skulls to the size of planets and Hubble volumes). These repetitions, > however, will be very far away, so I cannot point out one to you. This paper > estimates your nearest doppelganger might be 10^10^28 meters away: > https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/PDF/multiverse_sciam.pdf > <https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/PDF/multiverse_sciam.pdf> > > That is the theory. But it relies on many unproven assumptions about > distributions in the initial state. While eternal inflation might lead to > duplicate universes, it does not imply that every universe is duplicated. It > might well be the case that the only universes that are duplicated are > entirely uninteresting sterile universes without much structure. Why do you > think that the initial conditions of our Hubble volume should be duplicated > somewhere? We might come from unique initial conditions -- of measure zero in > the infinite extent of space in our extended universe. > > > Of course if there is no collapse then QM also implies duplications of > brains. I obtained the following 48 bits from a quantum random number > generator <https://qrng.anu.edu.au/RainBin.php>: > 000111100110110110001101011110111010011101101010 > > Since you have looked at them, there are 2^48 new copies of your brain. But > here, your mind has also differentiated, as these bits entered your conscious > awareness. If instead I kept the numbers to myself, and did not tell you > about them, only that I saw a 48-bit number, then I would have created many > new physically distinct brain states without creating new mind states (for > you). > > Everettian quantum mechanics might imply many worlds, split off as copies > from the world in which I exist. But these worlds are orthogonal to this > world. This means that the existence of such orthogonal worlds can be > assumed, or ignored, as you choose -- these "other worlds" have no > consequences for our present existence. > > > Minds can travel from one physical universe to another, or to locations > beyond the cosmological horizon receding at speeds greater than c, brains > cannot. > > Is this supposed to mean anything other than that we can think about such > things? Beside, what evidence do you have for the existence of other physical > universes to which we can travel, even in thought? > > You seem to assume a lot of mythology here. > > No mythology involved here. > > Let's say we simulate another physical universe with completely different > physical laws. And we simulate it in sufficient detail that we can witness > life evolve in that universe, and eventually evolve brains and consciousness. > We can then "abduct" one of those beings into our universe by copying its > information into our own, we might even equip it with a robotic body so that > we can interact with that alien in our own universe. This being was able to > travel from one universe to another, though its physical brain are forever > stuck in the physical universe where it evolved. > > I thought that your scenario involved a simulated "other world". That > simulation is presumably performed on a computer in our world, so there is no > transfer of a conscious mind from one physical universe to another. > > As a related question, if you simulate consciousness in a computer, is the > simulated mind necessarily conscious? For example, is the "Eliza" program > created at MIT conscious when running one of its scripts? > > This is an important question for the AI program. If you simulate a physical > brain by simulating the detailed behaviour and interconnections of all the > neutrons and other structure in the brain, will that be capable of > consciousness? Or if consciousness is actually a computation independent of > these neural processes, can you create consciousness only by actually running > the same (or similar) program on a computer? Yes, if the brain is emulated at the right level, which existence is part of the Digital Mechanist assumption.In arithmetic, the brain is emulated/simulated at all levels. The physical reality has to be given by the statistics on all computations, structured by the logic of self-reference. That works rather well, up to now. We can only pursue the testing and see. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS-y-yX6owqtz0df8MXdoqMAFayGKTD9rr%3DphTrfPQVsw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLS-y-yX6owqtz0df8MXdoqMAFayGKTD9rr%3DphTrfPQVsw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9D093D9F-0FB1-4115-9807-6676112476A2%40ulb.ac.be.
