> On 7 Sep 2019, at 17:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/6/2019 11:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, September 7, 2019 at 12:54:42 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 9/6/2019 10:21 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, September 7, 2019 at 12:14:07 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 9/6/2019 9:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > I would put "Horganism" another way. 
>>> > 
>>> > Science tells stories/theories, and some are successful in their 
>>> > application. But we don't know if any of the stories are the final 
>>> > ones to be told, or even close to being final. (They probably are 
>>> > not.) There is no settled story of gravity yet, much less 
>>> > consciousness. One reads about a new story of gravity in science news 
>>> > every week, it seems. 
>>> > 
>>> > David Chalmers' conclusion is ... 
>>> > 
>>> > "I think that the Hegelian [dialectical] argument gives good reason to 
>>> > take both panpsychism and panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can 
>>> > find a reasonable solution to the combination problem for either, this 
>>> > view would immediately become the most promising solution to the 
>>> > mind–body problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and 
>>> > sustained attention." 
>>> > - http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf 
>>> > <http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf> 
>>> 
>>> Zero predictive power and it's not clear that it's consistent with the 
>>> rest of neurophysics. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Sean Carroll is on a nationwide speaking tour now evangelizing Many Worlds.
>>> 
>>> What is the predictive power of Many Worlds?
>> 
>> None, unless someone can figure out how to derive Born's rule from 
>> it...which I think is impossible.  But it does go a way toward making the 
>> story of measurement more consistent.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> Maybe. But the wider point is Sean Carroll's unlinking (strict) 
>> observability from science.
>> 
>>      
>> https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2018/01/17/beyond-falsifiability/ 
>> <https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2018/01/17/beyond-falsifiability/>
>> 
>> (which many have exploded over).
>> 
>> In Sean's world, if a vocabulary of unobservables fits into a scientific 
>> fabric somehow, then it's tenable. Maybe that's OK. Who knows.
> 
> I think the measurement problem ultimately needs a theory of consciousness to 
> bottom out, and I think computationalism and the "engineering theory of 
> consciousness" will fill that need.

Computationalism, and computer science, gives an “easy” theory of consciousness 
(it is “consistency” as seen by the []p & p mode, or []p & <>t & p mode (for 
the immediate consciousness).

This, imo, solves the “hard consciousness” part of the mind-body problem.

Nevertheless,  it leads to an “easy-but-not-that-easy” problem of deriving the 
illusion of a physical reality and its stability, and its local sharability,  
from “pure arithmetic”. But the results obtained here are very promising, 
although not on the like of the believer in Matter as we could have expected 
given the history.

Bruno





> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>>  
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