On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:12:12 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: >> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: >>> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system >>> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or >>> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake >>> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening >>> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge >>> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. >>> >>> Define in terms of what? We define it ostensively. How would it help >>> to define it in words? >>> >>> Brent >>> >> >> I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define >> "consciousness”. >> >> >> Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim >> to not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and >> they will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having >> consciousness. Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, >> knowledge, etc. >> > > I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue. What I don't know is > how it can exist or the conditions for its existence. I also know that some > chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness, and in some cases destroy > it absolutely. So its material basis seems pretty firm. Also, more > fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds. > Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world, > whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I > see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical > object and I conceive "2". And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the > successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical > world, which you see as illusional. The successor principle as *codified* > in Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations, that is, > an extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on > what Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is > relevant to any of this? AG > >> In terms of what? >> >> With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of >> belief and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary >> arithmetic (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study >> Tarski theory of truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing >> that the arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, >> even by most non-mechanical entities too, with some exception. >> > "conjunction-onjction"? What the heck is that? I contend that all the postulates of arithmetic, including x + 0 = x, can be inferred from observations of the external, physical universe. AG
> Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such >> as the electron. >> >> You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p >> notion. >> (Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s >> for later). >> > > I am merely stating that an electron is defined by its measured properties > which anyone, with sufficient > effort, can confirm. I don't see that 1p or 3p has anything to do with > this, other than to obfuscate. AG > >> Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but >> you can't define it prior to the observation? So far, the most we can say >> about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's >> self-referential. AG >> >> >> Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive >> consciousness, which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness >> of the Löbian machine (which are not just universal, they know that they >> are universal) where the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It >> has about the difference between the consciousness of low animals compared >> to higher vertebrate, although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others >> invertebrate to have it too. >> >> Bruno >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fda96173-ec56-4a88-9479-f84d98e67e50%40googlegroups.com.
