> On 23 Sep 2019, at 09:49, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:12:12 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson <[email protected] <>> wrote: >> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: >> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system >> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or >> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake >> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening >> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge >> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. >> >> Define in terms of what? We define it ostensively. How would it help >> to define it in words? >> >> Brent >> >> I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define >> "consciousness”. > > Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim to > not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and they > will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having consciousness. > Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, knowledge, etc. > > I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue. What I don't know is how > it can exist or the conditions for its existence. I also know that some > chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness, and in some cases destroy it > absolutely. So its material basis seems pretty firm. Also, more > fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds. > Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world, > whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I > see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical > object and I conceive "2". And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the > successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical > world, which you see as illusional. The successor principle as codified in > Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations, that is, an > extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on what > Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is relevant to > any of this? AG >> In terms of what? > With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of belief > and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary arithmetic > (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study Tarski theory of > truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing that the > arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, even by most > non-mechanical entities too, with some exception. > > "conjunction-onjction"? What the heck is that?
A new type of typo error, due to the progress in applied computer science. Sorry. Read simply “conjunction”. > I contend that all the postulates of arithmetic, including x + 0 = x, can be > inferred from observations of the external, physical universe. AG No problem with this, all universal machine in arithmetic get their ignition of number through a physical reality, that they cannot avoid, even if it is not a primitive reality in the big picture. Bruno >> Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such as >> the electron. > You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p notion. > (Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s for > later). > > I am merely stating that an electron is defined by its measured properties > which anyone, with sufficient > effort, can confirm. I don't see that 1p or 3p has anything to do with this, > other than to obfuscate. AG >> Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but >> you can't define it prior to the observation? So far, the most we can say >> about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's self-referential. >> AG > > Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive consciousness, > which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness of the Löbian > machine (which are not just universal, they know that they are universal) > where the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It has about the > difference between the consciousness of low animals compared to higher > vertebrate, although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others invertebrate to > have it too. > > Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fda96173-ec56-4a88-9479-f84d98e67e50%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fda96173-ec56-4a88-9479-f84d98e67e50%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F3D5FFC7-9762-4A21-91F8-D864BF8FDB3A%40ulb.ac.be.
