On Thursday, October 24, 2019 at 8:46:48 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Oct 2019, at 11:29, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jan/09/soul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review > > <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fbooks%2F2011%2Fjan%2F09%2Fsoul-dust-nicholas-humphrey-review&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNETpskLHapVvHadsE4_Gk2rKHn1_Q> > > Once upon a time, not so long ago, no one thought that there was a > mind-body problem. No one thought consciousness was a special mystery and > they were right. The sense of difficulty arose only about 400 years ago and > for a very specific reason: people began to think they knew what matter > was. They thought (very briefly) that matter consisted entirely of grainy > particles with various shapes bumping into one another. This was classical > contact mechanics, "the corpuscularian philosophy", and it gave rise to a > conundrum. If this is all that matter is, how can it be the basis of or > give rise to mind or consciousness? It seemed clear, as Shakespeare > observed, that "when the brains were out, the man would die". But how could > the wholly material brain be the seat of consciousness? > > > Of course, this is in written in the Aristotelian era, or materialist era. > But the whole philosophy of Plato is an attempt to solve the mind-body > problem. In fact we can argue that the work of Plato contains the solution, > notably in the text Theaetetus. That is indeed a solution coherent with > Mechanism, up to an explanation of the existence of matter, or its > appearance, from a theory of consciousness. > > The usual solution of the mind-body problem is what we call “a religion”. > A religion is only a conception of reality which does not put the soul, or > consciousness under the rug. > > People who claim that they have no religion are usually people who take > for granted the solution proposed by Aristotle, where consciousness is > naturalised in some way. In fact it is the solution shared by atheists and > Christians, for example, except that atheist eliminates consciousness, > usually invoking a mechanist explanation, like “consciousness is a natural > product of the activity of a brain”. That solution can be shown > incompatible with Descartes Mechanism. > > > > > > Leibniz put it well in 1686, in his famous image of the mill: > consciousness, he said, "cannot be explained on mechanical principles, ie > by shapes and movements…. imagine that there is a machine [eg a brain] > whose structure makes it think, sense and have perception. Then we can > conceive it enlarged, so that we can go inside it, as into a mill. Suppose > that we do: then if we inspect the interior we shall find there nothing but > parts which push one another, and never anything which could explain a > conscious experience." > > Conclusion: consciousness can't be physical, > > > That’s a valid reasoning. > > > > so we must have immaterial souls. > > > That’s a valid conclusion. Of course this was found already in India and > China, and in the antic Greece. > > It comes from the understanding that the first person view is different > from the thread person view, which is something related to empathy: the > ability to put oneself in the shoes of someone else. > > > Descartes went that way (albeit with secret doubts). > > > OK. Note that Descartes theory is exposed in the indo-greek text “the > question of King Milinda”. > > > > So did many others. The mind-body problem came into existence. > > Hobbes wasn't bothered, though, in 1651. He didn't see why consciousness > couldn't be entirely physical. And that, presumably, is because he didn't > make the Great Mistake: he didn't think that the corpuscularian philosophy > told us the whole truth about the nature of matter. And he was right. > Matter is "much odder than we thought", as Auden said in 1939, and it's got > even odder since. > > > That matter is something weird is of course an important point here. > Mechanism explains why it has to be like that. > > In fact there are as many formulation of the mind-body problem than there > are type of metaphysics. > > Basically, > > 1) for a dualist (which believe in Matter and Mind as distinct > ontologically real things) the problem consist in explaining the relation > between both. Dualism is usually abandoned, because if there is a relation > between mind and matter, making them belonging to different realm makes > only the problem harder. > > 2) for a materialist monist, the problem consists in finding a materialist > phenomenology of mind. > > 3) for a immaterialist monist, the problem consists in finding an > immaterialist phenomenology of matter. That is what Mechanism, and the > “theology of the machine/number” provides. > > > There is no mystery of consciousness as standardly presented, although > book after book tells us that there is, including, now, Nick Humphrey's > Soul Dust: The Magic of Consciousness. > > > Yes, some people keep saying that they don’t see the problem, but it is > hard to judge them, given the 1500 years of pseudo-scientific, or > pseudo-religious, imposed solution on this. > > > > We know exactly what consciousness is; > > > Yes, indeed. Good point. > > > we know it in seeing, tasting, touching, smelling, hearing, in hunger, > fever, nausea, joy, boredom, the shower, childbirth, walking down the road. > If someone denies this or demands a definition of consciousness, there are > two very good responses. The first is Louis Armstrong's, when he was asked > what jazz is: "If you got to ask, you ain't never goin' to know." The > second is gentler: "You know what it is from your own case.” > > > This points correctly on the notion of first person knowledge. The problem > of knowledge is, fundamentally, the same as the problem of consciousness > (up to slight vocabulary nuance). > > > > You know what consciousness is in general, you know the intrinsic nature > of consciousness, just in being conscious at all. > > > That is valid data, but of course, it is not a theory, still less an > explanation. For some Catholics some time ago, without listening to Jesus, > you could not have a soul, so “Indian” (South American) were considered to > not have a soul, and so you could use them as slaves, etc. Eventually, they > changes their mind on this, and begun the christianisation of South-America > (which was a progress compared to treat them as zombies or animals). > > > > "Yes, yes," say the proponents of magic, "but there's still a mystery: how > can all this vivid conscious experience be physical, merely and wholly > physical?" (I'm assuming, with them, that we're wholly physical beings.) > This, though, is the 400-year-old mistake. In speaking of the "magical > mystery show", Humphrey and many others make a colossal and crucial > assumption: the assumption that we know something about the intrinsic > nature of matter that gives us reason to think that it's surprising that it > involves consciousness. We don't. Nor is this news. Locke knew it in 1689, > as did Hume in 1739. Philosopher-chemist Joseph Priestley was extremely > clear about it in the 1770s. So were Eddington, Russell and Whitehead in > the 1920s. > > > Saying that we don’t know what is matter means that, in particular, se > have not solve the mind/matter problem. We don’t know either what is the > mind or consciousness. To identify two mysteries does not solve any > problems. > But the intuition here is good: the hard problem of consciousness might > need to sole an hard problem of matter, indeed. > > > > > One thing we do know about matter is that when you put some very > common-or-garden elements (carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, sodium, potassium, > etc) together in the way in which they're put together in brains, you get > consciousness like ours – a wholly physical phenomenon. (It's happening to > you right now.) > > > That is correct, but belongs to the enunciation of the problem. It is not > a solution of the problem. Are those atoms necessary. Are atoms necessary > at all, etc. > > > > > And this means that we do, after all, know something about the intrinsic > nature of matter, over and above everything we know in knowing the > equations of physics. Why? Because we know the intrinsic nature of > consciousness and consciousness is a form of matter. > > > That is sheer non-sense. If consciousness is a form of matter, what is its > mass, volume, temperature, etc. That makes non sense, intuitively, and > indeed with mechanism, we do get a “simple” theory of consciousness > (machine’s knowledge), and we can explain the illusion of matter from this, > in a testable way. > > > > > This is still a difficult idea, in the present climate of thought. It > takes hard thought to see it. > > > Here the guy has given an embryo of the enunciation of the problem, and > immediately after talk like if it was a solution, identifying consciousness > with some matter. Of course this is just unrigorous hand waving. > > > > The fact remains that we know what consciousness is; any mystery lies in > the nature of matter in so far as it's not conscious. We can know for sure > that we're quite hopelessly wrong about the nature of matter so long as our > positive account of it creates any problem about how consciousness can be > physical. > > > That is one step toward the elimination of consciousness. > > > > Some philosophers, including Humphrey's long-time collaborator, Daniel > Dennett, > > > I guessed it! > > > > seem to think that the only way out of this problem is to deny the > existence of consciousness, ie to make just about the craziest claim that > has ever been made in the history of human thought. They do this by > changing the meaning of the word "consciousness", so that their claim that > it exists amounts to the claim that it doesn't. Dennett, for example, > defines consciousness as "fame in the brain", where this means a certain > kind of salience and connectedness that doesn't actually involve any > subjective experience at all. > > > OK. That is akin to the Churchland eliminativism (of consciousness). > > > > > In Soul Dust, Humphrey seems to agree with Dennett, at least in general > terms, for he begins by introducing a fictional protagonist, a > consciousness-lacking alien scientist from Andromeda who arrives on Earth > and finds that she needs to postulate consciousness in us to explain our > behaviour. The trouble is that she's impossible, even as a fiction, if > Humphrey means real consciousness. This is because she won't be able to > have any conception of what consciousness is, let alone postulate it, if > she's never experienced it, any more than someone who's never had visual > experience can have any idea what colour experience is like (Humphrey says > she'll need luck, but luck won't be enough). > > > OK. > > > > > Humphrey also talks in Dennettian style of "the consciousness illusion" > and this triggers a familiar response: "You say that there seems to be > consciousness, but that there isn't really any. But what can this > experience of seeming to be conscious be, if not a conscious experience? > How can one have a genuine illusion of having red-experience without > genuinely having red-experience in having the supposed illusion?” > > > That is correct. A genuine illusion needs to be conscious to be an > illusion, so to say that consciousness is an illusion is total nonsense. > > But we are not far from the indo-greek path toward a solution. If > consciousness is not an illusion, and we we want to be monist, maybe it is > “matter” which is the illusion. > > As I said often: it is easier to explain the illusion of a stone to a > conscious being than to explain the illusion of consciousness (already > non-sensical) to a stone ("inert matter"). > > > > Later, Humphrey seems to be a realist about consciousness. When he comes > to the question of how human consciousness evolved, his remarkable > suggestion is that it is adaptive and has survival value principally > because it allows for "self-esteem, coupled with self-entrancement". "Your > Ego… this awesome treasure island… never ceases to amaze and fascinate > you." And since this is tremendously pleasurable, you very much want to go > on living. The gloomier among us may doubt this, finding Hamlet nearer the > mark. The deeper problem with the self-entrancement theory is that natural > selection can select implacably for an intense instinct of > self-preservation without using consciousness at all. > > > That is false. In the mechanist theory, we can understand what > consciousness is, why it is necessary, and how it creates the illusion of > matter, and how matter makes it possible to stabilise consciousness in long > (deep) histories. But matter lost its primary ontology status. That runs > against our 1500 years of materialist brainwashing, of course, but it was > the most intuitive explanation for long, where reality is a sort of dream > (of some God, or not). > > > > > It seems to me, then, that Humphrey's central contentions are hopeless. > One doesn't solve the problem of consciousness (such as it is) by saying > that consciousness is really a kind of illusion. > > > Indeed. > > > > > Whatever difficulties there are in explaining the survival value of > consciousness, it doesn't lie in the fact that it makes self-entrancement > possible. There is initially something disarming about the rapturous > self-confidence of Soul Dust, but it comes in time to seem mere vanity. > > > It would be long to describe here, and now (it is done in my long text > “Consciousness and Mechanism” (in French: conscience et mécanisme), but > consciousness as an important role, first in the very fabric of the > physical reality, secondly, in the development of the living beings > abilities to act on their environment. It can be proved (it *has* been > proved!) that machine’s consciousness speed up their ability to compute > with respect to either the universal machine running them, or relatively to > other universal machine (in the material tensorial structure which allows > parallel computations). > > Let me explain a little bit. The consciousness of the machine is related > to two fundamental theorems in mathematical logic, both found by Gödel, > plus some others. > > I assume a chatty machine which asserts sometime some “belief”. I limit > myself to arithmetically sound and rich machine. > > 1) the completeness theorem: it says that is a machine is consistent then > there is a reality which satisfies (make true) its belief. This means that > the syntactical concept of consistency (of some beliefs) is related to the > semantical concept of having a reality satisfying such beliefs. > > 2) the incompleteness theorem: if a machine is consistent (and thus if > there is a reality which satisfy the machine’s belief), the machine cannot > prove its consistency. That is: if there is a reality, the machine cannot > prove that there is a reality. > > We can add > > 3) Tarski theorem, which explains that such a machine will not even be > able to define that reality. > Note that logician used the term “model” instead of reality, but as many > people comes from physics, and the fact that physicists use “model” in the > logician’s sense of theory, I use reality instead. It is a semantical > notion. A model/reality of a theory (set of beliefs) is a structure which > verifies/statisfies those beliefs/assertions/sentences. > > Then, it is again a theorem by Gödel, inihis “length of proof” short paper > (page 82 in Davis’s “Undecidable" book) which explains why consciousness > and self-consciousness provides an evolutive advantage among the living > beings, with also rather dangerous bad side effect, like the development of > fear. Indeed, Gödel showed that when you add an undecidable sentence of a > theory as a new axiom of that theory, you can solve an infinity of more > problem (may undecidable sentences become decidable) but the length of the > proofs of infinitely many decidable sentences can shortened in a quasi > arbitrary. In principle the machine enlarges its accessibility spectrum > imeans n its local environment. That can be related (non trivially) to some > other speed-up phenomenon in theoretical computer science (like notably the > Blum Speed-up theorem: which says that you can by using the right software > makes a Babbaage like machine more quick than a 2100 quantum computer, on > almost all arguments (that is the snap: I don’t claim this has any use in > practice, but it plays a role, due to the lack of first person > consciousness on the “delays” in the universal dovetailing). > > The universal dovetailer argument shows that the mind-body problem (the > problem of relating first person experiences to some third person sharable > realities) is reduced to the justification of the Turing machine’s > observable (and its mathematics) from a statistics of first person > experience on all computation (a mathematical concept with Church-Turing’s > theses). > > Eventually, we get the logic of those mathematics, at their propositional > level, by the modal logics of the “Theaetetus’ variants of Gödel’s > arithmetical “beweisbar predicate”. The logics of ([]p & p), []p & <>t, []p > & p & <>t” (+ graded variants with <>t replaced by <><>t, or <><><>t). > > Those are quantum logics, and the open problems here is how to extract the > tensor product, or the linear logic, from those logics of the observable. > > Like in physics, we get an interesting labyrinth of quantum logics, and by > incompleteness, G*, they are divided into private and non justifiable part > (the qualia) and relatively sharable parts: the qualia. > > Put in another way, with Mechanism, the elementary arithmetical reality > (which we know is not simple at all since Gödel) determine a consciousness > flux, initiated on all universal numbers, and which differentiate, and > fuse, along many histories. It converges (in some technical sense) to a > sort of multiverse. > > Mechanism is eliminativist, not of the observable, but of the idea that > what we observe is ontologically primary (Aristotle). What we observe is > “only” a local indexical projection of the whole (arithmetical) reality > into itself (assuming mechanism, and rather well tested thanks to Everett’s > QM (without collapse)). > > Bruno > > > It still seems though that what hits one over the head with being indisputable is:
One thing we do know about matter is that when you put some very common-or-garden elements (carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, sodium, potassium, etc) together in the way in which they're put together in brains, you get consciousness like ours – a wholly physical phenomenon. (It's happening to you right now.) That's sort of *have-matter-compiler, will-make-consciousness* (like the Frankenstein movies showing this time of year). Whatever Gödel-Löbs are going on are going on in that material form. @philipthrft -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d0b75bf1-a927-42ae-8e0c-5b150aa9cc79%40googlegroups.com.
