> On 25 Oct 2019, at 23:55, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 10/25/2019 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 24 Oct 2019, at 20:10, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/24/2019 6:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> Leibniz put it well in 1686, in his famous image of the mill: >>>>> consciousness, he said, "cannot be explained on mechanical principles, ie >>>>> by shapes and movements…. imagine that there is a machine [eg a brain] >>>>> whose structure makes it think, sense and have perception. Then we can >>>>> conceive it enlarged, so that we can go inside it, as into a mill. >>>>> Suppose that we do: then if we inspect the interior we shall find there >>>>> nothing but parts which push one another, and >>>>> never anything which could explain a conscious experience." >>>>> >>>>> Conclusion: consciousness can't be physical, >>>> >>>> That’s a valid reasoning. >>> >>> No it's not. Leibniz could find "producing flour" either, just parts that >>> push and pull. >> >> I don’t understand. I think you miss here the 1p and 3p crucial distinction. > > Oops. I see I wrote "could" where I intended "couldn't". > > But that's not your objection is it. The 1p would be the experience of the > mill in producing flour,
The production of flour by the mill is describable in pure 3p terms. I see not introspective machine there a priori. > which one wouldn't find by inspecting the machine. Indeed. But that would be different if the mill contains some chips, and would be capable to describe itself, asserting things like “Yesterday there was no wind, and I was unable to make as much flour that I expected, I am sorry”. > But that's because a mill doesn't have experience in the relevant sense. It > may well have "mill experience", i.e. it's parts wear and that constitutes a > kind of memory and it responds to environments as more or less power is > available from it's water wheel. But it can't have experience in the human > (or even dog sense) because it is not sufficiently complex nor programmed to > interact with it's environment based on internal modeling which includes > modeling itself. If it had those things, then with sufficient study Leibniz > could find them and know about the 1p experience of the mill. Not know. But he can bet, but then he bets on Mechanism, and eventually he will understand that physics has to be founded on machine’s psychology/theology/computer-science/arithmetic. He was going in that direction, and was not so far of the discovery of the universal machine. Bruno > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d8b96c72-3ef9-b870-38d9-aad0d381d348%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d8b96c72-3ef9-b870-38d9-aad0d381d348%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9120ECFD-2AC0-432A-B767-E8102E7B5F87%40ulb.ac.be.
