> On 26 Oct 2019, at 21:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 10/26/2019 1:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 25 Oct 2019, at 23:55, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 10/25/2019 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 24 Oct 2019, at 20:10, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 10/24/2019 6:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>> Leibniz put it well in 1686, in his famous image of the mill: >>>>>>> consciousness, he said, "cannot be explained on mechanical principles, >>>>>>> ie by shapes and movements…. imagine that there is a machine [eg a >>>>>>> brain] whose structure makes it think, sense and have perception. Then >>>>>>> we can conceive it enlarged, so that we can go inside it, as into a >>>>>>> mill. Suppose that we do: then if we inspect the interior we shall find >>>>>>> there nothing but parts which push one another, and never anything >>>>>>> which could explain a conscious experience." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Conclusion: consciousness can't be physical, >>>>>> >>>>>> That’s a valid reasoning. >>>>> >>>>> No it's not. Leibniz could find "producing flour" either, just parts >>>>> that push and pull. >>>> >>>> I don’t understand. I think you miss here the 1p and 3p crucial >>>> distinction. >>> >>> Oops. I see I wrote "could" where I intended "couldn't". >>> >>> But that's not your objection is it. The 1p would be the experience of the >>> mill in producing flour, >> >> The production of flour by the mill is describable in pure 3p terms. I see >> not introspective machine there a priori. >> >> >> >>> which one wouldn't find by inspecting the machine. >> >> Indeed. But that would be different if the mill contains some chips, and >> would be capable to describe itself, asserting things like “Yesterday there >> was no wind, and I was unable to make as much flour that I expected, I am >> sorry”. >> >> >> >>> But that's because a mill doesn't have experience in the relevant sense. >>> It may well have "mill experience", i.e. it's parts wear and that >>> constitutes a kind of memory and it responds to environments as more or >>> less power is available from it's water wheel. But it can't have >>> experience in the human (or even dog sense) because it is not sufficiently >>> complex nor programmed to interact with it's environment based on internal >>> modeling which includes modeling itself. If it had those things, then with >>> sufficient study Leibniz could find them and know about the 1p experience >>> of the mill. >> >> Not know. But he can bet, > > Scientists only ever know things in that sense; it goes without saying.
OK. Fair enough. > It is only metaphysicians who pretend to "know" things in some absolute sense. Only fraudulent metaphysicists do that, like when a science is stolen by a political power, like in USSR, or like non Occident in general in the fundamental domain. That is the whole point of making theology come back at the faculty of science: allows doubt and skepticism, and stop the claim of truth, or certainties, which are always symptoms of dishonesty. Bruno > > Brent > >> but then he bets on Mechanism, and eventually he will understand that >> physics has to be founded on machine’s >> psychology/theology/computer-science/arithmetic. He was going in that >> direction, and was not so far of the discovery of the universal machine. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d8b96c72-3ef9-b870-38d9-aad0d381d348%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d8b96c72-3ef9-b870-38d9-aad0d381d348%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9120ECFD-2AC0-432A-B767-E8102E7B5F87%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9120ECFD-2AC0-432A-B767-E8102E7B5F87%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1dcda6f2-ede6-cc47-ea73-505a330917c6%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1dcda6f2-ede6-cc47-ea73-505a330917c6%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3265091F-D08B-4776-9A68-AFDD9F190FDA%40ulb.ac.be.
