> On 4 Dec 2019, at 23:43, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 10:48 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > On 11 Nov 2019, at 12:45, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 8:18 PM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> That is the whole point of realism. To believe in things despite we can not >> access to them. The belief that reality is bigger than the reality we can >> personally observe. >> >> That is not scientific realism -- that is metaphysical mysticism. > > Hmm… You *can* say that, but then you need to assess that your invocation of > physical brain is such metaphysical mysticism. The point is that this version > of metaphysical mysticism is incompatible with the mechanist assumption. > > It is not a metaphysical to believe in the existence of a physical brain > underlying our conscious minds -- it is the result of solid scientific > evidence.
I agree, especially if you define the brain by some equivalence class of some number relation, like mechanism enforces us to do. And that is indeed con firmed by Quantum mechanics in the many worlds formulation (where we accept the existence of macroscopic superposition). > If it is incompatible with the mechanist assumption, then that is because the > mechanist assumption is useless rubbish. No, it is a consequence of the Mechanist assumption, unless you postulate that a brain is made of irreducible physical elements (energy, matter, space-time, etc.). > > > >> Evolution has precisely nothing to do with it. The preferred basis is >> determined by quantum Darwinism > > You can’t invoke quantum mechanics when using Mechanism, unless you explain > why the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations > (realised in arithmetic) seen from inside (a notion handled by the > self-referential logic, but some thought experience can give the main ideas > without delving too much in the provability logics). > > > I can invoke quantum mechanics when doing physics. The trouble with your > rubric "the quantum formalism emerges from the statistics on all computations > seen from the inside..." is that is precisely meaningless. You have never > given any indication of what "The statistics on all computations" might mean. > How do you select "all computations", and what "statistics" do you use on > them? And what might that give you, if anything? All computations exists provably, with the same relative statistics in all universal machineries (Turing complete set, Turing universal theories, etc.). The precise Turing complete formalism is irrelevant. All universal machineries gives rise to the same theology (and thus to the same physics, qualia included). Very elementary arithmetic is such a Turing complete formalism and it has to be assumed (up to a Turing-equivalence) if we want to be able to define what is a computation. > > Your grand promises have never actually delivered anything, Bruno. I predicted the “many world” from this well before I knew anything of Quantum Mechanics (except as a tool in the study of enzyme behaviour at that time). Then it took me 30 years to prove that the physics of all universal machine or number is quantum like. The theory explains consciousness and the appearance of matter, and this in a completely testable way, and well tested up to now. It is the Aristotelian materialism which explains nothing (despite given a good frame to do physics, but not to understand it as our discussion and other many debate illustrate). I did not promise anything. I submit a new formulation of a lasting problem (the mind-body problem) and I found the propositional part of the solution. It explains where the physical appearances come from, and why it divides into a sharable public domain, and a non sharable private domain. Non mechanism, on the contrary, invoke personal ontological commitment for which there are no evidences at all. > You seem to think that you can lay down the law about quantum mechanics, but > you have no idea how to get even the Schroedinger equation from your > "statistics over computations”. That is wrong. I explain exactly how to do it. The mathematics is just complicated, but that does not make it wrong, and what has already been derived is more than what physics has ever explained. Physicists use an implicit mind-brain identity criteria which works very well FAPP, but is inconsistent with Mechanism, and might be consistent with some theory of mind, which is still not there. Physicalism is highly speculative, in metaphysics. > Until you can actually produce something that even vaguely approaches an > account of the physical world we see around us, you can be safely ignored. You are the one speculating on some ontology without any evidence, and this just to avoid that a machine could be able to think (be conscious). You speculate on some non mechanist theory of mind, and thus on some actual physical infinities, just to get a unique world in which the machine cannot think. You remind me Jacques Arsac who wrote a book to demolish Artificial Intelligence and computationalism. The first sentence is “I am catholic, so I cannot believe that a machine can think”. Your argument seems to proceed in a similar way. That is what the materialist do since more than 1500 years. Why not listen to the machine? There are good books on this subject, like Smullyan’s "forever Undecided”, or the more technical books by George Boolos. They contain a chapter on the ([]p & p) mode of self-reference already. It would help you to understand better the technical part of the extraction of physics from arithmetic. This is not done to replace physics by theology, just to make physics coherent with psychology, biology and (platonician) theology. Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQgbcYxNGKzqc0BV_C%3Dn_TDUzfnLPf0%2B2Qb4J0y6S5h8g%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLQgbcYxNGKzqc0BV_C%3Dn_TDUzfnLPf0%2B2Qb4J0y6S5h8g%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/33B712C2-5815-4102-8AE2-AE0573B21EDC%40ulb.ac.be.
