> On 5 Dec 2019, at 18:30, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 6:31 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >>what did the correct answer to the question asked the day before yesterday > in Helsinki turn out to be? What one and only one city did "you" end up > seeing yesterday, was it Washington or Moscow? > > > Almost. > > Almost my ass, that's all that's going on and it's pretty damn banal. > > > Mechanism predicts [...] > > Translation from the original Brunospeak: A very silly theory predicts. > > > that you will see only one city, > > And that very silly theory can not say who that shadowy mysterious person > called Mr.You is,
The mechanist hypothesis assures that both copy have the right to be qualified as you. > nor can it say what the correct answer to a obvious question turned out to > be, "what one and only one city did Mr.You end up seeing??” Indeed. That is the point. That is the first person indeterminacy, that you are using each time you defend Everett. But with Mechanism, you have to derive the phenomenological collapse *and* the wave itself. Or you are using a magical conception of matter, having the magical ability to make something real or more real. Your use of matter is similar to the pseudo-explanation “God did it”. > . It can't say what the correct answer was EVEN AFTER the "experiment" is > long over. That is where you forget to put yourself in the shoes of the guy making the experience. After the experiment, it is easy to understand that both know very well the answer, despite having been unable to predict it, for simple logical reason. > And that means it was not an experiment at all, It is both an experiment, and an experience. Once we distinguish 1p and 3p modes, that distinction is of course crucial. > and it also shows that a question mark does not possess magical powers, it > shows that no punctuation mark can turn gibberish into a question, not even > if is placed at the very end. > > > What you cannot predict in Helsinki is the particular city you will feel to > > end in. > > It can not be pre-dicted and it can not be post-dicted either because Bruno > Marchal does not know what "it" is, or know what exactly the question was, or > know who the hell Mr. You is. > > > The clear answer is the prediction I have made in Helsinki: with certainty, > > I will [...] > > By casually throwing in the personal pronoun "I" in a thought experiment that > contains a "I" duplicating machine Bruno has already demonstrated that Bruno > is unable to clearly ask the question much less answer it. > > > You have claim this without ever saying what is unclear, > > WHAT THE HELL?! For over 5 years I have been asking the same question, the > most recent time was just a few days ago in the very post you're responding > to! I asked and I quote "what did the correct answer to the question asked > the day before yesterday in Helsinki turn out to be? What one and only one > city did "you" end up seeing yesterday, was it Washington or Moscow?". You > claim to have derived all sorts of cosmic significant things from the fact > that BEFORE the event it can not be predicted what some mysterious person > named Mr. You will see, but EVEN AFTER the event nobody knows anything more > than what was known BEFORE the event. In the 3p description, you are correct, but the question is about your 1p experience. Let us iterate it ten times, starting like always in Helsinki, where the question is asked before the experience, of course. We get the 2^10 first person histories. Imagine that there is no first person indeterminacy. That would mean you can predict your future experience in Helsinki; Imagine that you predict WMWWWWMMWM Now, the question is about the personal experience, so we have to ask all copies if they agree, and a good answer is when they all agree. So here, clearly (2^10 - 1) copies disagrees. Yet, if the guy say in Helsinki “I don’t know, except that it will be a sequence of “W” and “M”, then every copies get the confirmation. If they work together, they can verify that they have been distributed following the normal distribution exactly, and can use this to predict P = 1/2 for the next experience. > So the outcome of the "experiment" has produced precisely ZERO bits of new > information because everybody already know the man who saw Moscow would > become the Moscow Man and the man who say Washington would become the > Washington Man. But that is tautological. After the experience, each copy get one bit of information. The fact that this is not a verifiable 3p bit of information is rather welcome, as it illustrated the non justifiability of the personal individuality, which is so well illustrate by this. You ask for a 3p answer, like if someone was claiming to have found a 3p indeterminacy. But that is why I call it 1p-indeterminacy, to avoid this mistake. > > > > [...] feel to be in only one city, but I cannot predict which one among > > > Washington and Moscow. > > Forget prediction!! EVEN AFTER the experiment is long over you STILL can not > answer the question "what one and only one city did you turn out to see, > Washington or Moscow?” Nobody can answer this, except the copies, which are the one you need to ask to get their personal result, which is all what the predication was about. Just put your shoes at their places. You are just “eliminating” the 1p experience without saying, apparently. Bruno > and the reason you can't answer it is because it contains the personal > pronoun "you"; and if personal pronoun duplicating machines are involved that > means it is not a question at all, it's just gibberish with a question mark > at the end. > > If you can't even clearly say what happened yesterday then you can't have had > been expected to make a clear prediction on the day before yesterday about > what would happen the next day. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1sd67WE2wFJuy8TDVhe0mRx_RTyVsVfe%2BCLO6SLpW9gw%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1sd67WE2wFJuy8TDVhe0mRx_RTyVsVfe%2BCLO6SLpW9gw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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