> On 28 Nov 2019, at 17:22, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 10:01 AM Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com 
> <mailto:allco...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
> >>Forget prediction!! Even AFTER the experiment is long over you STILL can 
> >>not answer the question "what city did you turn out to see?"
> 
> > Wait... what ? Sure you can, if you are the one who ended up in moscow... 
> > you answer moscow and write it in the diary... if you're the one who end up 
> > in washington, you answer washington. Easy.
> 
> OK, but then what did the correct answer to the question asked the day before 
> yesterday in Helsinki turn out to be? What one and only one city did "you" 
> end up seeing yesterday, was it Washington or Moscow? 
> 
> What can be predicted is that the man that sees Moscow will turn from the 
> Helsinki Man into the Moscow Man, and the man that sees Washington will turn 
> from the Helsinki Man into the Washington Man. This banality is what Bruno 
> calls first person indeterminacy.

Almost. Mechanism predicts that you will see only one city, for the same reason 
that you can predict with certainty that you will have a cup of coffee. Indeed 
“seing one city” will be true in both places, like drinking the cup of coffee. 
What you cannot predict in Helsinki is the particular city you will feel to end 
in.

I agree that this is still rather banal, but if you agree now, you can move to 
the next step, and eventually grasp that when we assume mechanism, the physical 
laws have to emerge from the statistics on all computations. Then the math 
explains a testable quantum aspect of nature from this, so we can say that, 
thanks to (Everett-like) formulation of QM, nature confirms the mechanist 
theory of mind. 

Bruno




> 
>  John K Clark
> 
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