It's my impression that Scott Aaronson's counter example pretty well
disposed of IIT.
Brent
On 1/27/2020 1:12 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
*IIT vs. Russellian Monism: A Metaphysical Showdown on the Content of
Experience*
Matteo Grasso
https://www.academia.edu/38261136/IIT_vs._Russellian_Monism_A_Metaphysical_Showdown_on_the_Content_of_Experience
Integrated information theory (IIT) (Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi,
2014; Tononi et al., 2016) attempts to account for both the
quantitative and the phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and in
taking consciousness as fundamental and widespread it bears
similarities to panpsychist Russellian monism (RM). In this paper I
compare IIT's and RM's (in its categoricalist version) response to the
conceivability argument, and their metaphysical account of conscious
experience. I start by claiming that RM neutralizes the conceivability
argument, but that by virtue of its commitment to categoricalism it
doesn't exclude fickle qualia scenarios (e.g. inverted or changing
qualia). I argue that IIT's core notion of intrinsic cause-effect
power makes it incompatible with categoricalist versions of RM
(Chalmers, 2013; Alter and Nagasawa, 2015) and, to the contrary, is
best understood as entailing pandispositionalism, the view for which
all properties are powers. I show that, thus construed, IIT can cope
with both the conceivability and with the fickle qualia arguments,
offers a promising way to account for the content of experience, and
hence is preferable to categoricalist RM.
*Is Consciousness Intrinsic?: A Problem for the Integrated Information
Theory*
Hedda Hassel Mørch
https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that
consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or
maximal Φ. One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the
intrinsicality problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but
maximal Φ is an extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be
identical. In this paper, I show that this problem is not unique to
IIT, but rather derives from a trilemma that confronts almost any
theory of consciousness. Given most theories of consciousness, the
following three claims are inconsistent. INTRINSICALITY: Consciousness
is intrinsic. NON-OVERLAP: Conscious systems do not overlap with other
conscious systems (a la Unger’s problem of the many). REDUCTIONISM:
Consciousness is constituted by more fundamental properties (as per
standard versions of physicalism and Russellian monism). In view of
this, I will consider whether rejecting INTRINSICALITY is necessarily
less plausible than rejecting NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM. I will also
consider whether IIT is necessarily committed to rejecting
INTRINSICALITY or whether it could also accept solutions that reject
NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM instead. I will suggest that the best
option for IIT may be a solution that rejects REDUCTIONISM rather than
INTRINSICALITY or NON-OVERLAP.
@philipthrift
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