> On 29 Jan 2020, at 00:55, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 29, 2020 at 10:31 AM Philip Thrift <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Maybe. But the failure I wrote of applies if consciousness occurs only in > brains (or even in just human brains) and IIT only applies to that. Unless > IIT is modified as Mørch proposes, but then IIT would not be the same IIT > that Aaronson is writing about 6 years ago. > > I don't think simple modifications to IIT to make it no longer IIT is going > to allow it to escape from Aronson's critique. Besides, there is no "hard > problem" of consciousness……
The hard problem of consciousness is the nth materialist version of the mind-body problem. With mechanism, that problem is indeed solvable. Consciousness is just anything simultaneously true, non provable, knowable, even indubitable (knowingly for “rich" entities) and non definable, and indeed the logic of machine self-reference shows that all machine looking inward, in the way allowed by mathematical logic (theoretical computer science) will bring a term to describe this, and is a good candidate to be called consciousness. But the mind-body problem is not solved per se by this, as the physical universe vanishes from the ontology, and the laws of physics have to be retrieved from a special statistics on the computations, and indeed that gives both quantum logic, and a many-histories interpretation of the observable in arithmetic. Now, I am not sure if that works for you as you seem to believe in a material ontology, so you need a non Turing emulable notion of mind… (an idea that I find premature, let us test mechanism before speculating it is false. Mechanism is used in biology Drawinism, and is currently implied by all know physical theories, except for very special use of GR, known to be incompatible with QM). Bruno > > Bruce > > @philipthrift > > > On Tuesday, January 28, 2020 at 1:35:02 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > On 1/27/2020 10:42 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> The bottom line for why IIT fails: >> >> If there are no experiences (experiential units, constituents, whatever) - >> wherever they may be in nature, assumedly in brains - to process, there is >> nothing to be integrated in the first place. > > > No, it fails because it doesn't agree with the common sense assessment of > what is conscious and what is not. From Scott's blog: > > For we can easily interpret IIT as trying to do something more “modest” than > solve the Hard Problem, although still staggeringly audacious. Namely, we > can say that IIT “merely” aims to tell us which physical systems are > associated with consciousness and which aren’t, purely in terms of the > systems’ physical organization. The test of such a theory is whether it can > produce results agreeing with “commonsense intuition”: for example, whether > it can affirm, from first principles, that (most) humans are conscious; that > dogs and horses are also conscious but less so; that rocks, livers, bacteria > colonies, and existing digital computers are not conscious (or are hardly > conscious); and that a room full of people has no “mega-consciousness” over > and above the consciousnesses of the individuals. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTPi7wFumVnb9oFFc_ZOBpQ7dwapm6cNTPv3pzAVqinbg%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTPi7wFumVnb9oFFc_ZOBpQ7dwapm6cNTPv3pzAVqinbg%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B6425F9B-F41D-4131-A9C1-CA822AF08C36%40ulb.ac.be.
