What is Scott Aaronson's counterexample to IIT?
Is he in agreement with Mørch?
@philipthrift
On Monday, January 27, 2020 at 4:19:08 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
> It's my impression that Scott Aaronson's counter example pretty well
> disposed of IIT.
>
> Brent
>
> On 1/27/2020 1:12 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> *IIT vs. Russellian Monism: A Metaphysical Showdown on the Content of
> Experience*
> Matteo Grasso
>
> https://www.academia.edu/38261136/IIT_vs._Russellian_Monism_A_Metaphysical_Showdown_on_the_Content_of_Experience
>
> Integrated information theory (IIT) (Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi, 2014;
> Tononi et al., 2016) attempts to account for both the quantitative and the
> phenomenal aspects of consciousness, and in taking consciousness as
> fundamental and widespread it bears similarities to panpsychist Russellian
> monism (RM). In this paper I compare IIT's and RM's (in its categoricalist
> version) response to the conceivability argument, and their metaphysical
> account of conscious experience. I start by claiming that RM neutralizes
> the conceivability argument, but that by virtue of its commitment to
> categoricalism it doesn't exclude fickle qualia scenarios (e.g. inverted or
> changing qualia). I argue that IIT's core notion of intrinsic cause-effect
> power makes it incompatible with categoricalist versions of RM (Chalmers,
> 2013; Alter and Nagasawa, 2015) and, to the contrary, is best understood as
> entailing pandispositionalism, the view for which all properties are
> powers. I show that, thus construed, IIT can cope with both the
> conceivability and with the fickle qualia arguments, offers a promising way
> to account for the content of experience, and hence is preferable to
> categoricalist RM.
>
>
>
> *Is Consciousness Intrinsic?: A Problem for the Integrated Information
> Theory*
> Hedda Hassel Mørch
> https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
>
> The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that
> consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ.
> One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality
> problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an
> extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. In this paper, I
> show that this problem is not unique to IIT, but rather derives from a
> trilemma that confronts almost any theory of consciousness. Given most
> theories of consciousness, the following three claims are inconsistent.
> INTRINSICALITY: Consciousness is intrinsic. NON-OVERLAP: Conscious systems
> do not overlap with other conscious systems (a la Unger’s problem of the
> many). REDUCTIONISM: Consciousness is constituted by more fundamental
> properties (as per standard versions of physicalism and Russellian monism).
> In view of this, I will consider whether rejecting INTRINSICALITY is
> necessarily less plausible than rejecting NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM. I
> will also consider whether IIT is necessarily committed to rejecting
> INTRINSICALITY or whether it could also accept solutions that reject
> NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM instead. I will suggest that the best option
> for IIT may be a solution that rejects REDUCTIONISM rather than
> INTRINSICALITY or NON-OVERLAP.
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
>
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cd521cf7-2615-466e-8435-df83742a8070%40googlegroups.com.
