What I mean is, "consciousness exists" cannot be denied, in any context.
On Wed, Feb 19, 2020, 11:00 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote: > But it is the same as 'Consciousness exists'. The "true" is otiose; and > probably the "exists" too. > > Brent > > On 2/19/2020 7:16 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: > > That's my view as well. However, the original article made reference to > "absolute truth", and whether that concept is sensible. Thinking of > Descartes' famous "I think, therefore I am", the word "I" is suspect, but > we can do away with that and say it's absolutely true that "consciousness > exists", and this is about as context-free a statement as one can make. > > Terren > > > On Wed, Feb 19, 2020 at 7:20 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> >> >> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> Wittgenstein is at the core really of *linguistic pragmatism * >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >> >> Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there". >> >> >> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. >> Tacked onto a declarative sentence, it's just emphasis. In science it's an >> the attribute of statements that can be confirmed empirically. In logic >> and mathematics it's just a marker that is assigned to axioms and >> guaranteed to be preserved by the rules of inference. >> >> Brent >> >> >> Philosophers are merely a type of *programming language theorists*. >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory >> >> @philipthrift >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 12:43:01 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >>> >>> I quite agree with Horwich and Wittgenstein as they refer to >>> meta-physics. I think one contribution of meta-physics, as in analyzing >>> the interpretations of quantum mechanics, is what Wittgenstein called >>> "therapuetic", i.e. clarifying and identifying real problems versus >>> psuedo-problems of language. But I think they also serve a purpose in >>> suggesting how science may advance, what new theories might be developed or >>> how old ones may be better understood. Although the latter is generally >>> done by scientists who are specialists in the field, there are exceptions >>> like Tim Maudlin. And from a meta-physical perspective, mathematicians are >>> nothing but armchair philosophers. >>> >>> Horwich doesn't seem to touch at all on moral and ethical philosophy, >>> how one should live one's life, as exemplified by the epicurieans, the >>> stoics, the existentialists,... Someday neuroscience, evolution, AI, and >>> decision theory may make this field more scientific, but in the meantime >>> there's a place for philosophy. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> On 2/18/2020 11:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/was-wittgenstein-right/ >>> >>> *Was Wittgenstein Right?* >>> BY PAUL HORWICH >>> MARCH 3, 2013 >>> >>> A reminder of philosophy’s embarrassing failure, after over 2000 years, >>> to settle any of its central issues. >>> >>> >>> The singular achievement of the controversial early 20th century >>> philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein was to have discerned the true nature of >>> Western philosophy — what is special about its problems, where they come >>> from, how they should and should not be addressed, and what can and cannot >>> be accomplished by grappling with them. The uniquely insightful answers >>> provided to these meta-questions are what give his treatments of specific >>> issues within the subject — concerning language, experience, knowledge, >>> mathematics, art and religion among them — a power of illumination that >>> cannot be found in the work of others. >>> >>> Admittedly, few would agree with this rosy assessment — certainly not >>> many professional philosophers. Apart from a small and ignored clique of >>> hard-core supporters the usual view these days is that his writing is >>> self-indulgently obscure and that behind the catchy slogans there is little >>> of intellectual value. But this dismissal disguises what is pretty clearly >>> the real cause of Wittgenstein’s unpopularity within departments of >>> philosophy: namely, his thoroughgoing rejection of the subject as >>> traditionally and currently practiced; his insistence that it can’t give us >>> the kind of knowledge generally regarded as its raison d’être. >>> >>> Wittgenstein claims that there are no realms of phenomena whose study is >>> the special business of a philosopher, and about which he or she should >>> devise profound a priori theories and sophisticated supporting arguments. >>> There are no startling discoveries to be made of facts, not open to the >>> methods of science, yet accessible “from the armchair” through some blend >>> of intuition, pure reason and conceptual analysis. Indeed the whole idea of >>> a subject that could yield such results is based on confusion and wishful >>> thinking. >>> >>> This attitude is in stark opposition to the traditional view, which >>> continues to prevail. Philosophy is respected, even exalted, for its >>> promise to provide fundamental insights into the human condition and the >>> ultimate character of the universe, leading to vital conclusions about how >>> we are to arrange our lives. It’s taken for granted that there is deep >>> understanding to be obtained of the nature of consciousness, of how >>> knowledge of the external world is possible, of whether our decisions can >>> be truly free, of the structure of any just society, and so on — and that >>> philosophy’s job is to provide such understanding. Isn’t that why we are so >>> fascinated by it? >>> >>> If so, then we are duped and bound to be disappointed, says >>> Wittgenstein. For these are mere pseudo-problems, the misbegotten products >>> of linguistic illusion and muddled thinking. So it should be entirely >>> unsurprising that the “philosophy” aiming to solve them has been marked by >>> perennial controversy and lack of decisive progress — by an embarrassing >>> failure, after over 2000 years, to settle any of its central issues. >>> Therefore traditional philosophical theorizing must give way to a >>> painstaking identification of its tempting but misguided presuppositions >>> and an understanding of how we ever came to regard them as legitimate. But >>> in that case, he asks, “[w]here does [our] investigation get its importance >>> from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all >>> that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind >>> only bits of stone and rubble)” — and answers that “(w)hat we are >>> destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground >>> of language on which they stand.” >>> >>> Given this extreme pessimism about the potential of philosophy — perhaps >>> tantamount to a denial that there is such a subject — it is hardly >>> surprising that “Wittgenstein” is uttered with a curl of the lip in most >>> philosophical circles. For who likes to be told that his or her life’s work >>> is confused and pointless? Thus, even Bertrand Russell, his early teacher >>> and enthusiastic supporter, was eventually led to complain peevishly that >>> Wittgenstein seems to have “grown tired of serious thinking and invented a >>> doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary.” >>> >>> But what is that notorious doctrine, and can it be defended? We might >>> boil it down to four related claims. >>> >>> — The first is that traditional philosophy is scientistic: its primary >>> goals, which are to arrive at simple, general principles, to uncover >>> profound explanations, and to correct naïve opinions, are taken from the >>> sciences. And this is undoubtedly the case. >>> >>> —The second is that the non-empirical (“armchair”) character of >>> philosophical investigation — its focus on conceptual truth — is in tension >>> with those goals. That’s because our concepts exhibit a highly >>> theory-resistant complexity and variability. They evolved, not for the sake >>> of science and its objectives, but rather in order to cater to the >>> interacting contingencies of our nature, our culture, our environment, our >>> communicative needs and our other purposes. As a consequence the >>> commitments defining individual concepts are rarely simple or determinate, >>> and differ dramatically from one concept to another. Moreover, it is not >>> possible (as it is within empirical domains) to accommodate superficial >>> complexity by means of simple principles at a more basic (e.g. microscopic) >>> level. >>> >>> — The third main claim of Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy — an immediate >>> consequence of the first two — is that traditional philosophy is >>> necessarily pervaded with oversimplification; analogies are unreasonably >>> inflated; exceptions to simple regularities are wrongly dismissed. >>> >>> — Therefore — the fourth claim — a decent approach to the subject must >>> avoid theory-construction and instead be merely “therapeutic,” confined to >>> exposing the irrational assumptions on which theory-oriented investigations >>> are based and the irrational conclusions to which they lead. >>> >>> Consider, for instance, the paradigmatically philosophical question: >>> “What is truth?”. This provokes perplexity because, on the one hand, it >>> demands an answer of the form, “Truth is such–and-such,” but on the other >>> hand, despite hundreds of years of looking, no acceptable answer of that >>> kind has ever been found. We’ve tried truth as “correspondence with the >>> facts,” as “provability,” as “practical utility,” and as “stable >>> consensus”; but all turned out to be defective in one way or another — >>> either circular or subject to counterexamples. Reactions to this impasse >>> have included a variety of theoretical proposals. Some philosophers have >>> been led to deny that there is such a thing as absolute truth. Some have >>> maintained (insisting on one of the above definitions) that although truth >>> exists, it lacks certain features that are ordinarily attributed to it — >>> for example, that the truth may sometimes be impossible to discover. Some >>> have inferred that truth is intrinsically paradoxical and essentially >>> incomprehensible. And others persist in the attempt to devise a definition >>> that will fit all the intuitive data. >>> >>> But from Wittgenstein’s perspective each of the first three of these >>> strategies rides roughshod over our fundamental convictions about truth, >>> and the fourth is highly unlikely to succeed. Instead we should begin, he >>> thinks, by recognizing (as mentioned above) that our various concepts play >>> very different roles in our cognitive economy and (correspondingly) are >>> governed by defining principles of very different kinds. Therefore, it was >>> always a mistake to extrapolate from the fact that empirical concepts, such >>> as red or magnetic or alive stand for properties with specifiable >>> underlying natures to the presumption that the notion of truth must stand >>> for some such property as well. >>> >>> Wittgenstein’s conceptual pluralism positions us to recognize that >>> notion’s idiosyncratic function, and to infer that truth itself will not be >>> reducible to anything more basic. More specifically, we can see that the >>> concept’s function in our cognitive economy is merely to serve as a device >>> of generalization. It enables us to say such things as “Einstein’s last >>> words were true,” and not be stuck with “If Einstein’s last words were that >>> E=mc², then E=mc2; and if his last words were that nuclear weapons >>> should be banned, then nuclear weapons should be banned; … and so on,” >>> which has the disadvantage of being infinitely long! Similarly we can use >>> it to say: “We should want our beliefs to be true” (instead of struggling >>> with “We should want that if we believe that E=mc², then E=mc²; and >>> that if we believe … etc.”). We can see, also, that this sort of utility >>> depends upon nothing more than the fact that the attribution of truth to a >>> statement is obviously equivalent to the statement itself — for example, >>> “It’s true that E=mc²” is equivalent to “E=mc²”. Thus possession of the >>> concept of truth appears to consist in an appreciation of that triviality, >>> rather than a mastery of any explicit definition. The traditional search >>> for such an account (or for some other form of reductive analysis) was a >>> wild-goose chase, a pseudo-problem. Truth emerges as exceptionally >>> unprofound and as exceptionally unmysterious. >>> >>> This example illustrates the key components of Wittgenstein’s >>> metaphilosophy, and suggests how to flesh them out a little further. >>> Philosophical problems typically arise from the clash between the >>> inevitably idiosyncratic features of special-purpose concepts —true, good, >>> object, person, now, necessary — and the scientistically driven insistence >>> upon uniformity. Moreover, the various kinds of theoretical move designed >>> to resolve such conflicts (forms of skepticism, revisionism, mysterianism >>> and conservative systematization) are not only irrational, but >>> unmotivated.The paradoxes to which they respond should instead be resolved >>> merely by coming to appreciate the mistakes of perverse overgeneralization >>> from which they arose. And the fundamental source of this irrationality is >>> scientism. >>> >>> As Wittgenstein put it in the “The Blue Book”: >>> >>> Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with >>> the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of >>> natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural >>> laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by >>> using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science >>> before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the >>> way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and >>> leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it >>> can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain >>> anything. Philosophy really is “purely descriptive. >>> >>> These radical ideas are not obviously correct, and may on close scrutiny >>> turn out to be wrong. But they deserve to receive that scrutiny — to be >>> taken much more seriously than they are. Yes, most of us have been >>> interested in philosophy only because of its promise to deliver precisely >>> the sort of theoretical insights that Wittgenstein argues are illusory. But >>> such hopes are no defense against his critique. Besides, if he turns out to >>> be right, satisfaction enough may surely be found in what we still can get >>> — clarity, demystification and truth. >>> >>> NOTE: A response to this post by Michael P. Lynch will be published in >>> The Stone later this week. >>> [ >>> https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/of-flies-and-philosophers-wittgenstein-and-philosophy/ >>> ] >>> >>> Paul Horwich is a professor of philosophy at New York University. He is >>> the author of several books, including “Reflections on Meaning,” >>> “Truth-Meaning-Reality,” and most recently, “Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy.” >>> [ https://as.nyu.edu/content/nyu-as/as/faculty/paul-g-horwich.html ] >>> >>> >>> cf. >>> *Language Games, Writing Games - Wittgenstein and Derrida: A Comparative >>> Study* >>> Jolán Orbán >>> https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Lang/LangOrba.htm >>> >>> >>> @philipthrift >>> >>> >>> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bb962b26-45b5-45e5-b0ed-969ef177dbd0%40googlegroups.com >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bb962b26-45b5-45e5-b0ed-969ef177dbd0%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/64ff496a-b215-b857-35ed-f59608fdc15c%40verizon.net >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/64ff496a-b215-b857-35ed-f59608fdc15c%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >> . >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMy3ZA_LeCmdcaQ0%2B48nhs-c_hT%3DUHRqfoYQwp6UZ1PAdE7erw%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMy3ZA_LeCmdcaQ0%2B48nhs-c_hT%3DUHRqfoYQwp6UZ1PAdE7erw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9bbae90f-b63a-6f69-bcbb-a5bba1aa8317%40verizon.net > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9bbae90f-b63a-6f69-bcbb-a5bba1aa8317%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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