On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 7:29:26 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: > > > > On 2/23/2020 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Feb 2020, at 01:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > On 2/22/2020 3:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 10:40:12 AM UTC-7, PGC wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Wittgenstein is at the core really of *linguistic pragmatism * >>> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >>> >>> Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there". >>> >>> >>> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. >>> >>> >>> And in different modes (of self-reference). The platonists dis >>> understand that the absolute truth requires faith in something beyond “my >>> consciousness” or “consciousness” (to take into account Terren Suydam’ >>> remark). >>> >> >> Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those old arguments >> over anybody proposing science based ontological packages metaphysically: >> language will seduce people to overgeneralize, to confuse personal >> mysticism with reality, to engage in false equivalencies between terms used >> in formal contexts and everyday use of language, scientism etc. Slowly, >> yours truly is coming around to the idea that folks agreeing on >> ontology/reality/religion, which would guide research in some allegedly >> correct direction; spilling over positive effects into the world... that >> Wittgenstein may prove correct in that this is a confused product of >> muddled armchair thinking, not because of his generally negative stance, >> but because there seem to be positive developments out there that he >> couldn't have informed those arguments with. >> >> I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair forms of >> identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on this list with profound >> erudition, walking in circles for 20 years now (Wittgenstein says thousands >> of years) to optimization and more efficient pursuit of value and benefit >> questions instead, through say orchestration of highly sophisticated forms >> of organization applied to education, governing, finance, technology, >> problem solving, applied or theoretical etc. that are permissionless, >> universally accessible, require no hierarchy of politics, charlatan >> experts, control freaks, their sycophants, and bibles of some Messiah >> achieving miracles such as eternal life, self-duplication etc. >> >> Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth, trust, power, >> control, or proof and more emphasis on "can entities such as ourselves be >> highly organized, solve specific survival problems over short and long >> terms, without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks will be >> opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't agree on what reality may >> be, but we do agree on the need for habitable living space in the long >> term, nutrition, water, health, limiting self-destruction, expensive wars, >> standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more appropriate politics >> and economics on the horizon. Metaphysics here, shifting our old-school >> conceptions of what first principles are, and you'd refute Wittgenstein >> instead of running from him. Engineering incentive and not what the game is >> but *how* the game of life on this planet could be. >> >> >>> >>> About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I am”, Descartes use >>> the “first person” I. Indeed he start from the doubt. Dubito ergo cogito, >>> cogito ergo sum. Descartes did not prove the existence of Descartes, bit of >>> his own consciousness, hoping others can do the same reasoning for >>> themselves. Consciousness always refer to a first person experience >>> implicitly: like God (truth) it is not a thing. >>> >> >> You concede to Terren that "true means different things in different >> contexts" but everyday like clockwork you still barrage the list with your >> use of "large truth, 3p, reality that cannot be named, mechanism is >> incompatible with physicalism" and all the rest of it. I used to wonder why >> you don't pursue contact with linguists, physicists, a wider audience, and >> philosophers but this has ceased to surprise me. PNGC >> > > I think I finally got it -- what mechanism means for Bruno -- namely, that > a human being can be perfectly simulated by a computer. But if that's what > he means, how does it follow that mechanism is incompatible with > physicalism? > > > Because all possible computations (in the Turing sense) are implicit in > arithmetic. And Bruno thinks arithmetic exists, and hence all threads of > human (and non-human) consciousness exist in arithmetic. > > What exactly does Bruno mean by physicalism? > > > That physics is the basic science; i.e. the ontology of physics, whatever > it is, must give rise to everything else, including conscious thought. > > Why the incompatibility? Bruno? TIA, AG > > > Bruno's a fundamentalist. You can only have one, really real, true > fundamental ontology. > > > Given the sense of “fundamentalism” in the religious (pseudo-religious) > domain, it might be useful to make precise that I do not defend any theory > or religion. I just say that IF we can survive with an artificial brain, > then physics becomes the science of available predictions by universal > machine implemented in arithmetic. > > > If arithmetic exists independent of physics. > > Brent >
The likely flaw in Bruno's theory is that the axioms of arithmetic don't imply the existence of space and time. Hence, mechanism is false. Simulating a human brain, even if possible, is not enough to copying a universe. AG > > And that this makes Mechanism Versus Materialism testable, and indeed > confirmed by the observation, notably by QM without collapse. There is a > "many-world" interpretation of arithmetic (in the head of all universal > numbers), and we can test it. We can use any Turing universal formalism > instead of arithmetic. They all lead to the same theology, and the same > physics. > > Bruno > > > > > Brent > > >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a06f5819-1e53-49d6-918f-845fa799543d%40googlegroups.com.
