> On 25 Feb 2020, at 01:50, Alan Grayson <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 9:47:36 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: > > > On 2/23/2020 6:43 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >> >> >> On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 7:29:26 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 2/23/2020 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 01:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 2/22/2020 3:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 10:40:12 AM UTC-7, PGC wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>>> <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Wittgenstein is at the core really of linguistic pragmatism >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >>>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there". >>>>>> >>>>>> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. >>>>> >>>>> And in different modes (of self-reference). The platonists dis understand >>>>> that the absolute truth requires faith in something beyond “my >>>>> consciousness” or “consciousness” (to take into account Terren Suydam’ >>>>> remark). >>>>> >>>>> Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those old arguments >>>>> over anybody proposing science based ontological packages metaphysically: >>>>> language will seduce people to overgeneralize, to confuse personal >>>>> mysticism with reality, to engage in false equivalencies between terms >>>>> used in formal contexts and everyday use of language, scientism etc. >>>>> Slowly, yours truly is coming around to the idea that folks agreeing on >>>>> ontology/reality/religion, which would guide research in some allegedly >>>>> correct direction; spilling over positive effects into the world... that >>>>> Wittgenstein may prove correct in that this is a confused product of >>>>> muddled armchair thinking, not because of his generally negative stance, >>>>> but because there seem to be positive developments out there that he >>>>> couldn't have informed those arguments with. >>>>> >>>>> I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair forms of >>>>> identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on this list with profound >>>>> erudition, walking in circles for 20 years now (Wittgenstein says >>>>> thousands of years) to optimization and more efficient pursuit of value >>>>> and benefit questions instead, through say orchestration of highly >>>>> sophisticated forms of organization applied to education, governing, >>>>> finance, technology, problem solving, applied or >>>>> theoretical etc. that are permissionless, universally accessible, >>>>> require no hierarchy of politics, charlatan experts, control freaks, >>>>> their sycophants, and bibles of some Messiah achieving miracles such as >>>>> eternal life, self-duplication etc. >>>>> >>>>> Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth, trust, power, >>>>> control, or proof and more emphasis on "can entities such as ourselves be >>>>> highly organized, solve specific survival problems over short and long >>>>> terms, without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks will be >>>>> opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't agree on what reality >>>>> may be, but we do agree on the need for habitable living space in the >>>>> long term, nutrition, water, health, limiting self-destruction, expensive >>>>> wars, standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more appropriate >>>>> politics and economics on the horizon. Metaphysics here, shifting our >>>>> old-school conceptions of what first principles are, and you'd refute >>>>> Wittgenstein instead of running from him. Engineering incentive and not >>>>> what the game is but how the game of life on this planet could be. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I am”, Descartes use >>>>> the “first person” I. Indeed he start from the doubt. Dubito ergo cogito, >>>>> cogito ergo sum. Descartes did not prove the existence of Descartes, bit >>>>> of his own consciousness, hoping others can do the same reasoning for >>>>> themselves. Consciousness always refer to a first person experience >>>>> implicitly: like God (truth) it is not a thing. >>>>> >>>>> You concede to Terren that "true means different things in different >>>>> contexts" but everyday like clockwork you still barrage the list with >>>>> your use of "large truth, 3p, reality that cannot be named, mechanism is >>>>> incompatible with physicalism" and all the rest of it. I used to wonder >>>>> why you don't pursue contact with linguists, physicists, a wider >>>>> audience, and philosophers but this has ceased to surprise me. PNGC >>>>> >>>>> I think I finally got it -- what mechanism means for Bruno -- namely, >>>>> that a human being can be perfectly simulated by a computer. But if >>>>> that's what he means, how does it follow that mechanism is incompatible >>>>> with physicalism? >>>> >>>> Because all possible computations (in the Turing sense) are implicit in >>>> arithmetic. And Bruno thinks arithmetic exists, and hence all threads of >>>> human (and non-human) consciousness exist in arithmetic. >>>> >>>>> What exactly does Bruno mean by physicalism? >>>> >>>> That physics is the basic science; i.e. the ontology of physics, whatever >>>> it is, must give rise to everything else, including conscious thought. >>>> >>>>> Why the incompatibility? Bruno? TIA, AG >>>> >>>> Bruno's a fundamentalist. You can only have one, really real, true >>>> fundamental ontology. >>> >>> Given the sense of “fundamentalism” in the religious (pseudo-religious) >>> domain, it might be useful to make precise that I do not defend any theory >>> or religion. I just say that IF we can survive with an artificial brain, >>> then physics becomes the science of available predictions by universal >>> machine implemented in arithmetic. >> >> If arithmetic exists independent of physics. >> >> Brent >> >> The likely flaw in Bruno's theory is that the axioms of arithmetic don't >> imply the existence of space and time. > > Most people would say they don't even imply the existence of arithmetic. > > Brent > > ISTM that Peano's Postulates clearly imply positive and negative integers, > zero, and arithmetic. What's the contrary argument? TIA, AG
(Just a tiny detail, but there is no negative integer in Peano arithmetic). Now, Z + * can be shown to be also Turing universal, but usually we take PA which is simpler. Bruno > >> Hence, mechanism is false. Simulating a human brain, even if possible, is >> not enough to copying a universe. AG >> >>> And that this makes Mechanism Versus Materialism testable, and indeed >>> confirmed by the observation, notably by QM without collapse. There is a >>> "many-world" interpretation of arithmetic (in the head of all universal >>> numbers), and we can test it. We can use any Turing universal formalism >>> instead of arithmetic. They all lead to the same theology, and the same >>> physics. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected] <>. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] <>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a06f5819-1e53-49d6-918f-845fa799543d%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a06f5819-1e53-49d6-918f-845fa799543d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e0444074-cb95-4844-b45d-325f802d78a7%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e0444074-cb95-4844-b45d-325f802d78a7%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/66E65309-F72E-410C-A19B-E8A9B1E68226%40ulb.ac.be.
