On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 10:47:36 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 2/23/2020 6:43 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 7:29:26 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 2/23/2020 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 23 Feb 2020, at 01:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 2/22/2020 3:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 10:40:12 AM UTC-7, PGC wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>>> [email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Wittgenstein is at the core really of *linguistic pragmatism * >>>> >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >>>> >>>> Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there". >>>> >>>> >>>> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. >>>> >>>> >>>> And in different modes (of self-reference). The platonists dis >>>> understand that the absolute truth requires faith in something beyond “my >>>> consciousness” or “consciousness” (to take into account Terren Suydam’ >>>> remark). >>>> >>> >>> Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those old arguments >>> over anybody proposing science based ontological packages metaphysically: >>> language will seduce people to overgeneralize, to confuse personal >>> mysticism with reality, to engage in false equivalencies between terms used >>> in formal contexts and everyday use of language, scientism etc. Slowly, >>> yours truly is coming around to the idea that folks agreeing on >>> ontology/reality/religion, which would guide research in some allegedly >>> correct direction; spilling over positive effects into the world... that >>> Wittgenstein may prove correct in that this is a confused product of >>> muddled armchair thinking, not because of his generally negative stance, >>> but because there seem to be positive developments out there that he >>> couldn't have informed those arguments with. >>> >>> I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair forms of >>> identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on this list with profound >>> erudition, walking in circles for 20 years now (Wittgenstein says thousands >>> of years) to optimization and more efficient pursuit of value and benefit >>> questions instead, through say orchestration of highly sophisticated forms >>> of organization applied to education, governing, finance, technology, >>> problem solving, applied or theoretical etc. that are permissionless, >>> universally accessible, require no hierarchy of politics, charlatan >>> experts, control freaks, their sycophants, and bibles of some Messiah >>> achieving miracles such as eternal life, self-duplication etc. >>> >>> Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth, trust, power, >>> control, or proof and more emphasis on "can entities such as ourselves be >>> highly organized, solve specific survival problems over short and long >>> terms, without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks will be >>> opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't agree on what reality may >>> be, but we do agree on the need for habitable living space in the long >>> term, nutrition, water, health, limiting self-destruction, expensive wars, >>> standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more appropriate politics >>> and economics on the horizon. Metaphysics here, shifting our old-school >>> conceptions of what first principles are, and you'd refute Wittgenstein >>> instead of running from him. Engineering incentive and not what the game is >>> but *how* the game of life on this planet could be. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I am”, Descartes >>>> use the “first person” I. Indeed he start from the doubt. Dubito ergo >>>> cogito, cogito ergo sum. Descartes did not prove the existence of >>>> Descartes, bit of his own consciousness, hoping others can do the same >>>> reasoning for themselves. Consciousness always refer to a first person >>>> experience implicitly: like God (truth) it is not a thing. >>>> >>> >>> You concede to Terren that "true means different things in different >>> contexts" but everyday like clockwork you still barrage the list with your >>> use of "large truth, 3p, reality that cannot be named, mechanism is >>> incompatible with physicalism" and all the rest of it. I used to wonder why >>> you don't pursue contact with linguists, physicists, a wider audience, and >>> philosophers but this has ceased to surprise me. PNGC >>> >> >> I think I finally got it -- what mechanism means for Bruno -- namely, >> that a human being can be perfectly simulated by a computer. But if that's >> what he means, how does it follow that mechanism is incompatible with >> physicalism? >> >> >> Because all possible computations (in the Turing sense) are implicit in >> arithmetic. And Bruno thinks arithmetic exists, and hence all threads of >> human (and non-human) consciousness exist in arithmetic. >> >> What exactly does Bruno mean by physicalism? >> >> >> That physics is the basic science; i.e. the ontology of physics, whatever >> it is, must give rise to everything else, including conscious thought. >> >> Why the incompatibility? Bruno? TIA, AG >> >> >> Bruno's a fundamentalist. You can only have one, really real, true >> fundamental ontology. >> >> >> Given the sense of “fundamentalism” in the religious (pseudo-religious) >> domain, it might be useful to make precise that I do not defend any theory >> or religion. I just say that IF we can survive with an artificial brain, >> then physics becomes the science of available predictions by universal >> machine implemented in arithmetic. >> >> >> If arithmetic exists independent of physics. >> >> Brent >> > > The likely flaw in Bruno's theory is that the axioms of arithmetic don't > imply the existence of space and time. > > > Most people would say they don't even imply the existence of arithmetic. > > Brent > > Hence, mechanism is false. Simulating a human brain, even if possible, is > not enough to copying a universe. AG > >> >> And that this makes Mechanism Versus Materialism testable, and indeed >> confirmed by the observation, notably by QM without collapse. There is a >> "many-world" interpretation of arithmetic (in the head of all universal >> numbers), and we can test it. We can use any Turing universal formalism >> instead of arithmetic. They all lead to the same theology, and the same >> physics. >> >> Bruno >> >>
If you take the (La)TeX, AMS(La)TeX sources from all the physics papers on arXiv https://arxiv.org/help/submit_tex cf. Translating Math Formula Images to LaTeX Sequences Using Deep Neural Networks with Sequence-level Training https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.11415 and extract the math (Tex:Math), then all of arXiv physics can be reduced to arithmetic. That much is simple. The question is: can all physical stuff be reduced to arXiv physics? @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ea630ade-6769-4e05-9ecc-6624cce5f9bd%40googlegroups.com.
