> On 24 Feb 2020, at 05:47, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 2/23/2020 6:43 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >> >> >> On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 7:29:26 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 2/23/2020 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 01:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 2/22/2020 3:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 10:40:12 AM UTC-7, PGC wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>>> <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Wittgenstein is at the core really of linguistic pragmatism >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >>>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there". >>>>>> >>>>>> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. >>>>> >>>>> And in different modes (of self-reference). The platonists dis understand >>>>> that the absolute truth requires faith in something beyond “my >>>>> consciousness” or “consciousness” (to take into account Terren Suydam’ >>>>> remark). >>>>> >>>>> Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those old arguments >>>>> over anybody proposing science based ontological packages metaphysically: >>>>> language will seduce people to overgeneralize, to confuse personal >>>>> mysticism with reality, to engage in false equivalencies between terms >>>>> used in formal contexts and everyday use of language, scientism etc. >>>>> Slowly, yours truly is coming around to the idea that folks agreeing on >>>>> ontology/reality/religion, which would guide research in some allegedly >>>>> correct direction; spilling over positive effects into the world... that >>>>> Wittgenstein may prove correct in that this is a confused product of >>>>> muddled armchair thinking, not because of his generally negative stance, >>>>> but because there seem to be positive developments out there that he >>>>> couldn't have informed those arguments with. >>>>> >>>>> I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair forms of >>>>> identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on this list with profound >>>>> erudition, walking in circles for 20 years now (Wittgenstein says >>>>> thousands of years) to optimization and more efficient pursuit of value >>>>> and benefit questions instead, through say orchestration of highly >>>>> sophisticated forms of organization applied to education, governing, >>>>> finance, technology, problem solving, applied or theoretical etc. that >>>>> are permissionless, universally accessible, require no hierarchy of >>>>> politics, charlatan experts, control freaks, their sycophants, and bibles >>>>> of some Messiah achieving miracles such as eternal life, self-duplication >>>>> etc. >>>>> >>>>> Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth, trust, power, >>>>> control, or proof and more emphasis on "can entities such as ourselves be >>>>> highly organized, solve specific survival problems over short and long >>>>> terms, without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks will be >>>>> opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't agree on what reality >>>>> may be, but we do agree on the need for habitable living space in the >>>>> long term, nutrition, water, health, limiting self-destruction, expensive >>>>> wars, standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more appropriate >>>>> politics and economics on the horizon. Metaphysics here, shifting our >>>>> old-school conceptions of what first principles are, and you'd refute >>>>> Wittgenstein instead of running from him. Engineering incentive and not >>>>> what the game is but how the game of life on this planet could be. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I am”, Descartes use >>>>> the “first person” I. Indeed he start from the doubt. Dubito ergo cogito, >>>>> cogito ergo sum. Descartes did not prove the existence of Descartes, bit >>>>> of his own consciousness, hoping others can do the same reasoning for >>>>> themselves. Consciousness always refer to a first person experience >>>>> implicitly: like God (truth) it is not a thing. >>>>> >>>>> You concede to Terren that "true means different things in different >>>>> contexts" but everyday like clockwork you still barrage the list with >>>>> your use of "large truth, 3p, reality that cannot be named, mechanism is >>>>> incompatible with physicalism" and all the rest of it. I used to wonder >>>>> why you don't pursue contact with linguists, physicists, a wider >>>>> audience, and philosophers but this has ceased to surprise me. PNGC >>>>> >>>>> I think I finally got it -- what mechanism means for Bruno -- namely, >>>>> that a human being can be perfectly simulated by a computer. But if >>>>> that's what he means, how does it follow that mechanism is incompatible >>>>> with physicalism? >>>> >>>> Because all possible computations (in the Turing sense) are implicit in >>>> arithmetic. And Bruno thinks arithmetic exists, and hence all threads of >>>> human (and non-human) consciousness exist in arithmetic. >>>> >>>>> What exactly does Bruno mean by physicalism? >>>> >>>> That physics is the basic science; i.e. the ontology of physics, whatever >>>> it is, must give rise to everything else, including conscious thought. >>>> >>>>> Why the incompatibility? Bruno? TIA, AG >>>> >>>> Bruno's a fundamentalist. You can only have one, really real, true >>>> fundamental ontology. >>> >>> Given the sense of “fundamentalism” in the religious (pseudo-religious) >>> domain, it might be useful to make precise that I do not defend any theory >>> or religion. I just say that IF we can survive with an artificial brain, >>> then physics becomes the science of available predictions by universal >>> machine implemented in arithmetic. >> >> If arithmetic exists independent of physics. >> >> Brent >> >> The likely flaw in Bruno's theory is that the axioms of arithmetic don't >> imply the existence of space and time. > > Most people would say they don't even imply the existence of arithmetic.
The axioms cannot prove the existence of a model of arithmetic, by the second incompleteness theorem. But they do imply the existence of the PA theory itself, and of ZF, and of Brent …. (Assuming mechanism for that last one). When you say “existence of arithmetic” it is unclear if you talk about the theory, or about a model of the theory. To prove the existence of a model of a theory, you will need a more stronger theory that the one concerned. You can prove the existence of a model of RA in PA, or of a model of PA in ZF, or of a model of ZF in ZF + the existence of some large cardinal, etc. Bruno > > Brent > >> Hence, mechanism is false. Simulating a human brain, even if possible, is >> not enough to copying a universe. AG >> >>> And that this makes Mechanism Versus Materialism testable, and indeed >>> confirmed by the observation, notably by QM without collapse. There is a >>> "many-world" interpretation of arithmetic (in the head of all universal >>> numbers), and we can test it. We can use any Turing universal formalism >>> instead of arithmetic. They all lead to the same theology, and the same >>> physics. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>>> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com >>>>> >>>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a06f5819-1e53-49d6-918f-845fa799543d%40googlegroups.com >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a06f5819-1e53-49d6-918f-845fa799543d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/14fb34be-ce0e-6f75-837b-ffcc2ad06429%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/14fb34be-ce0e-6f75-837b-ffcc2ad06429%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/739F798B-288B-49A0-B5C9-1236CFC54EEA%40ulb.ac.be.
