> On 24 Feb 2020, at 03:43, Alan Grayson <agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, February 23, 2020 at 7:29:26 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: > > > On 2/23/2020 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 01:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/22/2020 3:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 10:40:12 AM UTC-7, PGC wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>>> <everyth...@googlegroups.com <>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Wittgenstein is at the core really of linguistic pragmatism >>>>>> >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism >>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism> >>>>>> >>>>>> Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there". >>>>> >>>>> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. >>>> >>>> And in different modes (of self-reference). The platonists dis understand >>>> that the absolute truth requires faith in something beyond “my >>>> consciousness” or “consciousness” (to take into account Terren Suydam’ >>>> remark). >>>> >>>> Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those old arguments >>>> over anybody proposing science based ontological packages metaphysically: >>>> language will seduce people to overgeneralize, to confuse personal >>>> mysticism with reality, to engage in false equivalencies between terms >>>> used in formal contexts and everyday use of language, scientism etc. >>>> Slowly, yours truly is coming around to the idea that folks agreeing on >>>> ontology/reality/religion, which would guide research in some allegedly >>>> correct direction; spilling over positive effects into the world... that >>>> Wittgenstein may prove correct in that this is a confused product of >>>> muddled armchair thinking, not because of his generally negative stance, >>>> but because there seem to be positive developments out there that he >>>> couldn't have informed those arguments with. >>>> >>>> I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair forms of >>>> identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on this list with profound >>>> erudition, walking in circles for 20 years now (Wittgenstein says >>>> thousands of years) to optimization and more efficient pursuit of value >>>> and benefit questions instead, through say orchestration of highly >>>> sophisticated forms of organization applied to education, governing, >>>> finance, technology, problem solving, applied or theoretical etc. that are >>>> permissionless, universally accessible, require no hierarchy of politics, >>>> charlatan experts, control freaks, their sycophants, and bibles of some >>>> Messiah achieving miracles such as eternal life, self-duplication etc. >>>> >>>> Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth, trust, power, >>>> control, or proof and more emphasis on "can entities such as ourselves be >>>> highly organized, solve specific survival problems over short and long >>>> terms, without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks will be >>>> opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't agree on what reality may >>>> be, but we do agree on the need for habitable living space in the long >>>> term, nutrition, water, health, limiting self-destruction, expensive wars, >>>> standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more appropriate >>>> politics and economics on the horizon. Metaphysics here, shifting our >>>> old-school conceptions of what first principles are, and you'd refute >>>> Wittgenstein instead of running from him. Engineering incentive and not >>>> what the game is but how the game of life on this planet could be. >>>> >>>> >>>> About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I am”, Descartes use >>>> the “first person” I. Indeed he start from the doubt. Dubito ergo cogito, >>>> cogito ergo sum. Descartes did not prove the existence of Descartes, bit >>>> of his own consciousness, hoping others can do the same reasoning for >>>> themselves. Consciousness always refer to a first person experience >>>> implicitly: like God (truth) it is not a thing. >>>> >>>> You concede to Terren that "true means different things in different >>>> contexts" but everyday like clockwork you still barrage the list with your >>>> use of "large truth, 3p, reality that cannot be named, mechanism is >>>> incompatible with physicalism" and all the rest of it. I used to wonder >>>> why you don't pursue contact with linguists, physicists, a wider audience, >>>> and philosophers but this has ceased to surprise me. PNGC >>>> >>>> I think I finally got it -- what mechanism means for Bruno -- namely, that >>>> a human being can be perfectly simulated by a computer. But if that's what >>>> he means, how does it follow that mechanism is incompatible with >>>> physicalism? >>> >>> Because all possible computations (in the Turing sense) are implicit in >>> arithmetic. And Bruno thinks arithmetic exists, and hence all threads of >>> human (and non-human) consciousness exist in arithmetic. >>> >>>> What exactly does Bruno mean by physicalism? >>> >>> That physics is the basic science; i.e. the ontology of physics, whatever >>> it is, must give rise to everything else, including conscious thought. >>> >>>> Why the incompatibility? Bruno? TIA, AG >>> >>> Bruno's a fundamentalist. You can only have one, really real, true >>> fundamental ontology. >> >> Given the sense of “fundamentalism” in the religious (pseudo-religious) >> domain, it might be useful to make precise that I do not defend any theory >> or religion. I just say that IF we can survive with an artificial brain, >> then physics becomes the science of available predictions by universal >> machine implemented in arithmetic. > > If arithmetic exists independent of physics.
Fair enough. But then physicist who use the number must provides a physical explanation of those numbers, and without using the numbers or anything (Turing) equivalent, and that is just logically impossible. You can’t extract the numbers (with add. and mult.) from something not already Turing universal. Then, between us, I am personally more convinced that 24 is divisible by 8 than of the (primary) existence of the moon, bosons brain and other such complex theoretical construct done unconsciously in the histories bringing brains and stuff. > > Brent > > The likely flaw in Bruno's theory is that the axioms of arithmetic don't > imply the existence of space and time. It implies the appearance of space and time and physical realities. At least it works up to now, that is why it is testable theory. > Hence, mechanism is false. Then Darwin is false, and most current theories are false. We have not yet found a natural phenomenon which would not be Turing emulable, except by using sophisticated construct near black hole, suing pure General relativity, but already made impossible if we add quantum mechanics. Postulating that mechanism is false is usually done by people defending fairy tales explanation of existence. > Simulating a human brain, even if possible, is not enough to copying a > universe. AG That is a consequence of Mechanism. There is no universe, and every piece of matter becomes NOT Turing emulable. Indeed, to get “all decimals” you will need to execute the entire universal dovetailer everywhere, and this in one instant. You might need to read the 8 step of the reasoning: matter emerges from all computations. Note that this too is somehow confirmed by the quantum field theories, where to get “all decimal correct”, you need to take into account an infinity of more and more complex Feynman diagrams, even just to computer the probability that an electron starting at A arrives at B. Mechanism entails that neither matter, nor consciousness are Turing emulable. They appear due to the non computable first person indeterminacy in the seven step protocol: in front of a universal dovetail, or just arithmetic (the tiny sigma_1, partial computable part). When a digital computer simulate a brain, it does not create my consciousness. It borrows it from the arithmetical truth (a highly non computable notion) and makes it possible to manifest itself in a relative way, with a higher probability than without it. Don’t confuse Digital Mechanism, with Digital physicalism (the thesis that the physical universe is computable) because those thesis are inconsistent when taken together. In fact, Digital Physicalism is simply inconsistent, because it implies mechanism, but mechanism implies its negation, and so Digital Mechanism implies its negation, and thus is false, with or without mechanism. Bruno > >> And that this makes Mechanism Versus Materialism testable, and indeed >> confirmed by the observation, notably by QM without collapse. There is a >> "many-world" interpretation of arithmetic (in the head of all universal >> numbers), and we can test it. We can use any Turing universal formalism >> instead of arithmetic. They all lead to the same theology, and the same >> physics. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com >>>> >>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9725ab5e-d50e-41aa-8932-0eafeecf6b4d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b6ea3692-2307-294c-292d-e0a5292c48cd%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2EFD4799-0C1D-4EAC-BFA5-D13D221755DE%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a06f5819-1e53-49d6-918f-845fa799543d%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a06f5819-1e53-49d6-918f-845fa799543d%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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