> On 1 Mar 2020, at 09:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 6:12:11 PM UTC-6, PGC wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 6:13:24 PM UTC+1, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/29/2020 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 29 Feb 2020, at 03:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> <[email protected] <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 2/28/2020 5:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> On 28 Feb 2020, at 13:05, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Only Platonists jump to a belief that there is a ghostly world of 
>>>>> abstract entities called "numbers" that exists outside of matter (whether 
>>>>> that matter is your brain or your computer).
>>>> 
>>>> We don’t need this either. We need only to believe that 2+3 = 5, or that 
>>>> phi_i(j) converges or not converges. The philosophy and metaphysics come 
>>>> after. 
>>>> If not, it is like studying the working of my brain to convince myself 
>>>> that I understand correctly that 2+2=4. That does not work, because my 
>>>> brain study is based on my belief that 2+2=4.
>>>> You could aswel say that Einstein’s theory is circular, because you want 
>>>> to explain 2+2=4 with Matter, but Einstein’s theory use the numbers, and 
>>>> assumes they do what they need to give sense to, say, E= mc^2.
>>>> 
>>>> At some point, people have to put *all* the hypothesis on the table, so 
>>>> that it is clear what is assumed, and what is derived.
>>> 
>>> That doesn't really help because it leaves open the relation between what 
>>> is assumed to be true and what is actually.  That's why reasoning that is 
>>> not grounded in ostensive definitions and empirically tested is just a game.
>> 
>> Accepting the Aristotelian credo, but I have never found one empirical or 
>> theoretical evidence for it,
> 
> You just refuse to see it.  It's all around you.  The evidence is that it 
> works.
> 
>> and then with Mechanism we know, or should know, that it does not make 
>> sense. Physicalism + mechanism gives magical power to “matter” by enabling 
>> it to prevent a Turing machine, 100% similar to you at the relevant 
>> description level, to be conscious. This raise the question if some holy 
>> water is not also needed, or the will of some supernatural creature …
>> 
>> Ostensive definition works very well, but not in computationalist 
>> metaphysics, as ostension happens in dreams, and thus in arithmetic. Physics 
>> is the science of measuring the relative plausibility of 
>> computations/dreams, and computer science, predicts quickly the many worlds, 
>> and the (propositional) quantum formalism, where materialism must still 
>> eliminate or dismiss consciousness and the mind-body problem.
> 
> Even in philosophizing about consciousness you rely on ostensive definition: 
> when you write about "seeing red" or "counting" as conscious activities you 
> are relying on and assuming that it points to what it brings to mind in your 
> reader.
> 
> Or even simpler regarding conscious activities: "how does the brain work?" in 
> the first place. The idea of the brain as a machine may or may not be 
> fruitful in terms of AI, philosophy etc. but it still is a metaphor. 
> "Machines work, brains work; they're both mechanisms, inputs and outputs... 
> so Descartes, right?" 
> 
> Convincing folks of the veracity of this metaphor as a computationalist with 
> such an agenda, you'd have to perform something as huge as "model/simulate an 
> entire complex nervous system, with neuronal function, at a single state" + 
> bring home loot, such as cures for illnesses and viruses etc.
> 
> Show folks this, in any language or code, informed by whatever beliefs of 
> researchers/scientists working on any substrate, and then we may or may not 
> want to talk machine philosophy and identity questions. Go ahead, Bruno + 
> computationalists (that can perfectly separate truth from falsity in reality, 
> you guys that can absolutely, with complete and utter seriousness distinguish 
> real facts from fiction; as we've learned in this thread): show the 
> neuroscience community and the rest of us how it's REALLY done. Everybody 
> ready to learn around here, right? PGC
> 
> 
> I presume :) everyone here has reviewed all the abstracts, workshops, 
> posters, and sessions at next month's TSC 2020 conference:
> 
> http://consciousness.arizona.edu/ <http://consciousness.arizona.edu/>
> abstracts: https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/abs_report_bysession.php?p=C 
> <https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/abs_report_bysession.php?p=C>
> 
> 
> (Does anyone have a presentation there?)
> 
> What approach to consciousness is missing from this gazillion collection of 
> presentations?

They missed the hard problem of consciousness, that is the mind-body problem. 
Explicitly so. In a sense, they miss a millenium of progress in that filed, but 
this reminds us that we are still in the Aristotelian era (even more after 
2000).

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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