On Sunday, March 1, 2020 at 2:57:34 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 1 Mar 2020, at 09:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 6:12:11 PM UTC-6, PGC wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 6:13:24 PM UTC+1, Brent wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/29/2020 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 29 Feb 2020, at 03:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/28/2020 5:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 28 Feb 2020, at 13:05, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Only Platonists jump to a belief that there is a ghostly world of >>> abstract entities called "numbers" that exists outside of matter (whether >>> that matter is your brain or your computer). >>> >>> >>> We don’t need this either. We need only to believe that 2+3 = 5, or that >>> phi_i(j) converges or not converges. The philosophy and metaphysics come >>> after. >>> If not, it is like studying the working of my brain to convince myself >>> that I understand correctly that 2+2=4. That does not work, because my >>> brain study is based on my belief that 2+2=4. >>> You could aswel say that Einstein’s theory is circular, because you want >>> to explain 2+2=4 with Matter, but Einstein’s theory use the numbers, and >>> assumes they do what they need to give sense to, say, E= mc^2. >>> >>> At some point, people have to put *all* the hypothesis on the table, so >>> that it is clear what is assumed, and what is derived. >>> >>> >>> That doesn't really help because it leaves open the relation between >>> what is assumed to be true and what is actually. That's why reasoning that >>> is not grounded in ostensive definitions and empirically tested is just a >>> game. >>> >>> >>> Accepting the Aristotelian credo, but I have never found one empirical >>> or theoretical evidence for it, >>> >>> >>> You just refuse to see it. It's all around you. The evidence is that >>> it works. >>> >>> and then with Mechanism we know, or should know, that it does not make >>> sense. Physicalism + mechanism gives magical power to “matter” by enabling >>> it to prevent a Turing machine, 100% similar to you at the relevant >>> description level, to be conscious. This raise the question if some holy >>> water is not also needed, or the will of some supernatural creature … >>> >>> Ostensive definition works very well, but not in computationalist >>> metaphysics, as ostension happens in dreams, and thus in arithmetic. >>> Physics is the science of measuring the relative plausibility of >>> computations/dreams, and computer science, predicts quickly the many >>> worlds, and the (propositional) quantum formalism, where materialism must >>> still eliminate or dismiss consciousness and the mind-body problem. >>> >>> >>> Even in philosophizing about consciousness you rely on ostensive >>> definition: when you write about "seeing red" or "counting" as conscious >>> activities you are relying on and assuming that it points to what it brings >>> to mind in your reader. >>> >> >> Or even simpler regarding conscious activities: "how does the brain >> work?" in the first place. The idea of the brain as a machine may or may >> not be fruitful in terms of AI, philosophy etc. but it still is a metaphor. >> "Machines work, brains work; they're both mechanisms, inputs and outputs... >> so Descartes, right?" >> >> Convincing folks of the veracity of this metaphor as a computationalist >> with such an agenda, you'd have to perform something as huge as >> "model/simulate an entire complex nervous system, with neuronal function, >> at a single state" + bring home loot, such as cures for illnesses and >> viruses etc. >> >> Show folks this, in any language or code, informed by whatever beliefs of >> researchers/scientists working on any substrate, and then we may or may not >> want to talk machine philosophy and identity questions. Go ahead, Bruno + >> computationalists (that can perfectly separate truth from falsity in >> reality, you guys that can absolutely, with complete and utter seriousness >> distinguish real facts from fiction; as we've learned in this thread): show >> the neuroscience community and the rest of us how it's REALLY done. >> Everybody ready to learn around here, right? PGC >> > > > I presume :) everyone here has reviewed all the abstracts, workshops, > posters, and sessions at next month's TSC 2020 conference: > > http://consciousness.arizona.edu/ > abstracts: https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/abs_report_bysession.php?p=C > > > (Does anyone have a presentation there?) > > What approach to consciousness is missing from this gazillion collection > of presentations? > > > They missed the hard problem of consciousness, that is the mind-body > problem. Explicitly so. In a sense, they miss a millenium of progress in > that filed, but this reminds us that we are still in the Aristotelian era > (even more after 2000). > > The mind-body problem could well be intractable. At least some of that work might lead to engineering solutions that could make the mind-machine metaphor more credible, which complaining and whining about others' attitudes and dismissing them for missing things and loving not your work, rarely accomplishes. PGC
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