> On 1 Mar 2020, at 15:13, PGC <multiplecit...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, March 1, 2020 at 2:57:34 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 1 Mar 2020, at 09:12, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 6:12:11 PM UTC-6, PGC wrote: >> >> >> On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 6:13:24 PM UTC+1, Brent wrote: >> >> >> On 2/29/2020 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 29 Feb 2020, at 03:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <everyth...@googlegroups.com <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 2/28/2020 5:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 28 Feb 2020, at 13:05, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Only Platonists jump to a belief that there is a ghostly world of >>>>>> abstract entities called "numbers" that exists outside of matter >>>>>> (whether that matter is your brain or your computer). >>>>> >>>>> We don’t need this either. We need only to believe that 2+3 = 5, or that >>>>> phi_i(j) converges or not converges. The philosophy and metaphysics come >>>>> after. >>>>> If not, it is like studying the working of my brain to convince myself >>>>> that I understand correctly that 2+2=4. That does not work, because my >>>>> brain study is based on my belief that 2+2=4. >>>>> You could aswel say that Einstein’s theory is circular, because you want >>>>> to explain 2+2=4 with Matter, but Einstein’s theory use the numbers, and >>>>> assumes they do what they need to give sense to, say, E= mc^2. >>>>> >>>>> At some point, people have to put *all* the hypothesis on the table, so >>>>> that it is clear what is assumed, and what is derived. >>>> >>>> That doesn't really help because it leaves open the relation between what >>>> is assumed to be true and what is actually. That's why reasoning that is >>>> not grounded in ostensive definitions and empirically tested is just a >>>> game. >>> >>> Accepting the Aristotelian credo, but I have never found one empirical or >>> theoretical evidence for it, >> >> You just refuse to see it. It's all around you. The evidence is that it >> works. >> >>> and then with Mechanism we know, or should know, that it does not make >>> sense. Physicalism + mechanism gives magical power to “matter” by enabling >>> it to prevent a Turing machine, 100% similar to you at the relevant >>> description level, to be conscious. This raise the question if some holy >>> water is not also needed, or the will of some supernatural creature … >>> >>> Ostensive definition works very well, but not in computationalist >>> metaphysics, as ostension happens in dreams, and thus in arithmetic. >>> Physics is the science of measuring the relative plausibility of >>> computations/dreams, and computer science, predicts quickly the many >>> worlds, and the (propositional) quantum formalism, where materialism must >>> still eliminate or dismiss consciousness and the mind-body problem. >> >> Even in philosophizing about consciousness you rely on ostensive definition: >> when you write about "seeing red" or "counting" as conscious activities you >> are relying on and assuming that it points to what it brings to mind in your >> reader. >> >> Or even simpler regarding conscious activities: "how does the brain work?" >> in the first place. The idea of the brain as a machine may or may not be >> fruitful in terms of AI, philosophy etc. but it still is a metaphor. >> "Machines work, brains work; they're both mechanisms, inputs and outputs... >> so Descartes, right?" >> >> Convincing folks of the veracity of this metaphor as a computationalist with >> such an agenda, you'd have to perform something as huge as "model/simulate >> an entire complex nervous system, with neuronal function, at a single state" >> + bring home loot, such as cures for illnesses and viruses etc. >> >> Show folks this, in any language or code, informed by whatever beliefs of >> researchers/scientists working on any substrate, and then we may or may not >> want to talk machine philosophy and identity questions. Go ahead, Bruno + >> computationalists (that can perfectly separate truth from falsity in >> reality, you guys that can absolutely, with complete and utter seriousness >> distinguish real facts from fiction; as we've learned in this thread): show >> the neuroscience community and the rest of us how it's REALLY done. >> Everybody ready to learn around here, right? PGC >> >> >> I presume :) everyone here has reviewed all the abstracts, workshops, >> posters, and sessions at next month's TSC 2020 conference: >> >> http://consciousness.arizona.edu/ <http://consciousness.arizona.edu/> >> abstracts: https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/abs_report_bysession.php?p=C >> <https://eagle.sbs.arizona.edu/sc/abs_report_bysession.php?p=C> >> >> >> (Does anyone have a presentation there?) >> >> What approach to consciousness is missing from this gazillion collection of >> presentations? > > They missed the hard problem of consciousness, that is the mind-body problem. > Explicitly so. In a sense, they miss a millenium of progress in that filed, > but this reminds us that we are still in the Aristotelian era (even more > after 2000). > > > The mind-body problem could well be intractable.
Relatively to which theory? Intractable is relative to a theory. Obviously, with mechanism, the problem is tractable. The mind-body problem is reduced to the mathematical problem of deriving the physical laws from self-reference logic, and this works well, up to now. > At least some of that work might lead to engineering solutions that could > make the mind-machine metaphor more credible, We should not confuse the use of some particular mechanical metaphor in the study of the brain, like when saying that the brain is a neural net, or a Boltzman machine, etc. and the Mechanist hypothesis, which assumes a level of description of oneself where we are Turing emulable. Mechanist entails that all mechanical metaphor are dangerous, and that is why saying “yes” to the doctor required an act of faith. No machine can ever know “for sure” which machine she is, and indeed, that plays a crucial role in the mathematical definition of the first person indeterminacy. Mechanical metaphor can be helpful in AI, or in some part of metaphysics, but the mechanist hypothesis makes any particular one never provable. It is the reason why I call that a theology, which really means that nobody can enforce any definition of who or what you are. Bruno > which complaining and whining about others' attitudes and dismissing them for > missing things and loving not your work, rarely accomplishes. PGC > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0600e12f-4b49-4598-a323-e6ac0b2c685e%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0600e12f-4b49-4598-a323-e6ac0b2c685e%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/881911C2-E174-46CB-AE20-16A61A61B0DA%40ulb.ac.be.
