On Saturday, February 29, 2020 at 6:13:24 PM UTC+1, Brent wrote: > > > > On 2/29/2020 1:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 29 Feb 2020, at 03:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > On 2/28/2020 5:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 28 Feb 2020, at 13:05, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > Only Platonists jump to a belief that there is a ghostly world of abstract > entities called "numbers" that exists outside of matter (whether that > matter is your brain or your computer). > > > We don’t need this either. We need only to believe that 2+3 = 5, or that > phi_i(j) converges or not converges. The philosophy and metaphysics come > after. > If not, it is like studying the working of my brain to convince myself > that I understand correctly that 2+2=4. That does not work, because my > brain study is based on my belief that 2+2=4. > You could aswel say that Einstein’s theory is circular, because you want > to explain 2+2=4 with Matter, but Einstein’s theory use the numbers, and > assumes they do what they need to give sense to, say, E= mc^2. > > At some point, people have to put *all* the hypothesis on the table, so > that it is clear what is assumed, and what is derived. > > > That doesn't really help because it leaves open the relation between what > is assumed to be true and what is actually. That's why reasoning that is > not grounded in ostensive definitions and empirically tested is just a game. > > > Accepting the Aristotelian credo, but I have never found one empirical or > theoretical evidence for it, > > > You just refuse to see it. It's all around you. The evidence is that it > works. > > and then with Mechanism we know, or should know, that it does not make > sense. Physicalism + mechanism gives magical power to “matter” by enabling > it to prevent a Turing machine, 100% similar to you at the relevant > description level, to be conscious. This raise the question if some holy > water is not also needed, or the will of some supernatural creature … > > Ostensive definition works very well, but not in computationalist > metaphysics, as ostension happens in dreams, and thus in arithmetic. > Physics is the science of measuring the relative plausibility of > computations/dreams, and computer science, predicts quickly the many > worlds, and the (propositional) quantum formalism, where materialism must > still eliminate or dismiss consciousness and the mind-body problem. > > > Even in philosophizing about consciousness you rely on ostensive > definition: when you write about "seeing red" or "counting" as conscious > activities you are relying on and assuming that it points to what it brings > to mind in your reader. >
Or even simpler regarding conscious activities: "how does the brain work?" in the first place. The idea of the brain as a machine may or may not be fruitful in terms of AI, philosophy etc. but it still is a metaphor. "Machines work, brains work; they're both mechanisms, inputs and outputs... so Descartes, right?" Convincing folks of the veracity of this metaphor as a computationalist with such an agenda, you'd have to perform something as huge as "model/simulate an entire complex nervous system, with neuronal function, at a single state" + bring home loot, such as cures for illnesses and viruses etc. Show folks this, in any language or code, informed by whatever beliefs of researchers/scientists working on any substrate, and then we may or may not want to talk machine philosophy and identity questions. Go ahead, Bruno + computationalists (that can perfectly separate truth from falsity in reality, you guys that can absolutely, with complete and utter seriousness distinguish real facts from fiction; as we've learned in this thread): show the neuroscience community and the rest of us how it's REALLY done. Everybody ready to learn around here, right? PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bac56499-6be5-4c4f-87b5-9fc57cd81eb1%40googlegroups.com.
