On Mon, Feb 28, 2022 at 7:39 PM Brent Meeker <meekerbr...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 2/28/2022 3:39 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 28, 2022 at 6:12 PM Brent Meeker <meekerbr...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 2/28/2022 1:12 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote:
>>
>> Superdeterminism goes well beyond Laplacean determinism. Determinism is
>> just about the dynamical laws--if you know some "initial" state of the
>> universe at time T1, it says you can perfectly predict the state at a later
>> time T2 (or an earlier time, in a time-symmetric theory). Superdeterminism
>> is a constraint on the initial conditions which is meant to rule out some
>> broad class of possible worlds that are *not* ruled out by the dynamical
>> laws.
>>
>>
>> In a deterministic system any given initial condition rules out
>> infinitely many futures.
>>
>
>
> Yes, the conditional probability P(later conditions B | initial conditions
> A) is 1 for a unique value of B, 0 for every other possible value of B. But
> the dynamical laws themselves don't tell you anything about the
> non-conditional probability P(initial conditions A) for different possible
> choices of A. Superdeterminism adds an extra constraint which says
> P(initial conditions A) is 0 for the vast majority of possible initial
> conditions in the phase space, and only nonzero for a tiny fraction with
> some very special characteristics.
>
>
> But if the universe is deterministic it had only *one* initial
> condition...so of course it had special characteristics.  Just as the
> winning lottery ticket had a special number on it.
>

But if you don't know that initial condition, then absent knowledge of some
lawlike constraint on initial conditions, I think it makes sense to treat
all initial microstates consistent with the historical data you've seen so
far as equally likely in terms of the subjective probability you assign to
them (this sort of assumption is needed in classical statistical mechanics,
where to make probabilistic predictions about an isolated system, you
generally start with the assumption that all microstates consistent with
your knowledge of the macrostate are equally likely). So even if Bell
inequalities have been consistently violated in the past, if you believe
that's just a consequence of a particular "lucky" set of initial conditions
and not the dynamical laws or a lawlike constraint on initial conditions,
then if you believe the dynamical laws are local ones you should expect the
pattern to break down in the future, since there are many more possible
initial microstates consistent with the experimental results you've seen so
far in which the pattern of Bell inequality violations would break down and
the inequalities would subsequently be respected.



>
>
>
>>
>> In quantum theory, superdeterminism is invoked to allow for the
>> possibility that the dynamical laws are local realist ones (of a
>> single-world kind), so that under "generic" initial conditions one would
>> expect statistically to see Bell inequalities respected (in contradiction
>> to quantum predictions), but superdeterminism constrains the initial
>> conditions to a special set
>>
>>
>> Then postulating that the initial conditions were in this set seems like
>> just another dynamical law; like Born's rule.
>>
>
> Can you elaborate on the analogy to Born's rule? Born's rule is not a
> constraint on initial states.
>
>
> Born's rule for measurement results is not a dynamical law either.
>

I would say that in the Copenhagen interpretation the experimenter's choice
about what to measure is not determined by dynamical laws, but once the
state of the detector is set, the interaction between the detector and the
quantum system being measured does obey a dynamical law, one that says the
system's wavefunction will collapse onto one of the eigenstates of whatever
variable the detector is set to measure (the projection postulate) with
probability determined by the square of the prior amplitude on that
eigenstate (Born's rule).

In any case, if you don't consider Born's rule to be any sort of true
dynamical law, were you saying it "seems like" a dynamical law in some
sense, and that the constraint on initial conditions "seems like" a
dynamical law in the same sense?


>
>
> Even if we accept in principle the idea of laws that consist of
> constraints on allowable initial conditions, there is also the argument
> that the mathematical formulation of such a constraint would have to be
> incredibly complex in an algorithmic sense,
>
>
> Why?  "No hidden variable" isn't very complex.
>

Are you interpreting superdeterminist theories as ones where there are no
hidden variables? Unless superdeterminism is assumed to measurably depart
from the predictions of QM, it does require hidden variables--the idea in a
Bell test measurement involving spin measurements, for example, is that the
particle pair have hidden variables which predetermine what spins they will
have along the axes the experimenters will later choose to measure.



>
> that it would have to have some built-in "concept" of high-level observers
> and measuring instruments so that the hidden variables could be assigned to
> particle pairs in a way that anticipated the fact that the two particles
> would later be measured by instruments in a certain configuration (the
> orientation of stern-gerlach devices used to measure each particle's spins,
> for example).
>
>
> But in a deterministic system all those things have a common cause; their
> past light cones overlap.
>

The event of the particle pair being emitted from the source is in the past
light cone of each of the measurements, but each experimenter could for
example base their decision about what axis to measure on a pseudorandom
algorithm that took as its seed some astronomical data from a region that's
outside the past light cone of the pair emission, and also outside the past
light cone of the other experimenter making their own decision. And the
hidden variables assigned to the particles when they're emitted have to act
as though they "anticipate" what measurements will be performed on them,
even if the choice of measurements depended on information outside the past
light cone of the emission event.



>
> Brent
>
>
> Jesse
>
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> which predetermine that experimenters doing Bell tests will routinely see
>> Bell inequalities violated. This is why, in stating the assumptions needed
>> to prove Bell's theorem, physicists will specify that they are assuming
>> superdeterminism is false by referring to the "no-conspiracy" assumption,
>> so named because superdeterminism is understood conceptually as a kind of
>> conspiracy in the initial conditions of the universe that makes us think
>> the dynamical laws are very different from what they actually are.
>>
>> Jesse
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 28, 2022 at 3:31 PM Brent Meeker <meekerbr...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2/28/2022 11:49 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Feb 28, 2022 at 2:22 PM Brent Meeker <meekerbr...@gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> > *Sabine seems to argue against free will as the source of statistical
>>>> independence...which might be true. *
>>>>
>>>
>>> It's neither true nor untrue because "free will" is just gibberish
>>>
>>> * > I don't see that it has anything to do with Occam's razor.  It just
>>>> says the universe is deterministic (as Laplace thought) and it started in
>>>> some one definite state and nothing random ever happened. *
>>>>
>>>
>>> Determinism just means a future state of the universe can be calculated
>>> from the information in a previous date, but it says nothing about the
>>> initial condition of the universe. Superdeterminism says in addition
>>> that out of all the huge, and possibly infinite, number of states the
>>> universe could've started out in it started out in the one in only state
>>> that would not only produce humans after 13.8 billion years but humans who
>>> would always just happen to perform the wrong experiments so that they
>>> would always be fooled into thinking that the universe was random and
>>> non-local when in reality it was neither. And it's literally impossible for
>>> there to be a theory with a greater violation of Occam's razor than that
>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>> That's like saying it's violation of Occam's razor that some buy won a
>>> million dollars in the lottery because it was so improbable that he won.
>>> If the universe started out in some definite state and it evolved
>>> deterministically then that it produced humans who did certain things is no
>>> more remarkable than if had produced Martians who did something different.
>>> Already the definite initial state and determinism imply all subsequent
>>> states.  That seems pretty simple.  And how is it different from MWI which
>>> is also deterministic?  Nobody seemed worried about superdeterminism when
>>> Lagrange wrote about it.  Was it just because he failed to extend it to
>>> human decisions?  Aren't you a compatibilist; you believe in will, but
>>> physically determined will?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> * > I don't buy it...I'm not even sure it's operationally distinct from
>>>> good old quantum randomness.  But then I don't buy MWI either.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't buy it either. Many Worlds is better than Superdeterminism,
>>> Copenhagen is better than Superdeterminism, "I don't know" is better than
>>> Superdeterminism, even Shut Up And Calculate is better than
>>> Superdeterminism.
>>>
>>> John K Clark    See what's on my new list at  Extropolis
>>> <https://groups.google.com/g/extropolis>
>>> sua
>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To view this discussion on the web visit
>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1g40c4nF1T0FXO0xu7ypBw4mrt9C48UQNQ9t%3DAGYBadQ%40mail.gmail.com
>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1g40c4nF1T0FXO0xu7ypBw4mrt9C48UQNQ9t%3DAGYBadQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To view this discussion on the web visit
>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6b2f2563-9231-ad7b-f444-0226b4546256%40gmail.com
>>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6b2f2563-9231-ad7b-f444-0226b4546256%40gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
>>> .
>>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To view this discussion on the web visit
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAPCWU3%2BD3rR7vyErL_NfyK180Wz8oYW0id2zO72ZShkFdydbMw%40mail.gmail.com
>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAPCWU3%2BD3rR7vyErL_NfyK180Wz8oYW0id2zO72ZShkFdydbMw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
>> .
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To view this discussion on the web visit
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9200337c-b1da-5de0-4c89-0494296cfeb4%40gmail.com
>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9200337c-b1da-5de0-4c89-0494296cfeb4%40gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
>> .
>>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAPCWU3%2BjPoBDd131NDsoM8MwDGTqg6oU%2BmeZELph%3D%3DHjJR1TvA%40mail.gmail.com
> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAPCWU3%2BjPoBDd131NDsoM8MwDGTqg6oU%2BmeZELph%3D%3DHjJR1TvA%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
> .
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a40cc3e8-6f9a-8f25-aa51-cba2ef6b3e88%40gmail.com
> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a40cc3e8-6f9a-8f25-aa51-cba2ef6b3e88%40gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAPCWU3%2BiJ6dGGn4Qiag7M%3DhrUSViJ1rk9iAEm3%2BSHM3m8cvUdQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Reply via email to