On Mon, May 2, 2022, 5:30 AM Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:

> On Fri, Apr 22, 2022 at 09:38:40PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote:
> > Artificial Life such as these organisms:
> > https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLq_mdJjNRPT11IF4NFyLcIWJ1C0Z3hTAX
> > ( https://github.com/jasonkresch/bots )
> >
> > Have neural networks that evolved through natural selection, can adapt
> to a
> > changing environment, and can learn to distinguish between "food" and
> "poison"
> > in their environment.
> >
> > If simple creatures like worms or insects are conscious, (because they
> have
> > brains, and evolved), then wouldn't these artificial life forms be
> conscious
> > for the same reasons?
> >
> > Why or why not?
>
> Most insects can't be consious (see my paper "Ants are not
> conscious"). Most ALife forms created to date are simpler than
> insects, and probably even worms, so are unlikely to be consious either.
>

Hi Russell,

Thanks for sharing. I had read this argument before, I believe in your
book, and reread it again just now. It is compelling and a quite novel
approach to the question.

However, I do not see it as bullet proof. For example:

The reasoning could be applied equally as an argument that we are living in
a computer simulation where simulating minds of higher level organisms is
more common than simulating simpler creatures, and so common as to outclass
simpler minds.

It could be used as an argument for Unificationism (the idea that
instantiating same mind more than once does not ascribe more measure to the
experience). Then the power law would reflect unique possible conscious
states across reality, and human and higher level minds would dominate in
that there are more ways for a human brain to create unique conscious
states.

It could also be that simple conscious states can jump or shift to
equivalent conscious states until they stabilize on an experience that is
less likely to stabilize. For instance, the question is sometimes asked
"What is it like to be a thermostat?" One answer could be that it is like a
person waking up in the morning. (Where the conscious state of a waking
person intersects the state of a thermostat, and a thermostat's mind is
equivalent to a wide class of many minds, it is not really like anything to
be a thermostat). I don't know that insect consciousness is simple enough
for this argument to apply though.

Then there's the question of whether it is correct to divide minds, or
whether something like universalism is true, which states there is only one
mind, and all experiences belong to it. Then any experience is one I am
100% likely to experience.

I am not sure what to think, but "why are we not ants?" is indeed a mystery
that calls for an explanation.

Jason

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