On Sat, Jul 6, 2024 at 2:52 PM Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
> You emphasize that a Zombie would assert that he had a consciousness, but > what about the converse? Suppose you met someone who simply denied that > the had a consciousness. When he stubs his toe and says "OUCH!" and hops > around on one foot he says yes that was my reaction but I wasn't conscious > of pain. Can you prove him wrong or do you just DEFINE him as wrong? > As Chalmers writes, even the statement "Consciousness does not exist" is a third-order phenomenal judgement, of the kind that seems to imply the presence of consciousness in those that come to such conclusions. It seems to be it is neither the assertion of having it, nor the denial of not having it, which proves the presence of consciousness, but rather, it is having a source of knowledge to be able to make such conclusions in the first place, which I think should be taken as the evidence for the presence of a mind. As to the example of denying a particular perception like pain, there are people who have no sense of pain, and there is also pain dissociation, where the pain's intensity and locus are known, but the experience has no noxiousness. I don't think such denies of pain would constitute evidence of having pain, in the same way denying that one is conscious could be taken as evidence of being conscious (as you have to have some self-awareness to be in a position to deny what aspects of yourself you possess or don't possess). Jason > > Brent > > On 7/5/2024 10:41 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > I finished this section for my article on consciousness: > > > https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jq3uOucSStCPe5TQnUv-8YWvGUW05Enr/view?usp=sharing > > It is an important question, because if zombies are not possible, then > consciousness is not optional. Rather, consciousness would be logically > necessary, in any system having the right configuration. > > (Whether that configuration is functional/organizational/causal/or > physical is a separate question). > > Jason > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjY6cGV8606u8Xf3_ELbBibF2Cs-dPv_bhuctitQsaUag%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjY6cGV8606u8Xf3_ELbBibF2Cs-dPv_bhuctitQsaUag%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/45e72f86-b4dc-4ebf-a38e-a09c331d3ba1%40gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/45e72f86-b4dc-4ebf-a38e-a09c331d3ba1%40gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgAfWb4Y36A_uVfwrYq_rBZj0Vu1ZgTaE-qc-z4qwZKWA%40mail.gmail.com.
