On Monday, November 25, 2024 at 7:44:36 AM UTC+1 Alan Grayson wrote:
On Sunday, November 24, 2024 at 9:34:01 PM UTC-7 PGC wrote: Barandes' work on non-Markovian quantum dynamics is undeniably sophisticated and offers potential applications (I appreciate the post, thanks), but it exemplifies a recurring issue in alleged foundational inquiry. In *"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory,"* for instance, his "kinematical axiom", that he states as a physical axiom on the slide, assumes natural numbers and sets—*abstract or metaphysical concepts, not physical concepts*—while presenting them as part of a physical ontology (see minute 11 of the video). This conflation risks undermining the rigor and clarity required in foundational inquiry. Quantum mechanics, in any interpretation (digital mechanism aside), cannot fully explain why it appears as it does to specific subjects without a precise account of what a subject is and how their interaction with the system is modeled. Questions like "Why collapse?" or "Why Many Worlds?" demand assumptions about the subject, their properties, and their relationship to both the physical and mathematical structures they interpret. Without this clarity, foundational reasoning risks either circularity or ambiguity. Foundational work should strive for clarity and honesty in its assumptions before reaching for elegance. It’s not enough to say "this works, it's sophisticated"—we have to address and state why it works for a subject with specific properties xyz in relation to the precise quantum or classical frameworks in play. Without this, we risk getting lost in the weeds of sophistication, leaving foundational gaps open and unexamined. Barandes is right: examine the obvious things we take for granted; too bad he didn't apply that to his axiom mentioned above. If Bruno's digital mechanism strikes you as an implausible foundation, *then what exactly are the assumptions underlying your stance* regarding existence of a subject, with which properties, experiencing which kind of physics and why; how QM, randomness, classicality, consciousness or lack thereof, qualia or not etc. manifest and emerge or don't? *Your philosophy, or shall we say point of view, is an example of the perfect as the enemy of the good. If Euclid had waited to satisfy your criteria, we wouldn't have plane geometry, and we'd still be waiting for the theorem of Pythagoras. Based on a voluminous catalog of passed experience, every successful theory begins with some undefined concepts. AG* Alan, I see where you're coming from, and I agree that every theory begins with undefined concepts. However, the issue isn’t with starting somewhere—it’s with failing to interrogate and refine those starting assumptions. Even Euclid, whose axiomatic system remains a cornerstone of mathematics, didn't engage with the metaphysical status of his constructs. He left unanswered whether points, lines, and planes exist independently or are purely abstractions. That omission has echoed through history, leaving significant gaps in how we understand the relationship between mathematics, reality, and observation. This lack of metaphysical clarity persists in modern science. The compartmentalization you defend has undoubtedly led to extraordinary achievements: life-saving technologies, powerful medicines, and yes, nuclear weapons. But it has also left us with a world where those weapons are pointed at each other, without any framework for addressing the deeper questions about the people wielding them: *Who are they? Why do they exist? What drives their actions? What physics supports their experiences and behaviors?* Physics, as it is often practiced today, avoids these questions, declaring them "philosophical" or "outside its domain." But that refusal reinforces a point made by digital mechanists: If physics refuses to confront the fundamental "why" questions—questions of consciousness, existence, and reality itself—it becomes epistemic rather than ontological. It describes appearances without engaging their deeper causes. Saying "PGC is drinking coffee at that table" is a satisfactory observation only if we stop there. But if we pursue foundational inquiry, we must ask: *Why does PGC appear to drink coffee? Why does he exist? What physics governs this observation? Does he experience the coffee as conscious, and if so, how does that consciousness emerge?* Dismissing such questions as irrelevant, philosophical, meaningless etc. suggests a discomfort with clarity and foundational honesty. Yet without such honesty, physics becomes not an inquiry into reality but a tool for predictions divorced from purpose or meaning. That tool can work—it can build bridges, launch rockets, and construct bombs—but at the cost of losing the deeper truths about the universe and ourselves. If your view is that physics need not address these questions, then perhaps the role of foundational inquiry must shift elsewhere—to disciplines unafraid to engage with reality at the most fundamental level. This is also why institutionalized religion and its abuses can persist. Domain specificity of science has left open a hole that people will want to see addressed elsewhere. That's why I encourage all of you, not merely Brent and yourself, to be clear on these assumptions regarding their statements or, at the very least, concede that physics is not fundamental inquiry. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ecbe13f2-4c30-4bf4-9ae2-6de886907bd1n%40googlegroups.com.
