On Tuesday, November 26, 2024 at 2:37:31 AM UTC+1 Brent Meeker wrote:
On 11/24/2024 8:34 PM, PGC wrote:
Barandes' work on non-Markovian quantum dynamics is undeniably
sophisticated and offers potential applications (I appreciate the post,
thanks), but it exemplifies a recurring issue in alleged foundational
inquiry. In *"A New Formulation of Quantum Theory,"* for instance, his
"kinematical axiom", that he states as a physical axiom on the slide,
assumes natural numbers and sets—*abstract or metaphysical concepts, not
physical concepts*—while presenting them as part of a physical ontology
(see minute 11 of the video). This conflation risks undermining the rigor
and clarity required in foundational inquiry.
His axiom only assumes that configurations of a physical system can be
labeled by the natural numbers. Your complaint could have included that
he's writing about it in English, which is not a part of physical ontology.
"Only" is already significant. By assuming that configurations of a
physical system can be labeled by the natural numbers, Barandes implicitly
adopts mathematical structures as foundational to physical ontology. What
about a configuration; is this an unambiguously physical notion? This
warrants scrutiny. Furthermore, as we see later in the video, he doesn’t
stop at natural numbers and configurations—he also assumes sets, including
countable and uncountable infinities, as part of the physical framework.
These are not physical concepts but abstract, mathematical ones.
The move and arguments conflate mathematical realism with physical
ontology, which is problematic if the aim is foundational clarity. To
introduce such assumptions without acknowledging their metaphysical nature
blurs the line between mathematical and physical inquiry, undermining the
rigor of the approach.
Quantum mechanics, in any interpretation (digital mechanism aside), cannot
fully explain why it appears as it does to specific subjects without a
precise account of what a subject is and how their interaction with the
system is modeled. Questions like "Why collapse?"
Copenhagen gave a clear answer to that by just referring to classical
physics. The subject reads the value on the instrument which assumed a
state corresponding to a projection of the object state.
Copenhagen’s reference to classical physics and the framing of the subject
as "reading the value on the instrument" conveniently bypasses the critical
questions of *what* the subject is and how this act of reading interacts
with the quantum system. While this framing may appear clear on the
surface, it sidesteps the deeper ontological and phenomenological
questions: What constitutes the subject, and how does their interaction
bring about a projection or collapse? Without addressing these, Copenhagen
leaves the subject as an undefined placeholder. Not that this isn't common
practice in engineering or fundamental science. But "fundamental" raises
the bar. Here, I tend to scrutinize such placeholders and with digital
mechanism, we even get proofs/vast consensus of the field for why the
ontology necessitates a placeholder in precise contexts.
I’m aware you’re fully capable of recognizing this gap, so I suspect this
appeal to naivety is more tactical than genuine. Still, let’s not ignore
that these foundational ambiguities in Copenhagen are exactly why other
approaches have sought to deepen our understanding. Avoiding these
questions might be strategically convenient, but it doesn’t advance the
conversation or solve the interpretational issues at hand.
or "Why Many Worlds?" demand assumptions about the subject, their
properties, and their relationship to both the physical and mathematical
structures they interpret. Without this clarity, foundational reasoning
risks either circularity or ambiguity.
Clarity which MWI very much lacks.
Your assertion about MWI's lack of clarity seems to rest on the presumption
that I am advocating for it. To clarify: I am not an MWI proponent. My
preference lies with many histories or, more fundamentally, many
computations-tyoe approaches, which directly relate observer phenomena to
the arithmetic structures and computations underpinning quantum mechanics
given the definitions and nuances stated in UDA through self-referentially
correct machines. This approach avoids the ontological baggage of MWI, it's
unclear reliance on the notion of "worlds" (which is game for criticism,
sure), and focuses instead on testable connections between computation,
arithmetic truth, and observed phenomena.
This said, my critique is broader and applies to any interpretation,
including MWI, Copenhagen, or collapse models.
The issue here is not about defending any particular interpretation but
about emphasizing the need for clear assumptions and definitions in any
foundational framework. Rather than framing this as a defense of MWI or a
critique of its clarity, I’m pointing to the shared foundational challenge
across all interpretations. Let’s address these deeper questions, as they
are crucial for advancing the dialogue—not just around quantum mechanics
but around the interplay of mathematics, physics, internal psychology
experienced by the subjects, and their phenomenology.
Foundational work should strive for clarity and honesty
Are you implying that Barandes is dishonest in his presentation? or it's
unclear?
It's unclear and therefore anything goes. If I assume an unspecified mix of
physical and mathematical primitives, I can conclude that fundamental
inquiry is physical or mathematical. I don't presume to know his
motivations for assuming such, therefore anything goes there too.
in its assumptions before reaching for elegance. It’s not enough to say
"this works, it's sophisticated"—we have to address and state why it works
for a subject with specific properties xyz in relation to the precise
quantum or classical frameworks in play. Without this, we risk getting lost
in the weeds of sophistication, leaving foundational gaps open and
unexamined.
I'd say it's the opposite. We get lost in sophistications precisely when
we go beyond "This works" Which is not to say it's not worthwhile to go
beyond instrumentalism. Going beyond, finding a different way of looking
at things or filling in some gap, can lead to a better, wider theory, e.g.
the long sought theory of quantum gravity.
You're absolutely right. Research into mathematical self-reference often
faces dismissal and underfunding, not due to lack of potential, but because
of ideological biases that prematurely marginalize it. When we say "this
works," we should proceed carefully, especially in foundational contexts,
to avoid conflating practical efficacy with ontological clarity/coherence.
A theory can "work" instrumentally while leaving critical gaps
unaddressed—such as the role of subject/observer or the formal
underpinnings of physical reality. Without fostering and funding diverse
approaches, including mathematical self-reference, we risk constraining
progress and missing out on insights that could redefine the foundations of
physics.
Barandes is right: examine the obvious things we take for granted; too bad
he didn't apply that to his axiom mentioned above.
To bad you didn't read it as intended.
While I appreciate his insights on non-Markovian dynamics, I believe it’s
fair to critically evaluate how his axiom and reasoning integrates abstract
mathematical entities, like numbers, infinities, and sets, under the guise
of "only conventional physics" as a starting point.
If Bruno's digital mechanism strikes you as an implausible foundation,
Bruno didn't "address and state why it works for a subject with specific
properties xyz in relation to the precise quantum or classical frameworks
in play." and he failed to make any new or surprising testable conclusions.
Bruno’s framework does address why indeterminacy arises for
self-referrentially correct subjects, assuming weak determinism. That a
"global" indeterminacy made precise with the UD notion implies a strong
form of indeterminacy. See how people still discuss "free will" as if it
were either/or. But I won't get into the plethora of non-trivial insights
of that work. You've dismissed it with ambiguous, non substantive arguments
for 20 years. Why should anybody expect you to a) not see it as "Bruno's
work" in isolation, but as the result of a long line of work stretching
back to the antique, and b) to actually go and invest time in not just
reading forum summaries but deep dive into the background literature and
conventions in the respective fields? You won't. The very point we're
discussing ("address and state why it works for a subject with specific
properties xyz in relation to the precise quantum or classical frameworks
in play") is a result of that work.
Personally, I will perform the deep dive with Barandes, even if
ontologically, this list has gone further in it's discussions.
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