--- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "Marek Reavis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Judy, your comment (below) seems very right on to me. > Similarly, do you think that your chronic criticism > of Barry might be related as much to something about > his personality or style that really rankles you as > much as it is to his actual/perceived missteps in > argument?
I'm not sure this is a valid dichotomy, Marek. One of the things I find most repellent about Barry is the intellectual laziness that generates his argumentative missteps. I mean, intellectual laziness, dishonesty, hypocrisy, general phoniness--are those all not matters of personality and style? What might be behind my criticism of Barry that doesn't fall into these categories? If you can figure out how to define it, I'm willing to entertain it. > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "authfriend" <jstein@> wrote: > > > > --- In FairfieldLife@yahoogroups.com, "curtisdeltablues" > > <curtisdeltablues@> wrote: > > <snip> > > > Me: I think a perfectly rational atheist is as much a myth as a > > > person who just believes everything. We are all a mix of mental > > > abilities and this is necessary to live in the world. None of > > > us just believe anything presented to us, we use the criteria > > > that we are comfortable with and has served us well to choose. > > > > While this is true, and an important point, I > > think it's also the case that folks choose the > > criteria they use to evaluate a belief according > > to how comfortable they are with the belief--i.e., > > more stringent criteria for beliefs that make > > them uncomfortable, less stringent for those that > > they find appealing. > > > > My sense is that the appeal or lack thereof of a > > particular belief comes first, and evaluation > > second; and that the evaluation is designed to > > reinforce or reject the belief on the basis of > > whether it does or does not have appeal to the > > individual. > > > > When we reject a long-held belief, it's not so > > much because we have evaluated it objectively > > and found it wanting, as it is because something > > about the belief has ceased to have the appeal > > it once held for us. In such a case we're likely > > to choose evaluation criteria stringent enough > > to give us a rational basis for rejecting the > > belief, but in fact the rejection has already > > taken place. > > > > And vice-versa, of course.
