On 17 Apr 2012, at 11:44, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

>> It seems to me that, if I believe I am duplicable, and understand the
> protocol, I must predict that I will experience being in both Moscow  
> and
> Washington. The process bifurcates one person, who becomes two  
> people with
> absolutely identical physique and memories immediately afterwards,  
> which
> will then begin to diverge.

OK. Then the uncertainty is bearing on the outcome of that divergence

You can predict this, in Helsinki:

(I will feel to be in W) and (I will feel to be in M)

But here you adopt a 3-view on your future 1-views.

But we assume comp, so we know that both copies will *feel* to be  
entire and complete in only one city. So from the first person point  
of view, it is

(I will feel to be in W) or (I will feel to be in M).

Assuming comp and the correct substitution level, you will never feel  
to be simultaneously in W and in M. This would entail a telepathic  
element which, given that we have chosen the right substitution level,  
would have a non computable element, and contradict comp.

We can verify this by asking the copy in W, and he will assesses to  
feel to be in W, and not in M, and having only an intellectual (3- 
view) belief of the existence of its copy in M. He cannot even know  
for sure that the copy has already been reconstituted there or not.

> Both, looking back to pre-bifurcation times,
> will say "that was me", and both will be correct.

Absolutely so. That is why we have to listen to both of them, and both  
of them agree to feel to be in only one city. One sees english  
speakers around him, the other sees russian speakers, and none of them  
can realy *know* if their doppelganger has been reconstituted. Nor  
could they know in advance that they would hear russians or americans.

The advantage of proceeding with such thought experience is that it  
avoids the need to agree on personal identity. The indeterminacy bears  
only on experience which can be noted in a diary.

Of course, the experience suggest that personal identity is an  
illusion. If you keep your identity on both copies, then we can argue  
that we are all the same amoeba, who duplicates itself a lot since a  
long time. But this remark needs not to be agreed upon to understand  
that computationalism reverses physics and the information/computer/ 
number science.

If you really believe that the you-in W and the you-in M are really  
still exactly the same person, having different experience, then I can  
argue that you and me are already exactly the same person. Why not?  
Perhaps God, playing hide-and-seek with itself :)
But here we try to predict direct accessible results of self- 
localization after a self-duplication, and without a non computable  
telepathic link, the answer of the copies are different.

> There is no "essence" to
> be randomly (or non-randomly) assigned to one location and not the  
> other.

But there are human beings, knowing in which city they feel to be.  
None will write "I feel to be in both M and W at once". Each will  
write "I feel to be in just the city X", with X being M or W  
respectively. They can only bet, intellectually, about the existence  
of the other. Indeed, the guy in W would not been able to see I have  
cheated on him, and that I did not reconstitute him in M. OK?

> The individual is now two people and therefore can be and is in both  
> cities.

Only from a third person point of view. From the point of view of each  
copies, despite both being the "same" person as the one in Helsinki,  
they both feel right now to be in only one city. And the first person  
indeterminacy bears on such feeling, not on the bodies to which we can  
attriibute consciousness, but on the content of the consciousness,  
which in this case corresponds to the result of the self-localization  
(W, M?) which they will write in their diaries. None will write in the  
diary "I feel to be in W and M".

Just replace humans by robots having some amount of inference  
inductive power. And imagine the iteration of the experience. So after  
finding themselves in some city, they buy a ticket to come back by  
plane to Helsinki, and they do the experience again and again. After  
iterating that experience 64 times, there will be 2^64 copies, and  
each of them will have, written in their respective personal diaries a  
specific sequence of "W" and "M". Such robots can have already well  
defined elementary inference inductive power to guess that their  
sequences are non algorithmically compressible. Each of them cannot  
predict the next outcome of the self-duplication. Of course, some of  
them will develop theories. For example the one having the story  
WWWWWWWWW...W, will be tempted to predict "W", but we know she will  
have many "descendants" contradicting that theory, and in this  
setting, they are deluded.

Of course "real life" will not be a sequence of self-duplication, but  
it will be a sequence of self-multiplication or differentiation on an  
extremely redundant set of computations, already existing through  
elementary arithmetical relations (if you agree with the definition of  
comp and the meaningfulness of Church thesis,  you have already  
accepted that elementary arithmetical truth (like "17 is prime") are  
not dependent of humans, nor of any universal machines.

All right?

> But this ignores the second law: one can expect unavoidable error in  
> the
> replication. :-)  !  L.

I don't think we need such an error. Nor do we need any precise  
physical theory. We need only the amount of "grand-mother physics" to  
believe in doctor, hospital, brains, the duplication device making  
sense of comp, etc. Eventually the apparent existence of such objects  
will have be justified from more fundamental notions. It is the  
purpose of the whole reasoning to explain this logical obligation.



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