Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
Because ... All words are already numbered  
We have published large monograph named
“Natural Language Addressing” 
where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and computer 
implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
One can read it at
The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer we 
enter not letters but their codes.
This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
It really works!!!
Friendly greetings

From: Karl Javorszky 
Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
To: Stanley N Salthe 
Cc: fis 
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory

Using the logical language to understand Nature

The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms “symbol”, 
“signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, because 
understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great works. 

There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical languages 
and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies. The following 
is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps. 

Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by investigating 
the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he has been mocked and 
ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that Wittgenstein had 
misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on the border that 
separates that what can be explained and that what is opaque; not to elaborate 
about how one can express truths that are anyway self-evident and cannot be 

The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of the 
world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate about, 
because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is true that 
nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a logical 
discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only point out 
truths that are factually true, and these have always been true. There is no 
opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an unveiling of that 
what could have been previously known: like an archaeologist can not be 
surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised about himself, how he had 
been able to ignore the possibility of the finding so long.

As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are well-defined, 
these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his results show, that if 
one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical words, the collection of all 
explanations is the solution of a combinatorial problem. This is also the 
reason why he says that his philosophy is just a tool of sharpening the brain, 
and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in a semantic fashion.

One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that Wittgenstein 
suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real philosophy 
has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical sentences or 
otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside philosophy, namely number 
theory. If every concept can be represented by a number, and valid sentence are 
those for which the rules that govern numbers are satisfied, then one can work 
with the numbers as such and figure out later for what they stand. 

This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The only 
noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that old 
dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering layer 
of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too high, one 
may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that one executes 
by routine.

We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible 
enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to order 
and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could memorise 
all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority readiness One into 
priority readiness Two. 

There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the field 
of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of reordering 
the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the concept of 
sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a reorder. 
Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each other. Learning is 
based on the concept of associations. Being an element in the corpus of a cycle 
may well be the formal explanation for a property of being associated with. 

Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place, relation 
to potential successors, …} {symbol, signal, mass, impact, chemical valence, 
predictability, energy level, information content,…} is of secondary 
importance. As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to make sure that 
we all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one. The next task is to 
make sure that we all perceive the same picture. As the kaleidoscope produces 
natural numbers, this should be a challenge that one can be expected to match. 
Only after it has been agreed that we all observe the same patterns is it 
reasonable to start discussing how to name the facts of perception.

The present problem is not with the inability of the logical language to 
process that what we wish to discuss.  The present task is to realise that one 
needs a clear idea before one enters the struggle to express it clearly. The 
unveiling has been done. Now the interested public is invited to look at the 

Once one has answered the dilemma: “On Tuesdays, this here cup is to the left 
of the screen, because Tuesdays I order things on their colour; on Wednesdays 
the same cup is to the right of the screen for its size, because on Wednesdays 
I order things on their size: so, which is the correct place of this cup, 
actually?”; once on has figured this out – that namely the cup would be 
oscillating between its two places, or take up a position on a plane with axes: 
colour, size -, then one has done great strides towards understanding that 
“symbol”, “sign”, “signal” etc. are surface concepts, while the underlying deep 
concepts have to do with sequencing and the mechanics of re-sequencing, which 
means cycles, rhythms and periodicities.

We all know that the DNA is a sequence. Then, if one wants to understand how 
the DNA functions, one had better resign to the fact that one has to deal with 
sequences, whether one likes the topic or not. As there can be nothing 
philosophically new in the explanation of how the DNA works, the only subject 
that needs investigation is, why one has such a reticence to deal with places, 
priorities, rankings, order, first and last becoming last and first, etc. Maybe 
the door to the edifice of insights on how the interplay between mixtures and 
sequences actually works and what this interplay produces; maybe this door 
opens from a well-barricaded corridor within the cellar of the sub-conscious, 
hidden among some skeletons of {to have sunken low, defeats of self-esteem, to 
have been downgraded, to be among the last, to be a low-ranking individual, 
etc.}. One of the techniques of influencing people with low self-esteem is to 
encourage them to find the discipline in which they are really good. In how 
many ways can a person be classified and how many of these ranking results are 
contradictory? Is the concept of cognitive dissonance linked to the similarity 
of two orders? Number theory should jump onto the subject of intermediate 
states between two differing permutations, as it is intimately connected with 
the subject of how DNA functions. Which names fit best the patterns we observe 
while doing manifold re-orderings is presently of a secondary importance. Of 
primary importance is presently to observe, what happens if a sequence is 
turned into a different sequence. After all, we deal with sequences, don’t we.

2018-02-10 16:24 GMT+01:00 Stanley N Salthe <>:

  Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically, as:

  In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in other 
ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus (using the 
compositional hierarchy):

          [information [language [signal]]]

  Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be understood 
or construed by way of linguistic constructs. 

  (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’, where:

          [sign [information [...]]] ) 

  Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):

          {language {signal {information}}}

  Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations, so 
that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information (informing) 
only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations.


  On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan <> wrote:

    Dear Colleagues,

    I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana 
recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination with 
Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human language, 
I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:

    In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple 
languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and interspecies 
cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various biological 
activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such as AI-2, it is 
a general language that bacteria use for intergenera signaling.

    I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the concept 
information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or signaling) 55 times, so 
we have to review the history and application of “information” and “signal” in 
biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to understand the relationship 
between language, signal, and information.

    The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be 
traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and 
endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of 
Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in 
Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since then, 
the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and biochemistry.

    As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to its 
transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used to 
employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From the 
tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal transduction 
study of cells is only equivalent to the level of telecommunications before 
1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's information theory, the central 
issue of telecommunications is "signal" rather than "information". After that, 
the central issue of telecommunications is "information" rather than "signal".

    According to the application history of information concept, nearly all the 
essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger, signal and 
so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem what we are 
discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the information.

    For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:

    1. Do Plants Think?  (June 5, 2012, Scientific American)


    2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn  (December 3, 2014, New Scientist)


    From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.

    Best wishes,


    From: [] On 
Behalf Of Sungchul Ji
    Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
    To: Francesco Rizzo <>; Terrence W. DEACON 
    Cc: Fis, <>
    Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on 
the cateogry theory

    Hi Terry,  and FISers,

    Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that, 
in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill?

    All the best.



    From: Francesco Rizzo <>
    Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
    To: Terrence W. DEACON
    Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji
    Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on 
the cateogry theory 

    Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, 

    è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of information è 
preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un sistema 
(o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un processo 
comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa necessariamente 
'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un  Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un 
Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun 
potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha significazione anche se si può 
dire che si ha passaggio di informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere 
umano (e non è necessario che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in 
presenza di un processo di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una 
costruzione semiotica autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di 
comunicazione che l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra 
esseri umani -- o tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia 
meccanico che biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come 
propria o specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica 
della significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è 
impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una 
semiotica della significazione.

    Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto 
Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza 
economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia o 
l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso libro 
si trovano:

    - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si 
colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di significazione e 
i processi di comunicazione;

    - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la 
neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova epistemologia 
sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130).

    Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio 
scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che mi 
fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA',  molto più grande del 
(per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie.

    Un saluto affettuoso.


    2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON <>:

      Dear FISers,

      In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model for 
building a general theory of information. 

      Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a claim 
that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it can be 
causally misleading.

      I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and 
evolution of the human language capacity.

      And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic Species.

      Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary 
biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary 

      Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing 
tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic 
thinking as well.

      So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I append 
the following excerpt from the book.

      "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for 
analyzing other 

      species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other 
form of communication as

      exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent 
case. No analytic method

      could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as long 
as animals have

      interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been around 
at least as long as frogs

      have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic 
communication was an afterthought,

      so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an 
ancient and well-established

      mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model 
against which to assess

      other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, and 
a quite anomalous

      exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with 
respect to the extent they possess or

      lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the types 
of hair on different mammals

      with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is an 

      anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we might 
see more typical wings

      and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced 
adaptations—but it does more to

      obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so 
should be analyzed as an

      exception to a more general rule, not vice versa."

      Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms.

      This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a 
vast nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure.

      So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more fundamental 

      And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw insight 
from this more familiar realm.

      I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that assumes 
what it endeavors to explain.

      Regards to all, Terry

      On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero 
<> wrote:

        In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, though I 
am still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I am afraid 
that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of it I will 
lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it comes:

        I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts in 
which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many contexts 
on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of the distinction 
between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. Baecker and E. Esposito. 
I have already expressed my opinion in this group that what information is 
depends on the system we are talking about. But  the concept of medium is more 
especific since a complex system ussualy has many sources and types of 
        So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a set 
of loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a 
temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements. 
Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by RNA to 
form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate cell. We 
can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a specific kind of 
molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or a set of linguistic 
conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or discourse. 
        The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as 
information. Or even better, each type of medium produces information of its 
own kind. 
        According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. It 
can only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference that a 
medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A medium 
can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can couple among 
them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic manner, where they 
depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions. And this also mean that 
they do this by translating noise into information. For instance, language is 
coupled to writing, and language and writing to print. Still oral communication 
is noisy to written communication. Let us say that the gestures, emotions, 
entonations, that we make when talking cannot be copied as such into writing. 
In a similar way, all the social practices and habits made by handwriting were 
distorted by the introduction of print. From a technical point of view you can 
codify the same message orally, by writing and by print. Still information and 
meaning are not the same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That 
interaction face to face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they 
can see if the other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring 
love and what that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he 
is being sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special place, 
so he planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable 
configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You shall 
write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone in her room and 
she would have to imagine everything you say. And  imagination makes 
information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral 
communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and send 
it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by adding some 
chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what he bought her) 
and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social sciences because that is 
my research field, although I have the intuition that it could also work for 
natural sciences. 



        El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <> 

          Hi  FISers,

          On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote:

          " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our discussions 
and recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways to many 
different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate the 
framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological, linguistic, 

          . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction 
introduced by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though it 
too is in my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be 
misleading when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less 
linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the division: 
i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and normative analyses/properties of 

          I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic 
metaphor in defining "information".  Although the linguistic metaphor has its 
limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique advantage as 
well, for example, its well-established categories of functions (see the last 
column in Table 1.) 

          The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied 
theories of information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging to 
the same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically 
represented as the 3-node closed network in the first column of Table 1.

                Table 1.  The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible 
Triadic Relation) as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell language 
theory, and linguistics.
                Category Theory

                   f            g
                   A -----> B ------> C
                    |                           ^
                    |                            |

                ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation)
               Deacon’s theory of information

                Theory of

               Peirce’s theory of signs
               Cell language theory
               Human language
               Intrinsic information
                Amion acids
                (Building blocks)
               Referential information
               Normative information
                (Totality of cell metabolism)
               Systems of words
                (Decision making & Reasoning)
               Sign production
               Physical laws
               Second articulation
               Sign interpretation
               Evoutionary selection
               First and Third articulation
               Information flow
               Information flow


          *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides.  
According to the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n genetic 
alphabets, each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn consisting of 
n nucleotides.  In this view, the classical genetic alphabet is just one 
example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1.  When n = 3, for example, 
we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet with 4^3 = 64 letters each 
consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the familiar codon table.  Thus, the 
64 genetic codons are not words as widely thought (including myself until 
recently) but letters!  It then follows that proteins are words and  metabolic 
pathways are sentences.  Finally, the transient network of metbolic pathways 
(referred to as "hyperstructures" by V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic 
pathways" by me more recently) correspond to texts essential to represent 
arguement/reasoning/computing.  What is most exciting is the recent discovery 
in my lab at Rutgers that the so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of mRNA levels 
in living cells can identify function-dependent "hypermetabolic pathways" 
underlying breast cancer before and after drug treatment (manuscript under 

          Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome.


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      Professor Terrence W. Deacon
      University of California, Berkeley

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