Dear Karl,
your analysis about Wittgenstein does not take into account the second
Wittgenstein, who repudiated his own idea from the Tractatus.
I think, in touch with Carnap on other issues, that the use of the terms
"symbol", "signal", "marker", "information" into scientific sentences does not
mean anything. Such use gives rise to metaphysical (in its worst meaning)
pseudosentences, because the propositions containing the terms "symbol",
"signal", "marker", "information" can neither verified (in the Schlick sense),
nor confirmed (in the Carnap sense), nor falsified (in the Popper sense), not
statistically assessed (in the Reichenbach or Shannon sense).
Therefore, I think, we are talking about pseudopropositions: there is not a way
to empirically test the propositions containing the useless terms "symbol",
"signal", "marker", "information". Therefore, as always, and sorry to be
boring and bothering, I suggest to fully REMOVE from the TRUE scientific
adventures the terms: "symbol", "signal", "marker", "information".
I'm deeply horrified by such residuals of the ancient Hermes Trismegstus'
hermetic conceptions in our current scientific vocabulary and practice. We are
not dwarves on the shoulders of giants, we are giants on the shoulders of
dwarves.
> Il 10 febbraio 2018 alle 19.36 Karl Javorszky <karl.javors...@gmail.com> ha
> scritto:
>
> Using the logical language to understand Nature
>
>
>
> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms
> “symbol”, “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome
> development, because understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when
> creating great works.
>
> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
>
>
>
> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he has
> been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is opaque;
> not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
>
> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is
> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised
> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding
> so long.
>
> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his results
> show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical words, the
> collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial problem.
> This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a tool of
> sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in a
> semantic fashion.
>
> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that
> Wittgenstein suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that
> real philosophy has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical
> sentences or otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside
> philosophy, namely number theory. If every concept can be represented by a
> number, and valid sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers
> are satisfied, then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out
> later for what they stand.
>
> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The
> only noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that
> old dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering
> layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too
> high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that
> one executes by routine.
>
> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible
> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to
> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could
> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority readiness
> One into priority readiness Two.
>
> There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the
> field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of
> reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the
> concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a
> reorder. Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each other.
> Learning is based on the concept of associations. Being an element in the
> corpus of a cycle may well be the formal explanation for a property of being
> associated with.
>
> Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place,
> relation to potential successors, …} {symbol, signal, mass, impact, chemical
> valence, predictability, energy level, information content,…} is of secondary
> importance. As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to make sure
> that we all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one. The next
> task is to make sure that we all perceive the same picture. As the
> kaleidoscope produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge that one
> can be expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we all observe
> the same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to name the facts
> of perception.
>
> The present problem is not with the inability of the logical language to
> process that what we wish to discuss. The present task is to realise that
> one needs a clear idea before one enters the struggle to express it clearly.
> The unveiling has been done. Now the interested public is invited to look at
> the picture.
>
> Once one has answered the dilemma: “On Tuesdays, this here cup is to the
> left of the screen, because Tuesdays I order things on their colour; on
> Wednesdays the same cup is to the right of the screen for its size, because
> on Wednesdays I order things on their size: so, which is the correct place of
> this cup, actually?”; once on has figured this out – that namely the cup
> would be oscillating between its two places, or take up a position on a plane
> with axes: colour, size -, then one has done great strides towards
> understanding that “symbol”, “sign”, “signal” etc. are surface concepts,
> while the underlying deep concepts have to do with sequencing and the
> mechanics of re-sequencing, which means cycles, rhythms and periodicities.
>
>
>
> We all know that the DNA is a sequence. Then, if one wants to understand
> how the DNA functions, one had better resign to the fact that one has to deal
> with sequences, whether one likes the topic or not. As there can be nothing
> philosophically new in the explanation of how the DNA works, the only subject
> that needs investigation is, why one has such a reticence to deal with
> places, priorities, rankings, order, first and last becoming last and first,
> etc. Maybe the door to the edifice of insights on how the interplay between
> mixtures and sequences actually works and what this interplay produces; maybe
> this door opens from a well-barricaded corridor within the cellar of the
> sub-conscious, hidden among some skeletons of {to have sunken low, defeats of
> self-esteem, to have been downgraded, to be among the last, to be a
> low-ranking individual, etc.}. One of the techniques of influencing people
> with low self-esteem is to encourage them to find the discipline in which
> they are really good. In how many ways can a person be classified and how
> many of these ranking results are contradictory? Is the concept of cognitive
> dissonance linked to the similarity of two orders? Number theory should jump
> onto the subject of intermediate states between two differing permutations,
> as it is intimately connected with the subject of how DNA functions. Which
> names fit best the patterns we observe while doing manifold re-orderings is
> presently of a secondary importance. Of primary importance is presently to
> observe, what happens if a sequence is turned into a different sequence.
> After all, we deal with sequences, don’t we.
>
>
>
> 2018-02-10 16:24 GMT+01:00 Stanley N Salthe <ssal...@binghamton.edu
> mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu >:
>
> > >
> > Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights
> > hierarchically, as:
> >
> > In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained
> > in other ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus
> > (using the compositional hierarchy):
> >
> > [information [language [signal]]]
> >
> > Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be
> > understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs.
> >
> > (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s
> > ‘sign’, where:
> >
> > [sign [information [...]]] )
> >
> > Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):
> >
> > {language {signal {information}}}
> >
> > Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic
> > formations, so that, even though it is an extremely broad category,
> > information (informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed
> > transformations.
> >
> > STAN
> >
> >
> > On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn
> > mailto:y...@pku.edu.cn > wrote:
> >
> > > > > Dear Colleagues,
> > >
> > > I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which
> > > Gordana recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In
> > > combination with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell
> > > language and human language, I have the following learning feelings to
> > > share with everyone:
> > >
> > > In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have
> > > evolved multiple languages for communicating within and between species.
> > > Intra- and interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to
> > > coordinate various biological activities in order to behave like
> > > multicellular organisms. Such as AI-2, it is a general language that
> > > bacteria use for intergenera signaling.
> > >
> > > I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author
> > > use the concept information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or
> > > signaling) 55 times, so we have to review the history and application of
> > > “information” and “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for
> > > us to understand the relationship between language, signal, and
> > > information.
> > >
> > > The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal
> > > transduction) can be traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980,
> > > biochemist and endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article
> > > titled: “The Role of Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in
> > > Membrane Transduction" in Nature, in this paper he used the "signal
> > > transduction" first time. Since then, the research on signal transduction
> > > is popular in biology and biochemistry.
> > >
> > > As for any information transmission system, if we pay more
> > > attention to its transmission carrier instead of its transmission
> > > content, we are used to employing "signal transmission" instead of
> > > "signal transduction". From the tradition of the early use of information
> > > concept, the signal transduction study of cells is only equivalent to the
> > > level of telecommunications before 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of
> > > Shannon's information theory, the central issue of telecommunications is
> > > "signal" rather than "information". After that, the central issue of
> > > telecommunications is "information" rather than "signal".
> > >
> > > According to the application history of information concept,
> > > nearly all the essential problems behind the concepts of communication,
> > > messenger, signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the
> > > language problem what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to
> > > analyze the information.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:
> > >
> > > 1. Do Plants Think? (June 5, 2012, Scientific American)
> > >
> > >
> > > (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b
> > >
> > > http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b
> > > ）
> > >
> > > 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn (December 3, 2014, New
> > > Scientist)
> > >
> > >
> > > (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn
> > >
> > > http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn
> > > )
> > >
> > > From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics
> > > can exists.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Best wishes,
> > >
> > > Xueshan
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
> > > mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
> > > mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es ] On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji
> > > Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
> > > To: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com
> > > mailto:13francesco.ri...@gmail.com >; Terrence W. DEACON
> > > <dea...@berkeley.edu mailto:dea...@berkeley.edu >
> > > Cc: Fis, <fis@listas.unizar.es mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es >
> > > Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of
> > > information based on the cateogry theory
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi Terry, and FISers,
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical)
> > > knife that, in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong
> > > hand, can kill?
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > All the best.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Sung
> > >
> > >
> > > ---------------------------------------------
> > >
> > > From: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com
> > > mailto:13francesco.ri...@gmail.com >
> > > Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
> > > To: Terrence W. DEACON
> > > Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji
> > > Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of
> > > information based on the cateogry theory
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
> > >
> > > è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of
> > > information è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e
> > > seguita da un sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando
> > > si ha un processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non
> > > significa necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un
> > > Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra
> > > macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal
> > > caso non si ha significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di
> > > informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è
> > > necessario che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza
> > > di un processo di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una
> > > costruzione semiotica autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di
> > > comunicazione che l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra
> > > esseri umani -- o tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente,
> > > sia meccanico che biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione
> > > come propria o specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere
> > > una semiotica della significazione indipendente da una semiotica della
> > > comunicazione; ma è impossibile stabilire una semiotica della
> > > comunicazione indipendente da una semiotica della significazione.
> > >
> > > Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo
> > > 10. Umberto Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento
> > > della scienza economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La
> > > scienza dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano,
> > > 1997). Nello mio stesso libro si trovano:
> > >
> > > - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp.
> > > 327-361) che si colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i
> > > sistemi di significazione e i processi di comunicazione;
> > >
> > > - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean
> > > Piaget e la neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una
> > > nuova epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp.
> > > 120-130).
> > >
> > > Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta
> > > il mio scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il
> > > dono che mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto
> > > più grande del (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie.
> > >
> > > Un saluto affettuoso.
> > >
> > > Francecso
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > 2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON
> > > <dea...@berkeley.edu mailto:dea...@berkeley.edu >:
> > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > Dear FISers,
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > In previous posts I have disparaged using language as
> > > > the base model for building a general theory of information.
> > > >
> > > > Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical,
> > > > it is not a claim that all those who use linguistic analogies are
> > > > wrong, only that it can be causally misleading.
> > > >
> > > > I came to this view decades back in my research into
> > > > the neurology and evolution of the human language capacity.
> > > >
> > > > And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The
> > > > Symbolic Species.
> > > >
> > > > Early in the book I describe what I (and now other
> > > > evolutionary biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy"
> > > > in evolutionary thinking.
> > > >
> > > > Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary
> > > > taxonomizing tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and
> > > > information theoretic thinking as well.
> > > >
> > > > So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for
> > > > quoting myself) I append the following excerpt from the book.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > "But there is a serious problem with using language as
> > > > the model for analyzing other
> > > >
> > > > species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to
> > > > treat every other form of communication as
> > > >
> > > > exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional
> > > > and divergent case. No analytic method
> > > >
> > > > could be more perverse. Social communication has been
> > > > around for as long as animals have
> > > >
> > > > interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication
> > > > has been around at least as long as frogs
> > > >
> > > > have croaked out their mating calls in the night air.
> > > > Linguistic communication was an afterthought,
> > > >
> > > > so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic
> > > > deviation from an ancient and well-established
> > > >
> > > > mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an
> > > > appropriate model against which to assess
> > > >
> > > > other forms of communication. It is the rare exception,
> > > > not the rule, and a quite anomalous
> > > >
> > > > exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’
> > > > wings with respect to the extent they possess or
> > > >
> > > > lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like
> > > > analyzing the types of hair on different mammals
> > > >
> > > > with respect to their degree of resemblance to
> > > > porcupine quills. It is an understandable
> > > >
> > > > anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or
> > > > porcupines we might see more typical wings
> > > >
> > > > and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more
> > > > advanced adaptations—but it does more to
> > > >
> > > > obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived
> > > > characteristic and so should be analyzed as an
> > > >
> > > > exception to a more general rule, not vice versa."
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms.
> > > >
> > > > This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is
> > > > supported by a vast nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure.
> > > >
> > > > So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated
> > > > more fundamental precursors.
> > > >
> > > > And our familiarity with language will naturally lead
> > > > us to draw insight from this more familiar realm.
> > > >
> > > > I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean
> > > > model that assumes what it endeavors to explain.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Regards to all, Terry
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco
> > > > Rivero <javierwe...@gmail.com mailto:javierwe...@gmail.com > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > In principle I agree with Terry. I have been
> > > > > thinking of this, though I am still not able to make a sound
> > > > > formulation of the idea. Still I am afraid that if I miss the chance
> > > > > to make at least a brief formulation of it I will lose the
> > > > > opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it comes:
> > > > >
> > > > > I have been thinking that a proper way to
> > > > > distinguish the contexts in which the concept of information acquires
> > > > > a fixed meaning or the many contexts on which information can be
> > > > > somehow observed, is to make use of the distinction between medium
> > > > > and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. Baecker and E. Esposito. I
> > > > > have already expressed my opinion in this group that what information
> > > > > is depends on the system we are talking about. But the concept of
> > > > > medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has many
> > > > > sources and types of information.
> > > > > So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be
> > > > > broadly defined as a set of loosely coupled elements. No matter what
> > > > > they are. While a Form is a temporary fixed coupling of a limited
> > > > > configuration of those elements. Accordingly, we can be talking about
> > > > > DNA sequences which are selected by RNA to form proteins or to codify
> > > > > a especific instruction to a determinate cell. We can think of atoms
> > > > > forming a specific kind of matter and a specific kind of molecular
> > > > > structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or a set of linguistic
> > > > > conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or discourse.
> > > > > The idea is that the medium conditions what can
> > > > > be treated as information. Or even better, each type of medium
> > > > > produces information of its own kind.
> > > > > According to this point of view, information
> > > > > cannot be transmitted. It can only be produced and "interpreted" out
> > > > > of the specific difference that a medium begets between itself and
> > > > > the forms that take shape from it. A medium can only be a source of
> > > > > noise to other mediums. Still, media can couple among them. This
> > > > > means that media can selforganize in a synergetic manner, where they
> > > > > depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions. And this also
> > > > > mean that they do this by translating noise into information. For
> > > > > instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to
> > > > > print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication.
> > > > > Let us say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make
> > > > > when talking cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way,
> > > > > all the social practices and habits made by handwriting were
> > > > > distorted by the introduction of print. From a technical point of
> > > > > view you can codify the same message orally, by writing and by print.
> > > > > Still information and meaning are not the same. You can tell your
> > > > > girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to face where the
> > > > > lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if the other is
> > > > > nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and what
> > > > > that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is
> > > > > being sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special
> > > > > place, so he planned it, and so on) take a very singular and
> > > > > untranslatable configuration. If you write a letter you just can say
> > > > > "I love you". You shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved
> > > > > would read it alone in her room and she would have to imagine
> > > > > everything you say. And imagination makes information and meaning to
> > > > > articulate quite differently as in oral communication. It is not the
> > > > > same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and send it to her. Maybe
> > > > > you compensate the simplicity of your message by adding some
> > > > > chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what he
> > > > > bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social
> > > > > sciences because that is my research field, although I have the
> > > > > intuition that it could also work for natural sciences.
> > > > >
> > > > > Best,
> > > > >
> > > > > JJ
> > > > >
> > > > > El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji"
> > > > > <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu mailto:s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu >
> > > > > escribió:
> > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > Hi FISers,
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > " So basically, I am advocating an effort
> > > > > > to broaden our discussions and recognize that the term information
> > > > > > applies in diverse ways to many different contexts. And because of
> > > > > > this it is important to indicate the framing, whether physical,
> > > > > > formal, biological, phenomenological, linguistic, etc.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > . . . . . . The classic
> > > > > > syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction introduced by Charles
> > > > > > Morris has often been cited in this respect, though it too is in my
> > > > > > opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be
> > > > > > misleading when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel,
> > > > > > less linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of
> > > > > > making the division: i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and
> > > > > > normative analyses/properties of information."
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I agree with Terry's concern about the
> > > > > > often overused linguistic metaphor in defining "information".
> > > > > > Although the linguistic metaphor has its limitations (as all
> > > > > > metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique advantage as well,
> > > > > > for example, its well-established categories of functions (see the
> > > > > > last column in Table 1.)
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The main purpose of this post is to suggest
> > > > > > that all the varied theories of information discussed on this list
> > > > > > may be viewed as belonging to the same category of ITR (Irreducible
> > > > > > Triadic Relation) diagrammatically represented as the 3-node closed
> > > > > > network in the first column of Table 1.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Table 1. The postulated universality of
> > > > > > ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) as manifested in information
> > > > > > theory, semiotics, cell language theory, and linguistics.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Category Theory
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > f g
> > > > > > A -----> B ------> C
> > > > > > | ^
> > > > > > | |
> > > > > > |______________|
> > > > > > h
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Deacon’s theory of information
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Shannon’s
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Theory of
> > > > > >
> > > > > > information
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Peirce’s theory of signs
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Cell language theory
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Human language
> > > > > > (Function)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > A
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Intrinsic information
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Source
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Object
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Nucleotides*/
> > > > > > Amion acids
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Letters
> > > > > > (Building blocks)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > B
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Referential information
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Message
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Sign
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Proteins
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Words
> > > > > > (Denotation)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > C
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Normative information
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Receiver
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Interpretant
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Metabolomes
> > > > > > (Totality of cell metabolism)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Systems of words
> > > > > > (Decision making & Reasoning)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > f
> > > > > >
> > > > > > ?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Encoding
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Sign production
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Physical laws
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Second articulation
> > > > > >
> > > > > > g
> > > > > >
> > > > > > ?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Decoding
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Sign interpretation
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Evoutionary selection
> > > > > >
> > > > > > First and Third articulation
> > > > > >
> > > > > > h
> > > > > >
> > > > > > ?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Information flow
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Information flow
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Inheritance
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Grounding/
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Habit
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Scale
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Micro-Macro?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Macro
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Macro
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Micro
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Macro
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > *There may be more than one genetic
> > > > > > alphabet of 4 nucleotides. According to the "multiple genetic
> > > > > > alphabet hypothesis', there are n genetic alphabets, each
> > > > > > consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn consisting of n
> > > > > > nucleotides. In this view, the classical genetic alphabet is just
> > > > > > one example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1. When n =
> > > > > > 3, for example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet
> > > > > > with 4^3 = 64 letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting
> > > > > > in the familiar codon table. Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not
> > > > > > words as widely thought (including myself until recently) but
> > > > > > letters! It then follows that proteins are words and metabolic
> > > > > > pathways are sentences. Finally, the transient network of metbolic
> > > > > > pathways (referred to as "hyperstructures" by V. Norris in 1999 and
> > > > > > as "hypermetabolic pathways" by me more recently) correspond to
> > > > > > texts essential to represent arguement/reasoning/computing. What
> > > > > > is most exciting is the recent discovery in my lab at Rutgers that
> > > > > > the so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of mRNA levels in living cells
> > > > > > can identify function-dependent "hypermetabolic pathways"
> > > > > > underlying breast cancer before and after drug treatment
> > > > > > (manuscript under review).
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Any comments, questions, or suggestions
> > > > > > would be welcome.
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Sung
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > _______________________________________________
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> > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > >
> > > > Professor Terrence W. Deacon
> > > > University of California, Berkeley
> > > >
> > > >
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Arturo Tozzi
AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
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