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Rakesh Bhandari wrote: For example, I don't see what's alarmist about saying that the power vacuum in Afghanistan would lead to proxy warfare by Iran, China, India and Pakistan and that a Taliban/ISI victory in its own "backyard" would be devastating for the Afghanis, and it would likely have horrible effects on the politics of Pakistan and the political development of India's Muslims....And who is shedding tears about the use of force against al Qaeda? Marxists? Really? 1) But they are not going after Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is in Pakistan, Yemen, Europe.The USA wants to secure Afghanistan for a natural gas pipeline, and maintain bases there to keep an eye on China and Russia. BTW, the troops are going into Helmand province. Is Al Qaeda in Helmand? No, but heroin is. That's another lucrative pipeline. If the strategy is to secure and cut off the Taliban's cash cow, that too will fail. The Taliban have stockpiled 8,000 tons of heroin. I bet that's more than the Karzai regime controls, not to mention the CIA. 2) Afghanistan already has a power vacuum, and has had one for quite some time. Using your own logic, 30k troops simply is not enough. And as the Escobar editorial indicates, according to US counterinsurgency doctrine, you would need 10 to 20 times as many troops to fight an effective counterinsurgency campaign there. The policy is doomed to fail. A real surge would insert 300k troops into the area, and since we're broke, that ain't gonna happen. 3) BTW, a Taliban-- ISI victory? You need to prove the Taliban is actually controlled by the ISI. To say this information is outdated is an understatement. Of course the ISI is not arguing for a big victory against the Taliban. Because they know such an argument is not serious. The US doesn't have the political will to obliterate the Taliban, which is what it would take, argues the ISI, so better if they work out a power-sharing agreement. Besides, the current Pakistani military offensive into southern Waziristan is already a flop, because it was never a serious effort to begin with. It's all a show for US dollars: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/6423710/Pakistan-armys-South-Waziristan-battle-fails-to-win-hearts-and-minds-of-tribesmen.html Then there is this: http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/09/29/the_view_from_pakistans_spies_97216.html "The ISI leadership thinks the United States can't afford to lose in Afghanistan, and it worries about a security vacuum there that would endanger Pakistan. But at the same time, the ISI fears that a big military surge, like the up to 40,000 additional troops McChrystal wants, could be counterproductive. ISI officials believe Washington should be realistic about its war objectives. If victory is defined as obliteration of the Taliban, the United States will never win. But the United States can achieve the more limited aim of rough political stability, if it is patient. In the ISI's view, America makes a mistake in thinking it must solve every problem on its own. In Afghanistan, it should work with President Hamid Karzai, who, for all his imperfections, has one essential quality that American strategists lack -- he's an Afghan. ISI officials suggest that Karzai should capitalize on the post-election ferment by calling for a cease-fire so that he can form a broadly based government that includes some Taliban representatives. ISI officials say they want to help America with political reconciliation in Afghanistan. But they argue that to achieve this goal, the U.S. must change its posture -- moving from "ruler mode" to "support mode" -- so that Afghan voices can be heard. The American suspicion that the ISI is withholding information about the Taliban, or is otherwise "hedging its bets," makes ISI leaders visibly angry. Pakistanis have the most to lose from a Taliban victory in Kabul, they argue, because it would inevitably strengthen the Taliban in Pakistan, too. A Pakistani version of Mohammad Omar is anathema to them, the ISI leaders say. As for American allegations that the ISI maintains direct links with Siraj Haqqani, a key ally of the Taliban, the ISI officials insist it isn't so. They do have a network of agents within the insurgent groups and tribes, but that's part of a spy agency's job. America's suspicion that Pakistan secretly pulls the Taliban's strings is many years out of date, they contend. One ISI analyst loudly calls my name at the end of a briefing and then recites a summary of Pakistani casualties since Sept. 11, 2001, from terrorism. The list totals 5,362 dead and 10,483 wounded. "Trust us," says another ISI official, referring to this casualty toll. "Do not interfere in a way that infringes on our sovereignty and makes us look bad in the eyes of the public." Talking with ISI leaders, I am reminded of something you see around the world these days. People want to help America more than we sometimes think. But they want to be treated with respect -- as full partners, not as useful CIA assets. Trust is always a conditional word when you are talking about intelligence activities, which are built around deception. But in this case, where America and Pakistan share common interests, the opportunities are real." http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/06/feingold-why-surge-where_n_381729.html One of the fiercest critics of the proposed surge of U.S. forces in Afghanistan warned on Sunday that the policy would distract America from the pursuit of global al Qaeda networks. During an appearance on ABC's "This Week" with George Stephanopoulos, Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wisc.) demanded that one question be answered when considering the implementation of the president's surge policy: Why send troops where al Qaeda isn't? Pakistan, in the border region near Afghanistan, is perhaps the epicenter [of global terrorism], although al Qaida is operating all over the world, in Yemen, in Somalia, in northern Africa, affiliates in Southeast Asia. Why would we build up 100,000 or more troops in parts of Afghanistan included that are not even near the border? You know, this buildup is in Helmand Province. That's not next door to Waziristan. So I'm wondering, what exactly is this strategy, given the fact that we have seen that there is a minimal presence of Al Qaida in Afghanistan, but a significant presence in Pakistan? It just defies common sense that a huge boots on the ground presence in a place where these people are not is the right strategy. It doesn't make any sense to me. The remarks by Feingold echoed earlier skepticism of an extended U.S. surge in Afghanistan offered by Vice President Joseph Biden, weeks before the policy was announced. And, as if to drive the point home further, they were delivered on the same morning that The Los Angeles Times published a story with a Sana, Yemen dateline, reporting that the growing al Qaeda presence within the country may end up toppling the government. "Al Qaeda in the past focused on bombings and suicide attacks, but now it is also able to target security forces," said Saeed Ali O. Jemhi, an expert on terrorist groups in Yemen. "They have sympathizers and agents within the Yemeni security and intelligence forces. Al Qaeda is in a renewing stage, and its aim is to spread an Islamic caliphate across the Arabian Peninsula." Feingold's concerns weren't merely that President Obama was taking his eye off al Qaeda at a time when the terrorist organization was resurgent. The Wisconsin Democrat also warned that U.S. policy in Afghanistan could actually push terrorists and extremists into Pakistan and, as a consequence, further destabilize the region. "You know, I asked the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, and Mr. Holbrooke, our envoy over there, a while ago, you know, is there a risk that if we build up troops in Afghanistan, that will push more extremists into Pakistan?" he told ABC. "They couldn't deny it, and this week, Prime Minister Gilani of Pakistan specifically said that his concern about the buildup is that it will drive more extremists into Pakistan, so I think it's just the opposite, that this boots-on-the-ground approach alienates the Afghan population and specifically encourages the Taliban to further coalesce with Al Qaida, which is the complete opposite of our national security interest." This seems to mirror the ISI argument against the pseudo-surge. Greg ________________________________________________ Send list submissions to: Marxism@lists.econ.utah.edu Set your options at: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
