Hi Bo --


> It is difficult discussing the MOQ if its basics aren't agreed on
> and the MOQ's basic "act" is to relegate all these Aristotelian
> categories - among them "ontology" - to its own static intellectual
> - level and after that to apply intellect to the MOQ is like
> applying the ancient Greek Physics to Quantum Theory.

Indeed, this is what I confront by even raising a question about the MoQ. 
When I mention the subject's relation to an object, right way you assume I'm 
talking about an "intellectual level" (which I don't recognize).  If Pirsig 
didn't think that intellection was a subjective function, he would have had 
no need to distinguish the "pre-intellectual" from the intellectual.

But can we work on what we agree on?

> SOM or intellect is always a subject/object relationship.

SOM is a metaphysical dualism that relates the subject (awareness) to its 
object (things).  What part of S/O are you equating with "intellect"?   All 
we have is a relationship which may be considered valuistic.  I see no need 
for intellect until we get to experience.  THEN I see the intellect working 
on value-sensibility to produce finite objects.  That's why I say that the 
intellect (mind) is the cognitive faculty of proprietary awareness.

> Well, here we go. This may look self-evident to you, but is
> Aristotle's echoing down through history and a bootstrap operation
> is needed to lift oneself out of SOM and on to the MOQ where a
> conscious subject (and its intellect) is NOT the starting point (self-
> evident), rather (as said the) MOQ's own static intellectual level.

Before you paint me as an Aristotelian, I should warn you that Essentialism 
is an idealistic philosophy, and it may surprise you to know that I consider 
Aristotle a materialist.  Moreover, my ontological "starting point" is not 
consciousness or subjective awareness divided from "being" but the undivided 
Source of this dichotomy.

[Ham previously]:
> That leaves the "objects" of awareness and the "value" they hold for us
> unaccounted for, except as they are defined by the laws of
> cause-and-effect and biological evolution.

[Bo]:
> Right, from SOM or Intellect seen the world becomes "objects of
> awareness" - mind only - if you are an idealist. If you are a
> materialist awareness is a mere by-product of biological brain
> and nothing of the former makes sense.

That isn't quite right for the idealist.  Objects are phenomena created by 
the mind, but they are not "mind only"; that is, "mind" is not their 
essence.  Objects are conscious images that represent the value of the 
source (Essence) to the subject.  The conscious subject makes being aware by 
extracting (differentiating) Value for itself.

> As said a million times a Metaphysics of Awareness is possible,
> but if its layout is similar to the MOQ with differentiated awareness
> equal to the levels nothing is gained.

A Metaphysics of Awareness would be a monism, just as the MoQ claims to be. 
Essentialism is a monism in that Essence is unified, but it supports a 
dichotomy (mutually dependent contingency) which amounts to a reduced 
perspective of Essence by a sentient agent that is "out of the loop".

[Ham, previously]:
> What struck me was [your] phrase: "the Value of the S/O divide."
> I don't see value as particularly intellectual, nor is intellect 
> necessarily
> a value (in the Pirsigian sense),

[Bo]:
> You don't see value as intellectual, and that's right: Intellect is
> supposed to be seen as value.

OK.  Here's where begin to disagree.  It is "valuable" that we are 
intellectual creatures, just as it is valuable that we are linguistic 
creatures.  The ability to think and communicate has social and cultural 
value.  But "intellection" is not sensible awareness which is man's primary 
source of value.  It's the manipulation of facts and data to form concepts 
and ideas.  In fact, the dictionary defines "intellectual" as "reasoning 
...guided by the intellect rather than by emotion or experience."   Since 
the S/O divide is the primary existential relationship, and it is the 
realization of the subjective self that it is estranged from its Essence 
(being), Value defines the nature of the relationship.  Why can't we say 
that Value IS the subject-object relationship?

[Bo]:
> Here you are back at square one with SOM your starting point.
> You want to be nice and call it "value", but it's just decoration, it's
> old SOM underneath.

You underestimate my meaning of Value.  It's hardly just a decoration.  It 
holds everything in existence together and is the basic substrate of objects 
and events.  The power of Value is great enough to overcome the power of 
negation which splits sensibility from Essence.

[Bo]:
> Quality was Pirsig's starting point - after that came the MOQ - but
> the DQ/SQ combines Quality with its two aspects, thus the MOQ
> becomes the new starting point (ontology) instead of being
> something that belongs to the Aristotelian kind of metaphysics.
>
> By this I mean that Aristotle instigated SOM and in it
> metaphysics belongs to the subjective realm while the reality that
> it's about belongs to the objective. By saying that Quality is reality
> and the the MOQ a (mere) metaphysics he made the MOQ a
> SOM sub-set.
>
> I see the DQ/SQ dualism as the ontological starting point, no
> Quality=DQ/SQ. Compare with SOM which isn't any
> Reality=Subjective Reality/Objective/Reality, but mere S/O.

Three questions:
1. How do you see Pirsig's ontology as separate from his Quality thesis?
2. Does it disappoint you that he has sided with idealism instead of 
following Aristotle's objective scheme of things?
3. Why do you consider my suggestion that Value is the essence of S/O 
existence "hilarious"?

> I'm already past all reasonable post lengths, but this is hilarious:
> In fact Pirsig DID just that once by calling the SOM a "quality
> metaphysics" splitting value the subject/object way. Something
> that fits the intellectual level but it does not aspire to a
> metaphysics. As SOM it's self-contradictory.

But we DO split value "the subject/object way" when we differentiate 
existents.  Quality can not stand by itself; it presupposes an objective 
referent.  What would make this concept aspire to a metaphysics would be to 
base it on a primary source from which Value, Selfness and Otherness are 
derived.

[Bo]:
> I thank you for trying, but because you start with the very
> premises that the MOQ is a revolt against it won't work.

You may be right--if my thesis is "a revolt" against everything the MOQ 
stands for.  I don't see it in such black and white terms, but then, I'm 
probably not the best judge of what principles I'm violating.
But I'm still having trouble understanding precisely what your grievance 
with the MoQ is.  I can see that you've worked it out in your head, but it's 
not coming through to us.  (I suffer from a similar communications gap.)  If 
you feel that continuing this discussion would be futile, I won't pressure 
you.to do so.

Thanks, Bo.

Ham


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