Hi Redsky235,
You said:
In ZMM, Pirsig uses realism to "prove" that Quality exists. Regardless or not
if you subscribe to that theory, the line of logic he uses seems somewhat
questionable. In claiming to remove "Quality" from the world, he isn't
removing Quality per se, but rather removing differences between objects. By
removing the distinction between fine art and a blank wall, he isn't removing
a definitive aesthetic judgment, but rather our ability to perceive a
difference between two scenarios.
Matt:
I think you've picked up on a subtle point I only became attuned to later on in
my thinking about Pirsig. I think it is important to emphasize it: in Pirsig's
philosophy, Quality is synonymous with the making of distinctions, in any kind
of distinguishing. In other words, the functioning of the "analytic knife"
from the beginning of ZMM is a direct function of there actually existing
Quality. (He brings up this point again in Lila when he talks about babies and
differentiation.)
This isn't a "proof," however, not in the sense of single argument on the basis
of which a conclusion stands or falls (much like Descartes wanted to argue for
the existence of God, the world and much else on the basis of "Cogito, Ergo
Sum"). Pirsig's just trying to point out how commonsensical the existence of
what he's talking about is. It's a beginning point. His more controversial
points require different arguments. That argument is a softening up move
before the more interesting stuff about Plato.
You said later:
Is it well built/Does it have good foundation? Well, that's purely
subjective. We "know" what Quality is? Someone out there prefers the blank
wall. Someone prefers PIL to Beethoven. Is there a definitive answer to
someone who's wondering if PIL or Beethoven has more Quality? You can remove
the notes, making them sound the same to the observers, but would that be
Quality?
Matt:
Pirsig's softening up move is to make us realize that Quality is basically the
same thing as differentiation, but there is more to it. I have a lot of
difficulty also with Pirsig's assertion that we already know what Quality is,
but I'm not sure if he isn't saying that we already know how to identify
Quality, we already know how to distinguish higher from lower value because
doing so is _the_ basic feature of living life.
You repeated rhetorically Khaled's examples of how we
know the wall has Quality, which were in the form of questions. "Is it
well built?" Yes or no, you'd have to distinguish between good and
bad, less and better walls in the way of them being built. You repeat
the questions, and reply, "Well, that's purely subjective." Pirsig is intent
on alleviating the pejorative sense to your rejoinder. Sure, answering yes or
no is made by a subject, a person, and therefore subjective. But what of it?
If you are looking for definitive answers to _any_ question, let alone
traditional aesthetic questions, you are looking in the wrong place if you are
looking some place other than what you yourself think. That's Pirsig's point.
It is a philosophical individualism that begins with each person. Granted, it
doesn't end there, which I don't think Pirsig emphasizes enough in ZMM, but it
has to begin there. Plato thought we needed to take it out of individuals'
hands, that we needed to refute Protagoras by showing that there was something
that wasn't at _all_ associated with what any particular individual thought.
Pirsig's point is that life begins through our eyes, the eyes of the beholder
of the world. There's no proof for Quality because Pirsig's "Quality" is the
staging point for a redescription of how people come to the world. Pirsig uses
a number of rhetorical tactics and strategies to enunciate his philosophy, to
undermine certain prevalent views of how the world works. It is important to
question his various arguments, the various means with which he moves his
vision forward, and I think you're grappling well with one of them. But I also
think you're going at it in the wrong direction, which is in looking for a
proof. Granted Pirsig's the one that brought it up, but while the first
question might be, "Is his argument successful and on what grounds?" the second
and more important question, given his revaluation of the relationship of
dialectic to rhetoric, might be, "Why would Pirsig forward this argument the
way he did?"
You said further:
To clarify my point: if we like certain things more because we recognize more
Quality in them, i.e., because our experiences help us relate to these
objects, then why do art connoisseurs differentiate between what's "good" and
what they "like?" For example, a critic might concede that, when it's all
said and done, "War and Peace" is the superior text, but what the heck, he
likes that mainstream Dan Brown book more. If he doesn't personally find
"Quality" in "War and Peace," he should dismiss it outright, but he doesn't.
He finds something in there that he doesn't relate to, so it's not a favorite,
but he appreciates its "value." On the other hand, a casual reader might say,
"War and Peace" bores me, so I don't like it. It's not good." How do you
reconcile this? Is the critic's opinion more valid simply because he knows
more about literature?
But say there is no such thing as Quality (we're leaving the question of
existence and reality aside for the time being). The critic and casual reader
will still appreciate their favored texts for the same reasons, namely, that
they like the texts. They can identify with the books. However, the critic
admires the historical importance of the Tolstoy book. He can point out the
precise form it's written in and he can analyze the manner in which the author
utilizes his language. He will then conclude that, based on these (arbitrary)
literary criteria, that it is, in fact, the superior tome. This has nothing
to do with any objective "quality," only the objective criteria set down by
the literary world.
Matt:
Right, the objective criteria set down by the literary world, which is what a
community of individuals agree to. Pirsig is eliminating the pernicious
subjective/objective distinction in order to undermine the notion of "these
(arbitrary) literary criteria" so that we can instead see any sort of criteria
that might be set forth by a community as set forth by individuals, though none
the worse for it because _anything_ set forth is set forth by _somebody_, every
view the product of the far end of the movement of an individual's brandishment
of the "analytic knife."
Pirsig has a deep distaste for critics, but his refurbishment of the
philosophical playing field does allow a reconciliation of "like" and "good" as
you opposed them. Pirsig would certainly object to the notion that a critic's
opinion is more "valid," but that does not destory the notion of authority
derived by communal attention, for instance the authority granted to
specialists, like physicists. With art, more people have the chance to be
specialists (unlike physics, where people are less likely to have a chance with
an electron machine). But that still doesn't mean we can't allow for different
ways to appreciate a text. Some literary critics (not all, only the worst--who
are the source of Pirsig's distaste) may think that their way is the only way,
but that view is as bad as Plato's.
We can distinguish between liking a text and thinking it good. But doing so
will be one more view set forth by an individual. For instance, Harold Bloom
has done so on occasion to enunciate why he doesn't enjoy one particular poet
but isn't about deny the poet's place in the Western canon. All we have to do
to get a distinction like that is to distinguish liking a text for highly
idiosyncratic reasons and placing it in high esteem because of its originality.
You are right that, in the argument you are concentrating on, the form (and
success) is similar to Spinoza's view of God: if we take God to be coextensive
with existence itself, then yeah, God must exist because existence exists. But
what kind of argument is that? It's not, but we should instead wonder why
Pirsig would make it. The pernicious view that he is trying to surmount is
that there are objective criteria or things or whatever that exist outside of
what anybody thinks of them, which then sets as pejorative anything that _does_
have to rest on what people think of them--things like aesthetic judgments.
Pirsig's trying to help us reconceive our view by showing how judgments sit at
the very bottom of things.
Matt
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