Matt (Kundert)
wrote on 1 Dec. (to Redsky235)
> Matt:
> I think you've picked up on a subtle point I only became attuned to
> later on in my thinking about Pirsig. I think it is important to
> emphasize it: in Pirsig's philosophy, Quality is synonymous with the
> making of distinctions, in any kind of distinguishing. In other
> words, the functioning of the "analytic knife" from the beginning of
> ZMM is a direct function of there actually existing Quality. (He
> brings up this point again in Lila when he talks about babies and
> differentiation.)
I agree with the "making of distinctions" point, which is why I years ago
said that Charles Peirces's "Semiotic Metaphysics" is the only one that
can remotely be compared to the MOQ ... in its early ZAMM "trinity"
phase that is. But since then the Dynamic/Static dualism plus the static
levels have been introduced, thus the distinction (experience) of
values always takes place at a level and the said "analytic knife" is the
subject/object value - intellect in my "book" - ZAMM says so (p.231 in
my Corgi Paperback)
"The knife of subjectivity and objectivity had cut Quality in two
and killed it as a working concept. if he was going to save it, he
could not let that knife get it."
That this in principle is a result of Quality being the only distinguishable
element is plain (an "knife" on all levels) but it not the "analytic knife"
from ZAMM.
I know you no longer speak to me but all the same.
Bo
(Quality/Subject & Object). Pirsig's argument that only a
thing/phenomenon different from background exists and that value is
other can be disninguished and that as value is the same as this being
a "sign" of difference. Thus sign=significance= value holds true and
Peirce developed his version of the said tinity. But the later
development of the MOQ that entailed the enlargement of the initial
"subjects and objects" part of the equation to the whole static hierarchy
made the analytic knife spoken of in ZAM the S/O value or the static
intellectual value INTELLECTUAL value - nam, the S/O value (ZAMM
page ) what ought to have become the 4th. level in LILA,
buta alas. became the , but not Quality
>
> This isn't a "proof," however, not in the sense of single argument on
> the basis of which a conclusion stands or falls (much like Descartes
> wanted to argue for the existence of God, the world and much else on
> the basis of "Cogito, Ergo Sum"). Pirsig's just trying to point out
> how commonsensical the existence of what he's talking about is. It's
> a beginning point. His more controversial points require different
> arguments. That argument is a softening up move before the more
> interesting stuff about Plato.
>
> You said later:
> Is it well built/Does it have good foundation? Well, that's purely
> subjective. We "know" what Quality is? Someone out there prefers
> the blank wall. Someone prefers PIL to Beethoven. Is there a
> definitive answer to someone who's wondering if PIL or Beethoven has
> more Quality? You can remove the notes, making them sound the same
> to the observers, but would that be Quality?
>
> Matt:
> Pirsig's softening up move is to make us realize that Quality is
> basically the same thing as differentiation, but there is more to it.
> I have a lot of difficulty also with Pirsig's assertion that we
> already know what Quality is, but I'm not sure if he isn't saying that
> we already know how to identify Quality, we already know how to
> distinguish higher from lower value because doing so is _the_ basic
> feature of living life.
>
> You repeated rhetorically Khaled's examples of how we
> know the wall has Quality, which were in the form of questions. "Is
> it well built?" Yes or no, you'd have to distinguish between good and
> bad, less and better walls in the way of them being built. You repeat
> the questions, and reply, "Well, that's purely subjective." Pirsig is
> intent on alleviating the pejorative sense to your rejoinder. Sure,
> answering yes or no is made by a subject, a person, and therefore
> subjective. But what of it?
>
> If you are looking for definitive answers to _any_ question, let alone
> traditional aesthetic questions, you are looking in the wrong place if
> you are looking some place other than what you yourself think. That's
> Pirsig's point. It is a philosophical individualism that begins with
> each person. Granted, it doesn't end there, which I don't think
> Pirsig emphasizes enough in ZMM, but it has to begin there. Plato
> thought we needed to take it out of individuals' hands, that we needed
> to refute Protagoras by showing that there was something that wasn't
> at _all_ associated with what any particular individual thought.
>
> Pirsig's point is that life begins through our eyes, the eyes of the
> beholder of the world. There's no proof for Quality because Pirsig's
> "Quality" is the staging point for a redescription of how people come
> to the world. Pirsig uses a number of rhetorical tactics and
> strategies to enunciate his philosophy, to undermine certain prevalent
> views of how the world works. It is important to question his various
> arguments, the various means with which he moves his vision forward,
> and I think you're grappling well with one of them. But I also think
> you're going at it in the wrong direction, which is in looking for a
> proof. Granted Pirsig's the one that brought it up, but while the
> first question might be, "Is his argument successful and on what
> grounds?" the second and more important question, given his
> revaluation of the relationship of dialectic to rhetoric, might be,
> "Why would Pirsig forward this argument the way he did?"
>
> You said further:
> To clarify my point: if we like certain things more because we
> recognize more Quality in them, i.e., because our experiences help us
> relate to these objects, then why do art connoisseurs differentiate
> between what's "good" and what they "like?" For example, a critic
> might concede that, when it's all said and done, "War and Peace" is
> the superior text, but what the heck, he likes that mainstream Dan
> Brown book more. If he doesn't personally find "Quality" in "War and
> Peace," he should dismiss it outright, but he doesn't. He finds
> something in there that he doesn't relate to, so it's not a favorite,
> but he appreciates its "value." On the other hand, a casual reader
> might say, "War and Peace" bores me, so I don't like it. It's not
> good." How do you reconcile this? Is the critic's opinion more
> valid simply because he knows more about literature?
>
> But say there is no such thing as Quality (we're leaving the question
> of existence and reality aside for the time being). The critic and
> casual reader will still appreciate their favored texts for the same
> reasons, namely, that they like the texts. They can identify with
> the books. However, the critic admires the historical importance of
> the Tolstoy book. He can point out the precise form it's written in
> and he can analyze the manner in which the author utilizes his
> language. He will then conclude that, based on these (arbitrary)
> literary criteria, that it is, in fact, the superior tome. This has
> nothing to do with any objective "quality," only the objective
> criteria set down by the literary world.
>
> Matt:
> Right, the objective criteria set down by the literary world, which is
> what a community of individuals agree to. Pirsig is eliminating the
> pernicious subjective/objective distinction in order to undermine the
> notion of "these (arbitrary) literary criteria" so that we can instead
> see any sort of criteria that might be set forth by a community as set
> forth by individuals, though none the worse for it because _anything_
> set forth is set forth by _somebody_, every view the product of the
> far end of the movement of an individual's brandishment of the
> "analytic knife."
>
> Pirsig has a deep distaste for critics, but his refurbishment of the
> philosophical playing field does allow a reconciliation of "like" and
> "good" as you opposed them. Pirsig would certainly object to the
> notion that a critic's opinion is more "valid," but that does not
> destory the notion of authority derived by communal attention, for
> instance the authority granted to specialists, like physicists. With
> art, more people have the chance to be specialists (unlike physics,
> where people are less likely to have a chance with an electron
> machine). But that still doesn't mean we can't allow for different
> ways to appreciate a text. Some literary critics (not all, only the
> worst--who are the source of Pirsig's distaste) may think that their
> way is the only way, but that view is as bad as Plato's.
>
> We can distinguish between liking a text and thinking it good. But
> doing so will be one more view set forth by an individual. For
> instance, Harold Bloom has done so on occasion to enunciate why he
> doesn't enjoy one particular poet but isn't about deny the poet's
> place in the Western canon. All we have to do to get a distinction
> like that is to distinguish liking a text for highly idiosyncratic
> reasons and placing it in high esteem because of its originality.
>
> You are right that, in the argument you are concentrating on, the form
> (and success) is similar to Spinoza's view of God: if we take God to
> be coextensive with existence itself, then yeah, God must exist
> because existence exists. But what kind of argument is that? It's
> not, but we should instead wonder why Pirsig would make it. The
> pernicious view that he is trying to surmount is that there are
> objective criteria or things or whatever that exist outside of what
> anybody thinks of them, which then sets as pejorative anything that
> _does_ have to rest on what people think of them--things like
> aesthetic judgments. Pirsig's trying to help us reconceive our view
> by showing how judgments sit at the very bottom of things.
>
> Matt
>
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